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This report presents new findings on the implementation and effectiveness 
of Britain’s Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration 
programme, which is being carefully evaluated though a large-scale randomised 
control trial. Launched in 2003, ERA was envisioned as a ‘next step’ in British 
welfare-to-work policies. ERA’s distinctive combination of post-employment 
advisory support and financial incentives was designed to help low-income 
individuals who entered work sustain employment and advance in the labour 
market. The programme was administered by Jobcentre Plus (which operates 
the nation’s main welfare-to-work programmes) in six regions of the UK: East 
Midlands, London, North East England, North West England, Scotland and Wales. 
Although the operational phase of this special demonstration project is now over, 
the evaluation will continue to follow study members’ work and benefit outcomes 
for several more years. 
The analysis presented here focuses on the experiences of lone parents (most 
of whom are mothers) within the first two years following their entry into the 
study. A separate companion report1 examines findings for long-term unemployed 
customers (most of whom are men). 
An earlier evaluation report published in 2007 showed that, despite the Jobcentre 
Plus districts’ early difficulties in operating the programme, ERA had a number 
of impressive positive effects on lone parents during the first year of follow-up. 
Across various types of people and places, it increased participants’ receipt of 
post-employment services and training, increased their likelihood of working full-
time, increased their likelihood of combining training and work, increased their 
average earnings and reduced their use of benefits. The new evidence presented 
here shows that this pattern of positive effects continued into the second year 
of follow-up. But while the programme has shown positive effects on several 
advancement-related outcomes (e.g. movement from part-time to full-time work 
1 See Miller et	al. (forthcoming, 2008).
2and participation in education and training), these improvements have not yet 
led to ‘better’ jobs, as indicated, for example, by higher wages and better fringe 
benefits.
It is still too soon to draw firm conclusions about ERA’s effectiveness. Advancement 
in work is a gradual process that can take several years to unfold. Furthermore, 
ERA customers had not completed their 33-month term of enrolment by the end 
of the second year of follow-up, most of them had not yet had an opportunity 
to take full advantage of the programme’s offer of at least two years of in-work 
guidance and incentives, and many had not yet completed their training activities. 
Consequently, the results reported here are necessarily of an interim nature. 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), working with Jobcentre Plus staff 
in each of the study districts, managed the overall implementation of ERA and is 
overseeing the evaluation. The study is being conducted by a research consortium 
that includes the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
the Office for National Statistics, and MDRC (a New York City-based research 
organisation experienced in conducting large-scale random assignment tests of 
new social policies). 
What is ERA?
ERA built on Britain’s New Deal welfare-to-work programme, which offers job 
placement help and other pre-employment assistance to out-of-work recipients 
of Government benefits. The New Deal programme is operated by Jobcentre Plus, 
a network of Government offices that administer cash benefits and employment 
services. To the existing pre-employment New Deal services ERA added a new set 
of financial incentives and job advisory services following customers’ entry into 
work. It was aimed at three groups that have had difficulty getting and keeping 
full-time work or advancing to more secure and better-paid positions: 
 lone parents (mostly women) who receive Income Support (IS) and volunteer 
for the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) programme;
2 longer-term unemployed people over the age of 25 (largely men) who receive 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and are mandated to enter the New Deal 25 Plus 
(ND25+) programme; and
3 lone parents who are already working part-time (between 16 and 29 hours a 
week) and are receiving Working Tax Credit (WTC). 
For the two New Deal customer groups, ERA began with job placement and 
other pre-employment assistance, largely following the same procedures as the 
regular New Deal programme. This assistance was expected to last for up to nine 
months. The programme then continued into a unique post-employment or ‘in-
Summary
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work’ phase expected to last for at least two years.2 During that phase, ERA’s job 
coaches, known as Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs), were expected to help 
customers avoid some of the early pitfalls that sometimes cause new jobs to be 
short-lived and to help them advance to positions of greater job security and better 
pay and conditions – at their current employer or a new one. ERA also offered 
special cash incentives and other resources to promote these goals, including: 
• an employment retention bonus of £400 three times a year for two years 
for staying in full-time work (at least 30 hours per week for 13 out of every 
17 weeks, which is about 75 per cent of the time); 
• training tuition assistance (up to £1,000) and a bonus (also up to £1,000) for 
completing training while employed; and
• access to emergency payments to overcome short-term barriers to staying in 
work. 
Members of the WTC group, who were already working when they entered ERA, 
began immediately with the post-employment phase. They were offered the same 
forms of in-work support and incentives, plus help getting re-employed if they left 
their jobs or their jobs ended.
The random assignment process
Qualifying members of the three target groups were invited to volunteer for a 
limited number of ERA openings. After completing an informed consent process, 
half the volunteers were assigned randomly to the ERA programme group and 
the remainder to a control group. Individuals assigned to the control group could 
continue to receive whatever provisions they were normally entitled to receive 
from Jobcentre Plus. Thus, control group members in the two New Deal customer 
groups went on to receive regular New Deal pre-employment services and had 
little regular or intensive involvement with Jobcentre Plus staff after entering work. 
Control group members in the WTC customer group, who would not normally 
enter the New Deal programme because they were not receiving IS or JSA, were 
not offered pre- or post-employment services or incentives through Jobcentre 
Plus. However, as always, all groups could seek other services or training on their 
own.
For all three groups, ERA’s success is determined by comparing the outcomes of the 
programme group (e.g. future average earnings) with the outcomes of the control 
group. Because the random assignment process created two groups with nearly 
2 Although the original design of the programme envisioned that the post-
employment phase would last for a maximum of two years, those who 
entered work sooner could receive more than two years of post-employment 
adviser support. In fact, WTC customers who were already working when 
they entered ERA could receive post-employment adviser support for their 
full 33 months of participation in ERA.
4identical background characteristics, on average, at the beginning of the study, 
the only difference between them was that one was offered the programme and 
the other was not. Thus, any statistically significant difference in future outcomes 
can confidently be assumed to have been caused by ERA. Such differences are 
referred to here as the programme’s effects or ‘impacts’.
Intake into the study began in October 2003 and continued through the end of 
2004 for most customers; it was completed for all by April 2005. Over 16,000 
people were randomly assigned through this process, making this study one of 
the largest randomised social policy trials ever undertaken in Britain. 
This report focuses on results for the programme’s two lone parent customer 
groups, each of which represents lone parents who entered ERA at very different 
stages in their working lives. The group entering through the NDLP programme 
was looking to begin working, usually after an extended period of time out of 
the labour force; for them, job retention was a more immediate priority and 
advancement a more distant goal. In contrast, the WTC group, which was already 
employed, was more focused on improving their current position in the labour 
market. Viewing the effects for the NDLP and WTC lone parents in tandem may, 
thus, offer a rough sense of how ERA might affect outcomes for lone parents when 
introduced at these different points in their working lives. However, it is important 
to note that the WTC group, on average, was more skilled and generally more 
advantaged than the NDLP group when starting ERA. Consequently, differences 
in ERA’s effects on each of these two groups reflect more than just the timing of 
the intervention in their lives.
The analysis relies heavily on data from two waves of a longitudinal customer survey 
administered at 12 months and 24 months, respectively, following each individual’s 
date of random assignment (when they entered the study). The survey data, thus, 
cover the experiences of each programme and control group customer over a 
two-year follow-up period. Survey respondents are a representative subsample 
of the full sample of lone parent customers enrolled in the study. The analysis 
also uses data on employment, earnings and benefits receipt from administrative 
records for the entire sample. To provide a richer understanding of the Jobcentre 
Plus offices’ experience of implementing ERA, lone parents’ efforts to balance 
work and parenting, their efforts to advance and their responses to the in-work 
assistance that ERA offered, the analysis also uses qualitative research involving 
in-depth interviews with ERA staff and customers. 
ERA’s implementation and delivery of in-work assistance
Perhaps the biggest challenge faced by ERA staff (principally the ASAs and 
their frontline managers) was learning how to help working customers meet 
employment and retention goals while operating within an organisational culture 
in which the entry of customers into jobs was the primary measure of staff and 
office performance. ERA thus posed a challenge to existing Jobcentre Plus delivery 
structures and staff skill sets. 
Summary
5• ERA’s implementation, which faced difficulties in the first year of 
operation, improved considerably over time, as staff grew more skilled 
and confident in delivering a post-employment intervention.
Not surprisingly, it took considerable time and effort for ERA district staff, whose 
prior experience had focused on helping the unemployed find jobs, to learn to 
incorporate strategies that involved building a partnership with customers that 
extended into work and was to last for at least two years after job placement. For 
advisory staff, retention and advancement support meant proactively engaging 
customers beyond traditional Jobcentre Plus routines, anticipating the needs 
of working individuals and promoting job progression. In the early days of the 
programme, staff were unfamiliar with what was entailed in providing post-
employment support and they had difficulty keeping working participants fully 
engaged in the programme. Moreover, there were tensions between the central 
job placement goals of Jobcentre Plus and the post-employment focus of ERA. 
Over time, the programme grew considerably stronger as technical assistance 
efforts were intensified, staff training was improved and DWP’s oversight and 
accountability mechanisms were strengthened to support ERA’s goals.
A new set of challenges arose in the third year of programme operations, as the 
operational phase of the demonstration began to wind down. As customers began 
to reach the end of their 33-month tenure and began to exit the programme (in 
July 2006) on a rolling basis, many staff were reassigned to other posts, but not 
necessarily at an even pace. Some staff caseloads thus grew to levels much higher 
than intended and many customers were assigned a new ASA. Thus, for some 
customers, the continuity and intensity of in-work assistance began to suffer. 
Several indicators suggest that ERA reached its peak performance level in most 
districts towards the end of 2005 and into the first half of 2006 (near the end of 
the two-year follow-up period covered by the impact analysis presented in this 
report). 
Overall, the districts’ implementation of the ERA model demonstrates that it 
was feasible to operate ERA as a Jobcentre Plus initiative, although not easy. 
The challenges of keeping working customers engaged in the programme and 
providing them with high-quality career guidance were ongoing. These challenges 
underscore the importance of assigning the role of ASA to staff who have 
the capacity to deliver a service that is more complicated than the normal job 
placement assistance of Jobcentre Plus. It is also critical to provide those staff 
with more extensive training and manager support and to motivate and recognise 
their accomplishments with performance assessments tailored to retention and 
advancement outcomes. 
Summary
• Working lone parents in ERA were much more likely than those in the 
control group to receive retention-related and advancement-related 
help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff.
Customers in the ERA group who worked at some point within the two-year 
follow-up period – about three-quarters of the NDLP customers and virtually all 
of the WTC customers – received a substantial post-employment intervention 
from Jobcentre Plus. This intervention differed in both content and intensity 
from what they would have experienced had ERA not existed (as evidenced by 
comparisons with workers in the control group). Substantial proportions of ERA 
lone parents received advice and guidance from staff on employment retention 
and advancement matters; help with personal and family problems that could 
interfere with work; and encouragement and assistance in accessing training 
while employed. For example, among NDLP customers in ERA who got jobs, 
61 per cent reported on the customer survey that, while they were employed, 
they had received help or advice from Jobcentre Plus (meaning primarily the ERA 
programme) that was related to staying employed or advancing. Among working 
WTC customers in ERA, 75 per cent said that they had received such assistance. 
The rates for the control groups were much lower – only 19 per cent for NDLP and 
seven per cent for WTC – and such assistance was likely to have been obtained 
through customer-initiated, informal interactions with Jobcentre Plus staff, since it 
was not a funded element of the regular New Deal programme. 
At the same time, qualitative data point to a number of challenges that Jobcentre 
Plus staff encountered in operating the ERA model in the real world. For example, 
although most working ERA customers had some in-work contact with their ASAs, 
the nature and quality of the support they received varied substantially, ranging 
from the simple processing of bonuses and perfunctory interactions to specialist 
advancement action planning. The advisers also differed in how proactive they 
were in reaching out to their customers, in keeping participants engaged in the 
programme, in their capacity to provide helpful guidance on advancement issues 
and even in their marketing of the financial incentives. Over time, though, advisers 
on the whole became more skilled in delivering in-work support and administering 
ERA’s incentives. 
• Staff and customers saw value in the use of Emergency Discretion Funds 
(EDFs) to help secure participants’ attachment to work. 
ERA customers who entered work could receive assistance from an EDF to take 
care of minor, short-term financial emergencies that might prevent them from 
continuing in work. Financial payment records indicate that 23 per cent and 18 per 
cent, respectively, of NDLP and WTC programme group customers who worked, 
received EDF assistance, making the EDF an important element of the in-work 
support provided through ERA. Most customers who received these payments 
received just one. The total payment amount averaged £235 per recipient for 
NDLP customers and £206 for WTC customers. In general, these funds were most 
commonly used to address minor emergencies related to childcare, transport or 
rent. 
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many did not meet the conditions for receiving them. 
When interviewed 24 months after entering the study, most lone parents in ERA 
(88 per cent of both NDLP and WTC customers) said that they knew about the 
programme’s employment retention bonus. Yet, only about one-third had received 
any of these bonus payments – largely because they did not meet the necessary 
conditions for the reward (i.e. sustaining full-time work for at least four months in 
a given payment period). However, among those who ever worked full-time during 
the follow-up period, about 75 per cent received at least one bonus payment and 
roughly 60 per cent received two or more payments.
Awareness of the bonus for completing an ERA-approved training course while 
employed was also high, especially among WTC customers, many of whom were 
attracted to ERA precisely because of its support for training. Among the WTC 
group, 87 per cent knew of this bonus and 23 per cent completed training and 
received a payment. (Of course, not all customers participated in training and not 
all training participants had completed their courses by the time of the 24-month 
survey.) Among the NDLP group, 72 per cent were aware of the bonus, but only 
eight per cent received a payment. In addition, 27 per cent of the WTC group and 
ten per cent of the NDLP group received ERA payments to help with training fees 
or tuition during this period.
ERA’s impacts on employment and earnings 
ERA has had a number of important positive effects on lone parents’ labour market 
outcomes. 
• Within the first two years after beginning ERA, lone parents earned 
substantially more than they would have without the programme.
When results for all districts are combined, NDLP customers in ERA earned £1,550 
more, on average, than the control group. This represents a substantial and 
statistically significant increase of 24 per cent over the control group’s average 
earnings of £6,498 during the two-year follow-up period (Table 1). (These findings 
are based on customer survey data and exclude ERA bonus payments.)3 The 
earnings impact was somewhat smaller in the second year than in the first, but 
still sizeable and statistically significant. 
3 Estimates of ERA’s impacts on average earnings were also computed using 
administrative records data available for the 12 months covered by the 
2005/06 tax year; these results are positive. 
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Among NDLP customers, the ERA group’s earnings were more than 11 per cent 
higher than the control group’s earnings in five of the six districts, where the 
differences ranged from £476 to £3,125 (Table 2).4 They were particularly large 
and statistically significant in two districts (North West England and Scotland).5 
The overall pattern of district-level impacts suggests that the programme can be 
effective under a variety of local conditions.
4 When results are examined separately by district, rather than for all districts 
combined, the smaller sample sizes mean that impacts within a district 
must be larger in order to reach the threshold of statistical significance, a 
designation that implies greater certainty that the effects are not simply due 
to chance. 
5 The variation in estimated impacts across the six districts is not statistically 
significant.
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ERA Control Difference Percentage
group group (impact) change
A. New Deal for Lone Parents customers
Average total earnings (£) 8,049 6,498 1,550 *** 23.9
Ever worked (%) 75.7 70.1 5.6 *** 7.9
Ever worked full time (%) 37.5 27.9 9.6 *** 34.3
Worked full time for at least 4 consecutive months (%) 33.6 25.0 8.7 *** 34.6
Worked and participated in training or education
courses while employed (%) 35.3 29.7 5.6 *** 18.9
Average total amount of Income Support received (£)a 4,911 5,192 -282 *** -5.4
B.  Working Tax Credit customers
Average total earnings (£) 17,267 16,392 874 ** 5.3
Ever worked (%) 98.3 97.4 1.0 1.0
Ever worked full time (%) 41.5 30.0 11.5 *** 38.2
Worked full time for at least 4 consecutive months (%) 39.2 28.9 10.3 *** 35.8
Worked and participated in training or education
courses while employed (%) 68.5 55.6 12.9 *** 23.2
Average total amount of Income Support received (£)a 367 383 -16 -4.1
*(FNàexplain based on admin records for full sample.)
Customer group and outcome measure, years 1-2
Table 1  ERA’s two-year impacts on selected outcome measures
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys and Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records.
NOTES:  Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control 
group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
aMeasures of Income Support were estimated from the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey; all 
other outcomes were estimated from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
9Table 2 ERA’s two-year impacts on selected outcome measures,  
 by district
 
ERA also had positive impacts on earnings among WTC lone parents. Among 
these customers, ERA raised average earnings for the programme group by £874, 
a statistically significant gain of five per cent above the control group average of 
£16,392 for the two-year follow-up period (Table 1)6. Moreover, in contrast to the 
pattern observed for NDLP customers, the earnings effect appeared larger in the 
second year relative to the first year (when it was not statistically significant). 
• ERA had positive impacts on earnings largely because it increased the 
proportion of lone parents working full-time. 
For the NDLP group, ERA increased the rate of full-time employment (i.e. working 
30 hours per week) to almost 38 per cent – a statistically significant increase of 
about ten percentage points over the 28 per cent rate observed for the control 
group (Table 1). (The impact on the proportion who worked at all was almost 
six percentage points.) Among WTC customers, ERA increased the likelihood of 
working full-time from 30 per cent to 42 per cent, a statistically significant gain of 
6 The small number of WTC sample members makes it difficult to produce 
reliable estimates of ERA’s impacts for this target group for each district 
separately.
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Table 2  ERA’s two-year impacts on selected outcome measures, by district
Difference Percentage Percentage point Percentage
Customer group and district (impact) (£) change (%) difference (impact) change (%)
A. New Deal for Lone Parents customers
East Midlands 476 7.3 7.3 * 20.2
London 840 11.1 5.1 19.2
North East England 709 11.9 7.0 25.5
North West England 3,125 *** 53.7 6.7 26.1
Scotland 2,168 * 31.6 3.8 12.2
Wales 1,222 17.7 -0.7 -2.0
B.  Working Tax Credit customers
East Midlands 627 3.8 14.5 *** 25.4
All other districts 1,086 6.8 10.3 *** 19.1
years 1-2
Average total earnings,
Worked and participated in 
while employed, years 1-2
training or education courses
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTES:  Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control 
group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
     A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across districts; no statistically 
significant differences were found.
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nearly 12 percentage points. It may be that ERA participants were more likely to 
take on full-time work in response to the staff’s encouragement and advice to do 
so and especially in the hope of receiving the ERA retention bonus, which created 
an explicit incentive to work full-time.
ERA’s effects on retention and advancement 
• ERA increased the length of time that lone parents worked full-time, but 
more by accelerating entry into such jobs than by improving retention, 
which was already high, at least in the short term. 
For NDLP customers, ERA reduced by a month and a half the average amount of 
time taken to find work (not shown in Table 1). ERA also substantially increased 
the proportion of customers who worked full-time for at least four consecutive 
months, raising this rate to 34 per cent – a nine percentage point gain over the 
25 per cent control group rate (Table 1). Interestingly, most NDLP customers 
(about 90 per cent) who began full-time jobs worked consecutively for at least 
four months, whether they were in the programme or the control group; thus, 
ERA’s effect on sustained full-time employment was achieved by increasing and 
speeding up entry into such work in the first place, not by prolonging such jobs 
for people who obtained them. 
ERA also increased the duration of full-time work among WTC customers, again 
by increasing and hastening movement into such jobs. For example, it raised their 
likelihood of working full-time for at least four consecutive months to 39 per cent 
– an improvement of ten percentage points over the 29 per cent control group 
rate. 
• Other than its effects on full-time employment, there is little evidence 
so far that ERA helped lone parents advance to ‘better’ jobs. 
Advancement is a complex concept whose interpretation is partly subjective in 
nature. The outcomes considered in this study focus on particular dimensions 
of job quality, including: job stability, responsibilities, fringe benefits (broadly 
defined), customers’ own assessment of their jobs and employment costs. The 
evidence shows little effect of ERA on the likelihood of obtaining ‘better’ jobs, at 
least as defined by these categories, within the two-year follow-up period. This 
observation holds for both NDLP and WTC customers. 
ERA’s effects on advancement-related efforts
ERA induced some lone parents to take steps that might improve their position in 
the labour market in the future.
• ERA lone parents – especially WTC customers – were more likely than 
the control group to combine training or education and employment. 
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ERA increased the likelihood that NDLP customers would participate in training 
activities relative to the control group, especially while employed (as intended by 
the programme). Among the NDLP customer group, 36 per cent of those in ERA 
combined training or education and work compared with a control group rate of 
30 per cent, which is a statistically significant improvement of six percentage points 
(Table 1). Among WTC customers, ERA increased the likelihood of combining 
training or education and work by 13 percentage points above the 56 per cent 
control group rate. 
Because such training is a potentially important form of human capital development, 
these effects may contribute to further earnings impacts in the future. However, 
there is no evidence, so far, that ERA increased the proportion of lone parents who 
earned formal education or training credentials. 
• ERA had small positive effects on lone parents’ efforts to improve their 
work situation or earnings at their current job, or to look for a new 
job.
ERA increased, by small but statistically significant margins, the extent to which 
customers in the NDLP and WTC programme groups were both in work and taking 
steps to advance. For example, relative to the control group rates, ERA increased 
the proportion of lone parents who both worked and either sought advancement 
with their current employers (such as by trying to increase hours of work, secure 
more convenient hours or shift to a different type of work) or looked for better 
jobs with different employers. For example, ERA increased the proportion of lone 
parents taking such steps by seven percentage points among the NDLP group 
(from a control group base of 52 per cent) and by five percentage points for the 
WTC group (from a control group base of 77 per cent) (not shown). 
ERA’s effects on benefits receipt
• ERA produced small savings in payments for IS for NDLP customers. It 
also reduced the use of Housing Benefit (HB) among both lone parent 
customer groups. 
All individuals who entered the study as NDLP customers were receiving IS from 
the start. By the end of the two-year follow-up period, the rate of benefits receipt 
had dropped by almost 60 per cent among both the programme and the control 
groups, due to factors not related to ERA. Nonetheless, ERA produced some 
additional savings in Government payments for IS. According to administrative 
records data, 42 per cent of the programme group was receiving IS in the 24th 
month after random assignment, which is a statistically significant two percentage 
points lower than the control group rate. Overall, the average total amount of 
IS payments over the two-year period was lower for the ERA group by £282 
relative to the control group – a five per cent drop (Table 1). In addition, customer 
survey data suggest that ERA produced statistically significant reductions in the 
proportion of lone parents receiving HB at the time of the 24-month interview (for 
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example, by six percentage points for the NDLP group and five percentage points 
for the WTC group). There is no evidence that ERA has produced any changes so 
far for either customer group in the likelihood of receiving WTC payments or in 
the total amount of such payments. 
ERA’s impacts by customer subgroups 
• ERA improved average earnings among many types of lone parents, 
including certain more disadvantaged customers, those with younger 
children and ethnic minorities. 
Overall, ERA’s effects did not vary consistently with background characteristics of 
lone parents that are typically associated with the degree of success in the labour 
market. For example, there was no strong evidence suggesting that ERA had larger 
or smaller impacts for lone parents with more rather than less previous work 
experience, or for those with more rather than fewer barriers to employment. The 
programme’s effects also did not vary to a statistically significant degree between 
lone parents with older or younger children. However, there are two important 
exceptions to this general observation within the NDLP group. First, ERA’s positive 
earnings effects were notably larger for ethnic minority NDLP customers compared 
with those identified as white, according to the survey data (although positive for 
both groups). Second, the analysis suggests that ERA, so far, may be less effective 
for NDLP customers who have no formal educational qualifications. It will be 
important in the future to assess whether these trends persist. 
Conclusions
The findings on ERA’s two-year effects are broadly positive. NDLP customers in ERA 
entered work more quickly than their control group counterparts. Among both 
the NDLP and the WTC customer groups, ERA increased the likelihood of working 
30 or more hours per week and boosted average earnings. ERA participants were 
also more likely than the control group to participate in training while employed, 
which might contribute to additional earnings gains in the longer run. Some of 
these impacts were fairly large and impressive, especially in light of the limited 
British and international evidence of effective post-employment strategies. 
So far, ERA has not shown much effect on other aspects of advancement. In 
part, this might reflect the fact that advancement effects require more time to 
materialise. It might also reflect some weaknesses in the delivery of the ERA 
intervention, especially during the first year of programme operations. Perhaps 
with better staff training and management, the intensity, quality and consistency 
of in-work advice and support would have been stronger and might have fostered 
larger impacts. However, there were hurdles that even a better administration of 
ERA would not have easily overcome. For example, many lone parents simply did 
not want to work full-time, as they gave higher priority to staying home to care for 
their children; for them, the employment retention bonus held little appeal. Many 
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also found it too difficult to manage the extra time it would take to incorporate 
training into their busy lives or they faced other practical obstacles that were 
beyond the programme’s control. In addition, lone parents who were relatively 
new workers tended to view advancement as a longer-term goal.
For many ERA participants, progression in work was far from linear; instead, it 
involved halts, reversals and recovery from setbacks. At the same time, lone parents’ 
attitudes towards work tended to evolve over time. For example, some eventually 
became more willing to organise care arrangements to suit the needs of their work 
lives, rather than seeking work that fitted around their caring responsibilities. As 
part of this evolution, some lone parents began to focus more on work that they 
would enjoy or that would provide a better standard of living, rather than, for 
example, simply planning for jobs that fit in with school hours.
Of course, the kinds of jobs some customers held offered limited future 
opportunities. For example, some lone parents found their potential to advance 
restricted by employers who could not offer more hours or career ladders. For 
them, advancement meant looking for another job – a decision that could take a 
fair amount of time to reach and then to achieve. 
Longer-term follow-up is thus essential for understanding how ERA influences 
customers’ journeys towards advancement, as those journeys continue to unfold 
after customers exit ERA. Current plans call for the evaluation to continue tracking 
outcomes for the programme and control groups until five years have passed from 
the time that customers entered the study. A benefit-cost assessment is also in 






This report presents the latest findings from the UK Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) demonstration, which, using a random assignment research 
design, tests the effectiveness of an innovative method of improving the labour 
market prospects of low-paid workers and long-term unemployed people. ERA 
targeted three groups:
• unemployed lone parents receiving Income Support (IS) benefits and volunteering 
for the New Deal welfare-to-work programme;
• low-paid employed lone parents working part-time and receiving Working Tax 
Credit (WTC) that supplements the income of working families; and
• long-term unemployed people receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and 
required to participate in the New Deal programme for recipients who are 25 
years of age or older.
This report, which provides evidence of the programme’s effectiveness over a two-
year follow-up period, deals solely with the two lone parent groups. The outcomes 
for the long-term unemployed group, New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+), are reported in 
a separate volume. 
The ERA programme, which was operated within Jobcentre Plus offices, attempted 
to go beyond the services that Jobcentre Plus typically offers to these groups, 
which are mostly focused on job placement assistance. ERA was designed to 
help participants enter and remain in full-time employment and then to advance 
in work. It included two main features: (1) job coaching to support customers 
for two years after entering employment; and (2) a set of financial incentives 
to encourage the take-up and retention of full-time work and the completion 
of training opportunities while employed. Participants who were not working 
when they entered the programme first received welfare-to-work assistance to 
help them find jobs. This process was expected to last nine months or less, after 
which participants who had entered work were entitled to two years of in-work 
support. As it turned out, nearly everyone was allowed to remain eligible for 
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ERA’s support and financial incentives for 33 months. WTC participants, who were 
already employed when they entered the programme, began receiving ERA’s in-
work support from the start. 
ERA was implemented as a research demonstration project in six regions across 
the UK between October 2003 and October 2007. Whereas labour market 
initiatives of this kind have tended in the past to be evaluated using comparative 
research designs, comparing areas where the programme was piloted with similar 
areas where it was not, this demonstration project relies on random assignment. 
ERA’s effectiveness is being evaluated using a random assignment research design 
involving over 16,000 sample members. Over the course of a little more than a 
year, eligible participants in these regions were randomly assigned to a programme 
group, who were offered the new ERA services and incentives, or to a control group, 
who were not. Because they share the same average characteristics and live and 
work in the same places, the control group represents the counterfactual – what 
happens to eligible people who receive no ERA services. By comparing subsequent 
outcomes, such as employment, earnings and benefits receipt patterns, of the 
programme group with those of the control group, the evaluation will determine 
the extent to which ERA achieved its core goals. 
The advantages of random controlled trials in testing large-scale labour market 
pilot schemes attracted attention from HM Treasury, which commissioned a team 
in the Cabinet Office to consider a demonstration project aimed at testing the 
effectiveness of post-employment services. This design process, including all the 
background and theoretical considerations, was published in detail in a previous 
report.7
The UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) managed the overall 
implementation of ERA and is overseeing the evaluation. A research consortium 
headed by MDRC (headquartered in New York City) and including the Policy 
Studies Institute (PSI), the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Office for National 
Statistics, carried out the study in the UK. 
This introductory chapter, much of which is drawn from earlier reports on ERA8, 
briefly recaps the earlier findings, explains the policy background of ERA, reviews 
the literature previously published on retention and advancement, describes the 
groups targeted by ERA and the service delivery model and explains the random 
assignment design and the various methods used to evaluate the programme.
Building on the analyses begun in the report on first-year impact findings9, 
this report continues the story of ERA’s implementation through its third and 
fourth years of operation, which ended in autumn 2007. The report goes on to 
7 Morris et	al., 2003.
8 See Dorsett et	al., 2007; Hall et	al., 2004; Hoggart et	al., 2006; and Walker, 
Hoggart and Hamilton, 2006.
9 Dorsett et	al., 2007.
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examine participants’ use of ERA’s in-work services and financial incentives and 
shows the effects of the programme on participants’ labour market behaviours 
and outcomes, including their earnings and benefits receipt within the first two 
years after random assignment. The report also includes analyses and first-hand 
accounts of participants’ choices as they strived to remain employed and advance. 
These observations provide insight into how and why ERA may have impacted 
upon its customers.
The research uses data from multiple sources, including in-depth qualitative 
interviews with programme staff and customers; two waves of survey interviews 
with customers (at 12 and 24 months after random assignment); and administrative 
data on customers’ employment, earnings and benefits receipt.
1.2 Summary of first-year impacts
The following summary highlights the most important effects of ERA after 
participants had spent their first 12 months in the programme:
• The staff assigned to ERA, called Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs), found 
their new jobs quite challenging because their assignments departed from the 
prevailing target-driven ‘work-first’ organisation of Jobcentre Plus. Training 
efforts had to be increased and renewed to reorient ASAs to focus primarily on 
their customers’ retention and advancement. 
• The majority of working ERA customers received advice and were aware of the 
advantages ERA offered, particularly the financial incentives attached to their 
retention of full-time work. They knew less of the training incentives.
• Customers beginning ERA from the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) group 
earned substantially more than their counterparts in the control group, largely 
because they were more likely to work full-time, having thereby become eligible 
for a cash ‘retention bonus’ for working at least 30 hours per week.
• WTC customers in ERA were also more likely to work full-time compared with 
their control group counterparts, though they did not earn substantially more.
• ERA increased the proportion of customers who were more likely to combine 
training or education with work, especially among the WTC group. 
• ERA’s impacts on ND25+ customers were less certain and more mixed than 
those for lone parents.
• Both New Deal ERA groups showed slightly less receipt of benefits compared 
with their control groups. 
ERA’s implementation was improving during the second and third years of service 
delivery. Following initially high turnover, ASA teams stabilised and, in some 
districts, formed post-employment task force groups. In general, the focus on 
retention and advancement goals intensified. ERA participants assigned from the 
New Deal programmes who had not yet found work, and there were many of 
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these, now received less attention from their ASAs. This report will examine the 
impact of ERA on the two lone parent groups as the project gained focus and 
strengthened.
1.3 Policy background
ERA was envisioned as a next step in Britain’s ‘welfare-to-work’ policy, which has 
been evolving since the early 1970s, when the Government began supplementing 
the wages of working families to help them overcome the cycle of unemployment 
and in-work poverty. Larger out-of-work benefits and falling tax thresholds had 
left many families with children with only a small difference between their incomes 
in or out of work.10 Family Income Supplement (FIS), an in-work benefit available 
to families with children, was introduced in 1971 to increase the cash value of 
working. This benefit remained in place for 17 years, marking the start of a strong 
British commitment to wage supplementation. In 1988, Family Credit (FC) was 
instituted to improve upon FIS. It offered higher rates of in-work benefit and lower 
qualifying hours. FC remained in place for about 13 years. 
Beginning its third year of office in 1999, the New Labour Party Government still 
faced a quarter to a third of children living in relative poverty – a rate that, even if 
measured by the contemporary index of the proportion of family incomes below 
60 per cent of the national median, had doubled between 1979 and 1995. More 
than half of lone parents remained out of work. In response, the Government 
made two important pledges:
• to halve the child poverty rate by 2010 and to eliminate child poverty by 2020; 
and 
• to raise the proportion of lone parents in paid work for at least some hours each 
week to 70 per cent by 2010. 
The policies that have ensued – particularly those directed at lone parents – were 
largely aimed at meeting these goals.
Beginning in 1999, the Government shifted in-work financial support from the 
benefits system to the tax system. Tax credits are designed to ‘make work pay’ 
by providing enough incentive to work while meeting the increasing challenge of 
keeping low-paid workers’ standards of living in sync with those of the working 
majority who have higher earnings. They also compensate low earners for the 
increasingly regressive effects of a greater use of indirect rather than direct taxation. 
In 1999, the Government introduced Working Families‘ Tax Credit (WFTC), which 
offered more generous wage supplements, as well as a credit to help cover most 
of the cost of childcare. It was also underpinned by the National Minimum Wage, 
which took effect in the same year. In 2003, WFTC was replaced by WTC, which 
10 An administrative device called the ‘wage stop’ prevented families from 
receiving more in benefits than they had had in wages, but did not count 
in-work expenses such as travel.
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was the first major tax credit also available to low-paid workers without children, 
and Child Tax Credit (CTC), which simplified support so that families with children 
could have a clearer idea of how much they could expect to receive in and out of 
work. 
Tax credits remain the Government’s key policy to combat child poverty by increasing 
parents’ incentives to become and remain employed. The Labour administration’s 
welfare-to-work policy has two other major components:
• Active case management delivered through the New Deal, or welfare-to-
work, programmes. These programmes include mandatory requirements for 
long-term unemployed people to actively seek work, as well as increased access 
for lone parents to work-focused advice and encouragement. Lone parents 
with older children are now required to attend Work Focused Interviews (WFIs). 
These services are delivered through Jobcentre Plus, Britain’s public benefits and 
workforce development system. 
• New services such as Sure Start, a programme designed to improve early 
educational, health and well-being outcomes and the National Childcare 
Strategy, which focuses on improving the quality, accessibility and affordability 
of childcare. 
Evaluative research on these aspects of the welfare-to-work strategy has reported 
broadly favourable outcomes. Research showed that FC drew more lone parents 
into work, particularly by fitting short-hours jobs around school hours. Reports of 
the effectiveness of FC led to a strengthening of these provisions under the new 
tax credit rules. One report estimated that the introduction of tax credits boosted 
lone parents’ employment by almost five percentage points, compared with the 
FC regime.11 There is also evidence that higher payments under the tax credit 
strategy met needs that FC had not successfully addressed.12
Nonetheless, there was growing concern about the sustainability of the low-wage 
jobs that long-term unemployed people and lone parents typically took and their 
potential for income growth. The New Deal programmes focus on job placement 
but offer no in-work support to help customers retain and advance in their work. 
The ERA programme built on the successes of tax credits and the New Deal services, 
but shifted the focus of service delivery towards sustaining and progressing in 
employment, in addition to job placement. ERA offered both pre-employment 
and in-work support to assist low-wage and unemployed individuals to maintain 
full-time, steady jobs with better working conditions and at the same time help 
them to leave the cycle of moving between work and spells receiving Government 
benefits.
11 Brewer, Clark, and Myck, 2001.
12 Vegeris and Perry, 2003. 
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ERA’s policy relevance has grown since its design was conceived in 2002. A paper 
published in mid-2004 by DWP emphasised the continuing importance of targeting 
services towards lone parents and delivering case management services tailored to 
individual needs.13 Another paper, published in October 2005, acknowledged the 
importance of retention and progression in work, in addition to job placement, as 
the next stage in welfare reform.14 In October 2006, Lisa Harker was appointed by 
DWP to carry out an independent review of the department’s child poverty strategy 
and to make recommendations for achieving its targets. The paper discussed the 
importance of both pre-employment and in-work support in combating child 
poverty and in reinforcing Government policy to reach the 2010 target of a 
50 per cent reduction from 1999 levels. This paper explicitly recommended rolling 
out ERA as a national programme, should the evaluation find it to be successful.15 
In December 2006, the final report of the Leitch Review of Skills, which considered 
the UK’s long-term skills needs, signaled the importance of focusing on sustainability 
and progression in work and called attention to the ERA project.16 As part of the 
response to the Leitch recommendations, two new Public Service Agreement (PSA) 
indicators, one for retention and one for progression, have been put in place.17
A more recent Government publication, issued jointly in November 2007 by 
DWP and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, highlighted the 
importance of retention and progression. The paper also cited ERA’s successful 
12-month impacts upon lone parents’ employment. It stated that ‘Based	 on	
the	 evidence	…’ the Government will roll out nationally elements of the ERA 
design.18
.3. Lone parent policy changes – 2008
The Government’s recent command paper, Ready	 to	Work;	Full	Employment	 in	
our	Generation, published in December 2007,19 introduced a set of reforms that 
will require that lone parents who claim benefit solely on the grounds of being a 
lone parent and are capable of work, must look for work. Currently, lone parents 
can receive benefits that do not require them to look for work until their youngest 
child reaches 16 years old. However, this age will progressively be reduced for 
those lone parents with a youngest child:
13 DWP, 2004.
14 DWP, 2005.
15 Harker, 2006. See http://www.dwp.gov.uk.publications/dwp/2006/harker/
harker-full.pdf
16 HM Treasury, 2006.
17 See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/A/5/pbr_csr07_psa2.pdf, and 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/5/9/pbr_csr07_psa8.pdf
18 Department for Work and Pensions and Department for Innovation, 




• aged 12 years from late 2008;
• aged ten years from October 2009; and 
• aged seven years from October 2010. 
This marks a substantial departure in British policy towards lone parents’ entitlement 
to benefits and is more in line with other Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries. 
These proposals are accompanied by the promise that what comprises a reasonable 
offer of work will be carefully assessed against lone parents’ caring responsibilities, 
such as the availability of childcare20 and the introduction of a comprehensive and 
flexible package of pre-employment and in-work support. 
Pre-employment support includes:
• a guaranteed job interview for every lone parent who is looking for and ready 
for work; 
• financial support to fund training to help lone parents secure sustainable work; 
and
• greater flexibility in the use of work trials, allowing work trials to be extended 
for up to six weeks where appropriate. 
In-work support includes: 
• national In-Work Advisory Support from Jobcentre Plus to assist lone parents 
with their transition in to work and career progression. This enabling them to 
advance to positions of greater job security and better pay and conditions; 
• the national roll-out of the In-Work Emergency Discretion Fund to provide 
financial help to overcome unexpected barriers which crop up when a lone 
parent first starts work;21 and
• piloting the use of In-Work Credit as an aid to retention. 
The in-work support has been designed and will be developed taking full account 
of the evidence from the first-year impact findings of this ERA project. 
In addition, the paper also announces an intention to roll out nationally In-Work 
Credit, which provides lone parents with payments of £40 a week (£60 in London) 
for 12 months, to ease the transition into work and encourage retention. This 
financial incentive has elements in common with ERA’s employment retention 
bonus, but it is not contingent on full-time work of 30 or more hours a week; 
instead, it will be available to lone parents working 16 hours or more per week.
20 Brown, 2007.
21 Lone parents moving into work of 16 or more hours per week could receive 
discretionary payments up to a maximum of £300 to divert minor financial 
emergencies that could prevent them from continuing in work.
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The Government will also be increasing the disregard of child maintenance (child 
support) payments in calculating IS for parents with care who are out of work. 
Currently, parents with care, on the new child maintenance scheme only, can 
keep the first £10 a week of maintenance paid to them before their benefit is 
affected; benefit is then reduced pound for pound. A higher disregard, first of 
£20 a week by the end of 2008 and then of £40 a week from April 2010, will add 
to out-of-work incomes, reduce child poverty significantly and encourage greater 
compliance among non-resident parents. These changes could help reassure lone 
parents entering work that their income platform will remain secure. Maintenance 
payments are already important additions to in-work income because they are 
ignored in estimating the value of tax credits. The Government has also announced 
that there will be a full maintenance disregard in Housing Benefit (HB) and Council 
Tax Benefit (CTB), which will help to ensure that work continues to pay for parents 
with care in receipt of maintenance. 
1.4 Research on retention and advancement in work
A literature review conducted before the ERA demonstration began found 
that, although some research existed on low-wage workers’ retention and 
advancement in work, as described in this section, there was relatively little hard 
evidence, especially for people recently on benefits.22 Nonetheless, job retention 
and advancement are important concerns for a significant portion of the labour 
force. While about nine out of ten workers remain in work steadily, recurring 
unemployment and lack of advancement are common among disadvantaged and 
low-paid workers. Many become entrenched in a ‘low-pay, no-pay cycle’, in which 
they shift repeatedly between low-wage work and unemployment. Often these 
individuals seek Government benefits to supplement their income.
Individuals who struggle to retain employment and to advance in work can face 
a multitude of barriers to finding and keeping well-paid jobs. Many have low 
education levels; others may have difficulty accessing transport. Some are in poor 
health; studies of large samples of longer-term unemployed people have found 
that, although many are not disabled enough to be eligible for disability benefits, 
they have health conditions that make it difficult to retain steady work. Moving 
frequently between work and benefits may have a ‘scarring’ effect, because 
individuals who spend more than a few weeks unemployed have been shown to 
experience chronic difficulty in re-establishing themselves in the labour market.23
The literature on job retention indicates that low-wage workers leave employment 
for a variety of reasons. Some have short-term contracts, which are often accepted 
involuntarily when the labour market seems to offer few other opportunities. There 
is also evidence that many leave work voluntarily. Some low-wage workers see an 
unfavourable contrast between the kinds of work they feel able to do and the jobs 




they get. Many of those who return to JSA24 say simply that the job did not suit 
them. Importantly for ERA, the literature also suggests that individuals’ barriers 
to employment often persist after they enter work. Sometimes new barriers can 
arise that cause new workers to leave their jobs; over half of lone parents who 
return to IS25 cite ‘voluntary’ reasons for leaving work. These reasons can include, 
for example, unexpected problems with the cost and reliability of childcare and 
transport, difficulties balancing work and childcare responsibilities and employers 
who are unwilling to accommodate their employees’ family responsibilities. 
There is also a growing concern regarding low-wage workers’ prospects for 
advancement. Wage inequality in the UK has risen since the 1980s,26 while wage 
mobility has declined.27 These trends indicate that few low-wage workers move 
into better jobs. They remain instead at junior levels, in jobs which require few 
higher skills, which are often part-time or temporary, and which tend to offer 
few opportunities for training.28 Conditions such as these often present barriers 
to advancement in work. Research also shows that employees earning the lowest 
wages and whose working conditions are poor are generally less able to negotiate 
better working conditions for themselves29 and are actually more likely to return 
to benefits than to improve their earnings.30 Poor prospects for advancement are 
also associated with decisions to leave work, which worsen the ‘scarring’ effect 
and have implications for such workers’ future labour market participation.
More recent reviews31 have confirmed that among certain low-paid and insecure 
workers the ‘low-pay, no pay’ cycle persists, even during this most recent period 
of high UK employment levels. Partnered mothers find difficulty in returning to 
work at levels of engagement, job security and pay similar to those they left, 
unless, it now seems clearer, they earlier qualified for maternity rights and pay.32 
Lone parents are far less likely to have secured that degree of progression in earlier 
24 JSA is a conditional cash benefit available in Britain to unemployed individuals 
who are actively seeking work. Recent workers who built up entitlements 
while employed can receive contribution-based JSA for six months, unaffected 
by other household income, but other JSA recipients have their household 
income assessed.
25 IS is an (almost) unconditional out-of-work benefit typically received by 
lone parents who are unemployed or working less than 16 hours a week. 
Entitlement to IS is assessed against other income and its value varies with 
family size and composition.
26 Machin, 1999.
27 Dickens, 2000b; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999.
28 Dickens, 2000a.
29 Dex and Smith, 2001.
30 Dickens, 2000b.
31 See, for example, Nunn et	al., 2007.
32 Smeaton and Marsh, 2006.
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work; indeed, a minority of them have never had a proper job. Women who do 




Nunn et	al. go on to acknowledge that ‘…there	now	appears	to	be	a	widespread	
consensus	 that	 progression	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 is	 as	 important	 in	 terms	 of	
economic	competitiveness	and	social	 justice	as	 is	ending	worklessness’ and cite 
ERA’s first findings. They conclude that ‘…the	UK	labour	market	severely	punishes	
those	who,	at	any	point	in	their	lives,	sacrifice	career	for	family’. Among the lone 
parents in this study, few had had a real career to sacrifice. Establishing them as 
permanent full-time workers with proper terms and conditions of service was 
the considerable task given to the Jobcentre Plus staff that worked on the ERA 
project.
1.5 Design of the ERA programme
The ERA programme was designed to test a method to improve job retention 
and advancement among low-income individuals. The primary policy aims of ERA 
were to:
• promote a work-based welfare policy, building on the progress made by 
increased wage supplementation and the active case management of the New 
Deal;
• interrupt the ‘low-pay, no-pay cycle’ and so lessen the ‘scarring effect’ of 
unemployment;
• improve ‘job matching’ by placing customers in work that is likely to suit them 
in the longer term, which may include changing employers after beginning 
work;
• provide longer-term ‘treatment’ for barriers to work by continuing to 
provide support after customers begin working and encounter barriers, such as 
transport, childcare or reversals in health; and
• reduce in-work poverty by promoting work advancement and training 
opportunities. 
The primary hypothesis of ERA’s design is that a mix of job coaching and financial 
incentives, including adviser support while customers are employed as well 
as beforehand, can have a positive impact on individuals’ job retention and 
advancement. Before entering employment, customers would be advised to find 
good jobs with prospects for advancement; once they were in work, they would 
be offered continuous close support as well as financial incentives to stay in work 
and take up training opportunities. The in-work support would also help them 
33 Walby, 2006, cited by Nunn et	al., 2007.
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to continue to resolve their barriers to work. The design envisioned that these 
strategies would result in higher retention and would make advancement more 
likely.
The development of the programme was inspired by a similar demonstration, the US 
ERA project, which was already being implemented in several US states. Launched 
in 1999, the US ERA demonstration tests a variety of retention and advancement 
programmes and has many features that are similar to the UK demonstration (see 
Box 1.1). It is directed by MDRC, which also leads the consortium conducting the 
UK ERA evaluation. Many of the early findings from the US project informed the 
implementation of the UK ERA programme.
A related demonstration project, the Work Advancement and Support Center 
(WASC) demonstration, was launched in the US in 2005, two years after the UK 
ERA programme began (see Box 1.1). MDRC designed and is evaluating WASC, 
and findings from both the US and UK ERA programmes have informed its 
implementation. Like the UK ERA programme, both US projects are being assessed 
through randomised control trials.
 
Box . Description of the US ERA project and the WASC demonstration
US ERA: 
Launched in 1999, the US ERA project is evaluating the effectiveness of 16 very 
different programme approaches located in eight US states. The programmes’ 
aims and target populations vary, as do the services they provide. Some of them 
focus on advancement, i.e., helping low-income workers move into better 
jobs by offering services, such as career counseling, education, training and 
financial incentives. Others focus on both placement and retention and aim to 
help participants, mostly ‘hard-to-employ’ people (such as welfare recipients 
with disabilities or substance abuse problems), find and hold jobs. Finally, 
other programmes have mixed goals and serve a variety of populations.
WASC demonstration:
In an effort to help US workforce development and welfare systems meet the 
needs of low-wage workers and their families, MDRC developed the WASC 
demonstration. This project aims to test the feasibility and effectiveness of 
establishing WASC units – locations where staff would target low-wage 
workers for employment retention and advancement services in combination 
with education about, and easier access to, financial work supports – in 
‘one-stop’ employment centers in four communities around the country. The 
establishment of WASC units began in 2005.
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1.6 The lone parent target groups
The ERA programme targeted two groups of lone parents: (1) those entering 
NDLP; and (2) those working part-time between 16 and 29 hours a week and 
receiving WTC.
The programme’s two lone parent customer groups represent lone parents who 
enter ERA at very different stages in their working lives. The group entering 
through the NDLP programme is looking to begin working, usually after an 
extended period of time out of the labour force; for them, job retention is likely to 
be a more immediate priority and advancement a more distant goal. In contrast, 
the WTC group, which is already employed, is more focused on improving their 
current position in the labour market. Viewing the effects for the NDLP and WTC 
lone parents in tandem may, thus, offer a rough sense of how ERA might affect 
outcomes for lone parents when introduced at these different points in their 
working lives. 
This section describes the services regularly available to these two groups before 
ERA was implemented. The following section then explains how ERA expanded 
on these services.
.. New Deal for Lone Parents
NDLP is a voluntary programme whose customers are interested in finding jobs, 
even though some may not be ready to start immediately. NDLP customers are 
assigned a Personal Adviser (PA) through Jobcentre Plus to provide pre-employment 
job coaching services. PAs can offer job search assistance and may address any 
barriers customers have that challenge their search for work. They also advise 
customers on their likely in-work income at differing hours of work and help them 
access education or training. 
The majority of NDLP customers are women and many face an array of labour 
market disadvantages, such as lack of work skills and experience, poor family 
health, financial disincentives to working, lack of confidence, problems with 
transport, lack of job opportunities and employer prejudices.34 Many lone parents 
also struggle to balance work and care for their children, which often results 
in employment instability. Findings from interviews in a national survey in 1999 
and 2000 showed that 17 per cent of lone parents in employment left for either 
unemployment or inactivity.35 Research on NDLP itself found that 20 per cent of 
lone parents who left IS returned within about ten months36 and that lone parents 
have higher job exit rates than parents in couples and single childless women, 
even after personal and job characteristics are controlled for.37
34 Millar and Ridge, 2002.
35 Marsh, 2001.
36 Hales et	al., 2000.
37 Evans, Harkness, and Arigoni Ortiz, 2004.
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..2 Lone parents receiving Working Tax Credit
Low-wage working adults in the UK whose employment conditions meet certain 
criteria are eligible to receive WTC (similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 
US). Those receiving WTC generally do not receive services through Jobcentre 
Plus. 
ERA programme eligibility was open to a certain subset of those receiving WTC: 
lone parents working between 16 and 29 hours per week. Because Jobcentre 
Plus does not traditionally serve this target group, comparable data on their 
demographic characteristics and barriers to work were not available. However, 
data from the 2001 Families and Children Survey (FACS) indicate that they too 
are disadvantaged and face employment challenges: For example, many lack 
transport and live in social housing, although to a lesser extent than lone parents 
receiving NDLP. 
1.7 The ERA service model 
A team established by the Cabinet Office devised the ERA demonstration project 
to offer services beyond those already offered by the New Deal.38 Table 1.1 
summarises the staff and services available through ERA, compared with the 
services available to customers who are not in ERA. The following sections set 
out the full details of the ERA design. Not all of these design features were fully 
implemented, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3. 
38 For a detailed discussion of the design process, including all the background 




Table . Staff and services available to ERA (programme group)  
 and non-ERA (control group) customers
.. Work-related services 
Customers assigned to the ERA programme each worked with an ASA for a 
maximum of 33 months over both pre-employment and in-work periods. The 
ASAs were drawn largely from the pool of PAs already working at Jobcentre Plus 
in the selected districts and they were provided with training on how to deliver 
ERA services. The design envisioned that the 33-month service period would allow 
out-of-work customers about nine months to find a job, followed by two years of 
in-work support. Customers in the WTC group, who were already working, would 
begin receiving in-work support immediately but would still receive support for up 
to 33 months. 
ERA was designed so that in the pre-employment stage, ASAs coached their ERA 
customers to consider the advancement opportunities of a job before taking it 
and to try to identify work that would be a good fit with their skills and interests. 











Job coaching staff 
x PA: Personal Adviser
x ASA: Advancement Support Adviser ASA
PA
ASA
Eligible for New Deal pre-employment 
services 
x Job placement assistance  
x Advice on training and increasing 
skills 
9 9
Eligible for in-work support 
x Coaching on advancement in current 
position and/or finding a better job 
x Rapid re-employment services when 
necessary 
9 9
Eligible for in-work bonuses 
x Retention Bonus: Up to six payments 
of £400 for each period when 
customers work 30 or more hours per 
week for 13 out of 17 weeks  
x Training Bonus: Tuition payment of 
up to £1,000 if training undertaken 
while working; if training is 
successfully completed, £8 for every 
hour of training, up to £1,000 
9 9
Eligible to receive Adviser Discretion 
Fund (ADF) money 
x Pre-employment funds available to 
help customers obtain work 
9 9
Eligible to receive Emergency Discretion 
Fund (EDF) money 
x In-work funds available to help 




strategy, and it was never fully achieved in practice.)39 Once in work, coaching 
continued in order to help customers address any continuing or new barriers and 
to help them advance in their work, for example, through higher pay, more hours, 
a promotion, better pension provision or by finding a better job. ASAs listened 
carefully for any signs of difficulty in work, but also to help customers envision 
advancement even when they were not experiencing difficulties. 
ASAs could also step in to support customers in periods of stress by rearranging 
childcare if necessary or advising on renewing a claim for tax credits. To guide their 
work with customers, ASAs developed an Advancement Action Plan for each ERA 
customer, which set out job search, retention, and advancement steps. The plan, 
reviewed at each face-to-face meeting, was individually tailored for the customer 
to: 
• balance short-term requirements with longer-term ambitions and goals; 
• incorporate local labour market opportunities; 
• lay down steps to achieve goals; and 
• connect to other services to address special barriers. 
ASAs also had an Emergency Discretion Fund (EDF), which was a pool of up to £300 
per customer to cover minor financial emergencies that threatened to prevent a 
customer from continuing in work, such as the need for special clothing, new 
tools, car repairs or help with short-term childcare problems. It became available 
only when a customer was in employment of 16 hours or more per week. The 
EDF was separate from the pre-employment Adviser Discretion Fund (ADF), which 
is available to PAs as well as to ASAs (in other words, to both non-ERA and ERA 
advisers) to make purchases that will help out-of-work customers obtain a job or 
accept a job offer. 
..2 Financial incentives 
In addition, the ERA programme included financial incentives – separate from the 
EDF – designed to promote retention and advancement. These incentives, as well 
as the EDF funds, were tax-free and did not count as income against entitlement 
to tax credits. 
Retention	bonus	
To motivate customers to enter full-time work or to make the transition from part-
time to full-time work and to encourage them to do so earlier than they might 
have considered, ERA offered up to six payments of £400 for each period when 
39 See Chapter 3 of Dorsett et	al., 2007.
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customers worked 30 or more hours per week40 for 13 out of 17 weeks.41 This 
amounted to £2,400 for a customer who received all six payments.42 Customers 
were required to provide evidence of their employment and hours by showing 
wage slips and to come into the office to claim their retention bonus. This contact 
provided another opportunity for face-to-face interaction with their ASA. 
Training	bonus
ERA customers were also eligible for financial incentives to combine work with 
training. This was intended to encourage them to invest time and effort in 
developing skills that might promote their long-term career progression. While in 
work for at least 16 hours per week, customers qualified for tuition payments of 
up to £1,000 for approved courses that reflected the agreed goals in their own 
Advancement Action Plans and corresponded with local labour market needs. 
These payments were made directly to the training providers. 
In addition, customers who successfully completed an approved course received 
an additional bonus of £8 for every hour of training completed, up to a maximum 
of £1,000 (or 125 hours). It was paid only for training within the 33-month ERA 
service period, so the courses must have been completed within this time for 
customers to receive the bonus.43
1.8 The random assignment design and the intake  
 process
The ERA programme, which had a limited number of available slots, was 
implemented as a random assignment demonstration, meaning that customers 
who volunteered for the programme were assigned at random – regardless of 
their background characteristics – to a programme group that was enrolled in ERA 
or to a control group that was not enrolled in ERA. The control group continued 
to receive the standard NDLP services or WTC. This design resulted in two groups 
that were similar at the outset; the only difference was that one group was offered 
40 In 1997, the OECD set 30 hours as the cut-off to delineate part-time and 
full-time work (OECD, 1997). In ERA, part-time work is tied to WTC eligibility 
rules, which set the threshold at a minimum of 16 hours per week and 
specify that an extra amount is to be paid for work of 30 hours or more per 
week.
41 This provision accommodates the likelihood that many workers may lose 
jobs, and offers an incentive for quick re-employment.
42 At the currency exchange rate in effect on 11 February 2008, these retention 
bonus payments were equivalent to US$780 and US$4,680, respectively.
43 Customers could claim the payment after the 33-month period as long as 
the training was completed within the 33 months; this was to allow for the 
delay in the production of certificates.
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ERA services and incentives, while the other was not (the services that the control 
group members were eligible for are represented in the non-ERA columns in Table 
1.1). Thus, in comparing the outcomes of the two groups over time, differences 
that emerge can most likely be attributed to ERA. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the random assignment process, which varied somewhat 
between the New Deal and WTC target groups. Entering into the programme 
was voluntary for customers. When customers came into Jobcentre Plus offices, 
basic demographic information was recorded, and they were told of the possible 
advantages of participating in the ERA programme. They were then invited to 
enter the demonstration and were told that they had a 50 per cent chance of 
being selected for ERA services.
Figure . Random assignment process
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Some customers (about eight per cent of those to whom the offer was made) 
declined to undergo random assignment, but most went through an informed 
consent process and accepted and were assigned by a computerised algorithm to 
the programme group or to the control group.44 Approximately 16,000 customers 
were randomly assigned, with about 8,000 allocated to the programme group and 
8,000 to the control group. Of these, about 42 per cent were NDLP customers, 
41 per cent were ND25+ customers and 17 per cent were lone parents receiving 
WTC. 
The random assignment process was carried out successfully. As a result, programme 
and control group members shared similar characteristics, on average. This helps 
ensure that the control group will provide unbiased estimates of how programme 
group participants would have progressed over time had they never encountered 
ERA. The ERA demonstration represents the first time in the UK that a random 
assignment social policy evaluation has been carried out on such a large scale. 
The design was influenced by random assignment evaluations done in the US. 
Given the pioneering nature of this initiative, a special study, published in 2006, 
was undertaken to describe and capture lessons from the implementation of the 
random assignment process itself, including staff and customers’ reactions.45 
The study found that, although the process was not without its challenges, and 
although it appears, with hindsight, that some procedures could have been 
implemented better, the random assignment process generally proceeded well, 
especially considering the scale of the ERA programme. Most customers and 
staff viewed the process as fair. This experience shows that random assignment is 
practical in a UK context, which has encouraging implications, even beyond the 
ERA demonstration.
44 A special study, conducted by the Institute for Fiscal Studies as part of the 
ERA evaluation, carefully examined the issue of non-participation and its 
implications for interpreting the results of the main impact study. That 
analysis assessed how representative ERA study participants are of the full 
eligible population by first documenting the incidence of non-participation 
and then testing for the presence of any systematic differences between 
non-participants and participants in terms of observed characteristics and 
subsequent outcomes. The analysis found some differences of these kinds, 
especially among the ND25+ group, which had the larger proportion of non-
participants overall. However, the report concluded that, especially for the 
NDLP group, those who participated in ERA were not so different from the 
non-participants such that the study’s impact analysis would have produced 
different conclusions had the non-participants been included in the random 
assignment sample. (See Goodman and Sianesi, 2007.)
45 Walker, Hoggart, and Hamilton, 2006.
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1.9 Implementing ERA 
DWP was responsible for managing the implementation of the ERA demonstration. 
It was in charge of overseeing site selection, establishing guidance on service 
delivery, overseeing a training strategy, selecting and overseeing the evaluators, 
and monitoring service delivery in the sites. It developed a special Project Team 
to carry out programme implementation functions and to work closely with the 
sites. It also assigned an Evaluation Team to work with the research contractors 
and monitor the evaluation. 
This section describes some of the key implementation decisions made before the 
demonstration began, including the sites in which ERA was rolled out and the 
special staff that were hired to assist in ensuring that random assignment was 
carried out properly and that services were delivered as envisioned. It also provides 
a timeline of the programme’s implementation and how it corresponds with that 
of other national policies relevant to Jobcentre Plus. 
.9. The ERA sites 
The ERA demonstration was rolled out in six Jobcentre Plus districts (areas of 
varying sizes and populations demarcated across the UK by DWP) within six UK 
regions. 
Figure 1.2 shows the approximate locations of these six areas. One district 
was in Scotland, one was in Wales and four were in England. The regions in 




Figure .2 Map of the six ERA districts
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.9.2 Technical Advisers 
In order to help ensure that the implementation of random assignment and of 
ERA services and incentives went as planned, the evaluation consortium recruited 
six Technical Advisers (TAs) – one for each site – to work on the project. They 
were recruited largely from among Jobcentre Plus staff but were seconded to, and 
placed on the payroll of, the PSI, one of the research partners, for two years and 
worked under the authority of the evaluation consortium. Working closely with 
the DWP Project Team, the TAs spent most of their two years on the project in the 
district offices. They assisted in monitoring random assignment procedures as well 
as in training local staff on ERA procedures and contributing ‘good practice’ ideas. 
Their post outside the Jobcentre Plus management structure allowed them to 
contribute an additional perspective on how the project was progressing at a local 
level. At the same time, their experience of working in Jobcentre Plus ensured 
that they were able to give advice that took full account of operational realities, 
so enhancing their credibility with ERA staff. 
.9.3 Timeline of ERA implementation
Random assignment began in October 2003 in five of the six ERA sites and in 
January 2004 in the sixth site (see Figure 1.3). Intake for the New Deal groups 
ended about a year later. Intake for the WTC group was extended until April 
2005 to increase the number of customers in this group. (There were unique 
challenges in recruiting WTC customers into the sample, because they were not 
already coming into the Jobcentre Plus offices for services; additional efforts to 
recruit WTC customers were made in the East Midlands district and this region 
has by far the largest WTC sample.) Following their 33-month service period, the 
first customers moved off the programme beginning in July 2006, and the last 
customers phased out in October 2007. 
Several other policies affecting Jobcentre Plus coincided with the implementation of 
ERA. Figure 1.3 highlights a few of these policies. In 2003 and 2004, the Pathways 
to Work pilot, an employment programme for recipients of Incapacity Benefit (IB) 
and disabled recipients of IS, began in three of the six ERA districts. Although this 
intervention does not directly affect ERA customers, it was a priority programme for 
districts and district resources and so may have affected the attention and funding 
dedicated to ERA during that first year before funding for ERA was ring-fenced.46 
In addition, DWP implemented important changes in staffing and performance 
goals. In January 2006, Jobcentre Plus underwent an organisational review, which 
resulted in staff reductions and reorganisation. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Beginning in April 2006, Jobcentre Plus changed the focus of its performance 
goals from Job Entry Targets to a more varied set of Job Outcome Targets. The Job 
Entry Targets measured performance by the number of customers Jobcentre Plus 
staff helped enter work. They required that staff demonstrate that it was because 
of their intervention that a customer began work. The Job Outcome Targets, in 
contrast, measure all off-flows of customers from benefits into work, including 
those for whom there has been no specific intervention. The goal of this change 
was to allow staff to encourage customers to take their own initiative to find 
work and to eliminate the need for staff to ‘manufacture’ interventions in order 
to claim a job entry. The Job Outcome Targets also introduced a more varied set 
of ‘points’ that Jobcentre Plus districts receive when different groups of customers 
enter work and established targets for the number of points the districts are to 
aim for among each of these groups. 
1.10 Scope of the ERA evaluation 
The evaluation of ERA is divided into three research strands:
• A process study: The purpose of the process study is to understand how ERA 
was implemented ‘on the ground’ – whether it was implemented as envisioned 
in its design, particular implementation challenges, and differences in service 
delivery across the six sites. It is intended to provide insight into possible reasons 
for the programme’s impacts or, in some aspects, its lack of impacts. 
• An impact study: The impact study uses customer surveys as well as 
administrative data to compare the service receipt, employment, earnings, 
benefits receipt and other outcomes for ERA customers with those of the 
control group customers. For example, it examines whether programme group 
customers worked more than control group customers during the ERA service 
period and whether the earnings of the programme group were higher than 
those of the control group. 
• A cost and cost-benefit study: The cost study examines the total cost of 
implementing ERA, by adding up the total expenditures associated with 
operating it. It will also provide a foundation for the cost-benefit study, which 
will seek to understand the net economic gains or losses generated by ERA by 
comparing the costs of the programme with the financial benefits it induces. 
This strand of the evaluation is not reported in this volume. 
This report focuses on the first two strands: It updates the assessment of ERA’s 
implementation provided in earlier reports and examines, in detail, ERA’s impacts 
over the 24 months following random assignment. Longer-term impact findings 
and a full benefit-cost analysis will be presented in future reports. 
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In examining the results from the UK ERA demonstration, it is also important 
to consider the project within a broader context of retention and advancement 
programmes. Results are available from the US ERA demonstration.47 Special 
note might be taken of the Texas US ERA programme, which is perhaps the most 
similar to the UK ERA programme and appears to be showing similar outcomes. 
It targeted low-income families applying for, or receiving, cash benefits (similar 
to the NDLP group). It offered pre-employment job search and job placement 
assistance, in-work job coaching and monthly in-work stipends for maintaining 
full-time employment, available after four months of employment.48 
1.11 The remainder of this report
The remainder of this report is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 sets the stage for the core analyses in this report by describing the 
economic context within which the ERA demonstration was launched and 
operated. It discusses the characteristics of the two lone parent target groups 
and shows how key characteristics of those groups varied across the six districts. 
It also describes in more detail the data sources used in the report.
• Chapter 3 discusses programme operations, updating the findings from 
previous reports. It highlights the continued evolution of ERA over time and 
also the challenges encountered as operations finally came to a conclusion in 
autumn 2007. 
• Chapter 4 reports on the patterns of programme participation, service receipt, 
and take-up of the financial incentives over the first two years after random 
assignment. Drawing on qualitative as well as quantitative data, it focuses on 
customers’ experiences once employed and compares the patterns of in-work 
service receipt among the working customers in ERA with the experiences of 
workers in the control group.
• Chapter 5 describes the impacts of ERA on employment, earnings and benefits 
receipt over the two years after random assignment. It focuses on the two lone 
parent groups, rather than district-level differences and gives special attention 
to ERA’s effects on various measures of ERA. 
• Chapter  analyses the variation in ERA’s effects across the six districts and 
across key customer subgroups. It considers whether the programme’s effects 
are broadly based or driven by particular districts’ programmes or types of 
customers.
47 See reports online at www.mdrc.org
48 Martinson and Hendra, 2006.
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• Chapter  draws heavily on in-depth interviews with a sample of customers 
to explore their perspectives on work and family life, their personal situations 
and their experiences in work to highlight their challenges and opportunities. 
These observations provide some insights into the magnitude of ERA’s impacts 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 




2 Sample and sites
2.1 Introduction
The Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration was launched 
in six regions across the UK, with each having a particular set of economic 
circumstances and varying demographic profiles. As discussed in Chapter 1, ERA 
has been implemented in a political climate in which increasing employment among 
lone parents and making work pay for low-wage earners were important priorities. 
This chapter more fully describes the national and local economic context in which 
the demonstration was launched and operated. It begins with a brief discussion 
of recent national economic trends in the UK. It then discusses how the regions in 
which the programme was implemented were chosen. The chapter provides local 
economic and demographic information on each of these six regions, including 
data on population, racial/ethnic composition, major industries, unemployment 
trends and benefits receipt. These regional differences are important because a 
goal of the demonstration is to determine whether the programme can be effective 
across a variety of local environments. The chapter then turns to a discussion of 
the sample members in each lone parent target group, showing how selected 
characteristics of the two groups vary by region as well. Finally, it concludes with 
a discussion of the data sources used in the following chapters. 
2.2 National economic context 
In order to understand broadly the economic context in which the demonstration 
was tested, it is important to consider the national employment and benefits receipt 
trends that relate to the ERA target populations. Figure 2.1 presents a timeline of 
random assignment and data collection, as a reference against which these trends 
can be compared. As the figure shows, the follow-up period for the quantitative 
analysis presented in this report covers the first two years after each customer’s 
random assignment date. The start and end dates of the two-year period vary 
depending on when a customer entered the study. For example, customers who 
were randomly assigned in November 2003 were followed through November 
2005, whereas customers who entered the study in March 2005 were followed 
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through March 2007. As it turned out, for most New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) 
sample members, the two-year follow-up period fell sometime between the 
months of January 2004 and October 2006 and for Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
sample members, it fell largely between the months of January 2004 and March 
2007. The qualitative analysis extends into October 2007 – considerably beyond 
the end of the two-year mark for most sample members.
Figure 2. Timeline of collection and coverage of primary data for  
 the ERA process and impact studies
Sample and sites
Figure 2.1  Timeline of collection and coverage of primary data for the ERA process 
and impact studies
Key:
12-month and 24-month follow-up periods Staff surveys administered
Rounds of qualitative customer interviews
Rounds of qualitative staff interviews
NOTES: Most customers were surveyed 12 and 24 months after their date of random assignment. 
However, some customers could not be located at their anniversary date, and therefore, the data collection 
period for these customers may have extended a few months beyond their actual anniversary.
               For the December 2004 and January 2005 cohorts of the NDLP target group, only administrative 
data are available. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ERA services end date
Random Assignment cohorts with 
administrative and survey data
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The employment rate in Great Britain has been increasing since the early 1990s. 
Between 1999, when the Labour Government pledged to decrease child poverty 
and increase the employment rate of lone parents, and 2004, the national 
employment rate rose from 72.6 per cent to 74.9 per cent, an increase of about two 
million individuals.49 It continued to increase slightly in 2005.50 The employment 
rate of lone parents, in particular, has increased substantially since 1997.51 
Similarly, the unemployment rate began a downward trend in the early 1990s. 
It dropped from 7.4 per cent in 1997 to 4.7 per cent in 2004, around the time 
that ERA was launched. This was its lowest level in almost 30 years. Since 2004, 
however, the unemployment rate has slightly increased, reaching 5.3 per cent in 
2006. (See Figure 2.2 for the trend from 1999 to 2006.) In other words, the two-
year follow-up period for the impact results presented in this report occurs during 
a time when the national labour market was showing signs of weakening. 
Figure 2.2 Unemployment rate in Great Britain, 999-200
49 Brewer and Shephard, 2005.
50 Office for National Statistics.




















SOURCE: UK Office for National Statistics (2007) 'Nomis official labour market statistics', Web 
site: www.nomisweb.co.uk.
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Also relevant for understanding the economic (and policy) context in which ERA 
was implemented are trends of income transfer and New Deal programmes. In 
Great Britain, the Income Support (IS) caseload for adults under 60 has been 
relatively stable since 1999 at just over two million. It rose somewhat to 2.3 million 
in 2001, but has declined since 2002 to about 2.1 million. The proportion of the 
population in Great Britain claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) has also declined 
over time, from over six per cent in 1996 to under three per cent in 2006. (JSA 
benefits begin as unemployment insurance payments for people actively seeking 
work and can be extended beyond six months for low-income people based on 
a means test.) The total national caseload for JSA declined from over a million in 
1999 to under 800,000 in 2004 but began to rise again in 2005.52 
Both New Deal programmes involved in the ERA demonstration have served large 
numbers of unemployed individuals. By 2004, over 700,000 lone parents had left 
the NDLP programme since its inception in 1998. The NDLP caseload increased 
as the programme was built up and as the total number of lone parents with 
older children in the UK grew. By the end of 2004, the caseload had reached 
over 70,000,53 but it subsequently declined by the end of 2006 to approximately 
50,000.54 The New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) programme has served slightly more 
customers: 720,000 individuals had gone through the programme by the end 
of 2004. However, the ND25+ caseload declined until recently, dropping to 
approximately 50,000 in 2004.55 The number then grew somewhat through 2006, 
to 57,000.56 
2.3 The ERA Sites 
The six Jobcentre Plus districts that were chosen to be a part of the ERA 
demonstration are among about 50 Jobcentre Plus districts that were operating in 
2006 throughout Great Britain. Rather than rolling out the programme nationally, 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the research consortium selected 
a limited number of specified districts in which to assess the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the ERA model. They selected districts strategically in order to 
ensure that the programme would be tested across diverse local settings. 
The process of selecting the districts occurred at the same time as DWP was 
implementing the Jobcentre Plus service delivery system. Launched in April 2002, 
Jobcentre Plus merged employment and benefits services that were previously 
located in separate agencies. This was a substantial administrative reform and it 
was decided that the ERA districts would be drawn from the 25 districts where 
52 DWP, Tabulation Tool.
53 Brewer and Shephard, 2005.
54 DWP, Tabulation Tool.
55 Brewer and Shephard, 2005.
56 DWP, Tabulation Tool.
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the new service delivery model had been operating for a minimum of six months 
before ERA began in October 2003. This ensured that they would be relatively 
stable administratively by that time. The consortium worked to identify six districts 
within the 25 that met the following criteria:
• all were to be districts with a large number of customers expected to enter 
ND25+ and NDLP;
• some were to be districts with a substantial proportion of ND25+ and NDLP 
entrants from an ethnic minority background;57
• the districts were to be spread across varied regions encompassing some urban, 
some semi-urban, and some rural, areas. 
Based on these criteria, one district was chosen in each of the following areas: 
East Midlands, London, North East England, North West England, Scotland and 
Wales. The map in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.2) shows the approximate location of 
these six areas within Great Britain. Within each of the six districts are a number 
of Jobcentre Plus offices of varying sizes. In total, ERA was operated in about 60 
local offices.
2.3. Local economic and demographic characteristics
Each of the districts has distinctive economic and demographic characteristics. 
Considerable variation in local conditions also exists within some of the districts. 
Table 2.1 shows basic data on population, unemployment and number of people 
receiving benefits in each district during the period of the ERA evaluation. Box 
2.1 provides a short narrative about each district to supplement the descriptions 
below. All of this information can provide useful context for understanding the 
implementation and effects of ERA. 
57 Information on the number of ethnic minority customers by Jobcentre Plus 
district was obtained from the New Deal Evaluation Database.
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Table 2. Population, employment rates, benefits caseloads, and  
 take-up rates in the six ERA districts
Box 2. Local economic and demographic trends in the six ERA  
 districts
East Midlands: This district is the largest of the six ERA districts, with a 
population nearing a million in 2006.  The population includes large Afro-
Caribbean and Eastern European communities, especially in the city-centre 
areas. The Eastern European population is continuing to increase, particularly 
from Poland. The district’s manufacturing base is declining and is being replaced 
by a growing service industry, for example in retail and health care. The region 
has also seen an increase in construction jobs, as many new development 
projects are under way. Unemployment is relatively low, hovering between 
4.0 and 5.0 per cent between 2004 and 2006. The IS and JSA caseloads are 
about average but the percentage of the population receiving these benefits 
is the lowest among the six ERA sites. 
Continued
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Table 2.1 Population, mployment rates, benefits caseloads, and take-up rates in the six ERA
districts
East North East North West
District Midlands London England England Scotland Wales
Local demographic and economic 
characteristics
Population, 2004 980,400 858,100 341,700 436,000 782,800 317,700
Population, 2006 990,400 866,600 341,500 452,000 785,300 319,000
Population density Semi-urban Urban Semi-urban Urban Rural Rural
Unemployment rate, 2004 (%) 4.38 6.34 6.46 8.66 4.56 4.57
Unemployment rate, 2006 (%) 5.01 7.35 7.93 7.37 4.42 5.05
Caseload trends
Income Support caseload, May 2004 31,660 39,300 19,160 37,980 30,090 13,330
Income Support caseload, May 2006 30,070 39,950 17,420 36,090 28,370 12,630
Percentage of the population receiving
Income Support, 2004 (%) 3.23 4.58 5.61 8.71 3.84 4.20
Percentage of the population receiving
Income Support, 2006 (%) 3.04 4.61 5.10 7.98 3.61 3.96
Jobseeker's Allowance caseload,  May 2004 12,220 15,350 6,920 10,500 13,420 4,020
Jobseeker's Allowance caseload,  May 2006 14,740 17,990 7,860 11,160 12,520 4,940
Percentage of the population receiving
Jobseeker's Allowance, 2004 (%) 1.25 1.79 2.03 2.41 1.71 1.27
Percentage of the population receiving
Jobseeker's Allowance, 2006 (%) 1.49 2.08 2.30 2.47 1.59 1.55
SOURCES: UK Office for National Statistics (2007) 'Nomis official labour market statistics', Web site: 
www.nomisweb.co.uk; DWP tabulation tool; interviews with DWP staff. Population and unemployment data for Scotland do 




London: This is one of the larger districts, with a population of around 
867,000 in 2006. The district is very urban and has a relatively high proportion 
of ethnic minorities. Certain parts have significant proportions of Indian, Afro-
Caribbean, African and Pakistani residents. There is also a growing migrant 
population from Eastern Europe. Much of the population is employed in the 
service sector. Manufacturing has been on the decline for several decades but 
has been relatively stable since 2003. Unemployment in this district increased 
from about 6.3 per cent in 2004 to over 7.4 per cent in 2006. The district has 
the largest IS and JSA caseloads in the study, with approximately 40,000 IS 
recipients and 18,000 JSA recipients in May 2006. However, the percentage 
of the population receiving these two benefits falls in the middle when 
compared with the other ERA sites.  
North East England: This district is relatively small, at around 342,000 
people in 2006. The vast majority are white and were born in England; only 
a small proportion of this district is made up of recent migrants, although 
this percentage increased somewhat around 2001. Large declines in 
manufacturing have resulted in a broader economic base – including a high-
tech sector, service industries, health and pharmaceuticals and automotives 
(part of a smaller but persisting manufacturing sector) – but has left higher 
than average unemployment, at 7.9 per cent. North East England trails only 
North West England in the percentage of the population receiving IS and 
JSA. 
North West England: The population in this district falls in the middle 
relative to the other districts, at around 452,000. The district is urban and 
has a relatively high proportion of ethnic minorities. The population includes 
a diverse migrant community of Eastern Europeans, Afro-Caribbeans, Asians, 
and Africans, particularly in some city-centre areas. The newer migrant 
population is also increasing, in particular those from Eastern Europe. The 
majority of the population in this region are employed in the service sector 
and this number continues to increase. At the same time, manufacturing has 
declined significantly since the 1970s. Unemployment is higher than in the 
other districts, fluctuating between 7.4 and 8.7 per cent between 2004 and 
2006 and, similarly, the percentage of the population receiving IS and JSA is 






Scotland: This district is relatively large, with a population of about 785,000 
in 2006, though the district encompasses sizeable rural areas. The proportion 
of the population comprised of immigrants has increased somewhat in 
Scotland as a whole and the ERA district has seen increases, in particular, 
in its recent Polish migrant community. Hospitality and tourism are major 
industries, while manufacturing has been on the decline, including during 
ERA’s implementation. Unemployment is low, at 4.4 per cent in 2006. The 
percentage of the population claiming IS and JSA, as well as the caseloads for 
these benefits, are relatively low.
Wales: This district is the smallest of the six sites; the population in 2006 
was about 319,000. Also encompassing comparatively rural areas, the vast 
majority of the population in this district is white British; only 2.1 per cent 
of the population are from other ethnic backgrounds. The service sector 
dominates the district’s economy, with media and communications, financial 
and business services, public administration and manufacturing making up 
smaller sectors. Unemployment is low but increased from about 4.6 per cent 
to just over 5.1 per cent between 2004 and 2006. The district has the smallest 
IS and JSA caseloads, with approximately 13,000 IS recipients and 5,000 JSA 
recipients in 2006. The proportion of the population receiving these benefits 
is also relatively low.
2.3.2 Population 
The population of the districts varies considerably, ranging from under 320,000 in 
the Welsh district to nearly a million in the East Midlands district.58 The districts in 
London and Scotland are also relatively large, while those in North East England 
and North West England are somewhat smaller.
The population density also varies, as districts were chosen specifically based on 
this criterion. The districts in London and North West England are more urban; the 
districts in Scotland and Wales encompass sizable rural areas; and the districts in 
the East Midlands and North East England are comprised of a mix of urban and 
rural areas. 
The more urban districts – those in London and North West England – also have 
relatively high ethnic minority populations. Comparatively, the districts in North 
East England and Wales have a low proportion of ethnic minorities. Despite these 
differences, new migrant communities across the ERA districts are generally 
increasing. Several have growing migrant communities from Eastern Europe. 
2.3.3 Major industries
All of the ERA districts have seen long-standing declines in manufacturing and rises 
in the service sector. Manufacturing in the UK has generally been on the decline 
since the 1970s. In some districts, such as London, manufacturing remained 
58 Office for National Statistics. 
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steady throughout the period of ERA’s implementation, while in other districts, 
such as Scotland, manufacturing declines continued during ERA’s implementation. 
The majority of the population in each district generally works within the service 
sector, although the predominant areas of employment within this sector vary 
across the districts.
2.3.4 Unemployment levels and trends
As shown in Figure 2.3, unemployment rates in recent years varied substantially 
across the six districts. They were lowest in the East Midlands, Scotland and Wales 
(roughly four to five per cent in 2003-2006) and highest in North West England 
(peaking at about nine per cent in 2005).59 Three of the six districts (London, East 
Midlands and North East England) saw unemployment rates begin to climb in 
2006, following national trends. As Figure 2.1 shows, the survey and administrative 
records data collected for this report extend through 2006, so it is possible that 
some of the sample members in the ERA study may have been affected by these 
trends. 
Figure 2.3 Unemployment rate in the six ERA districts, 2003-200
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SOURCE: UK Office for National Statistics (2007) 'Nomis official labour market statistics', Web site: 
www.nomisweb.co.uk. 
NOTE: The 2003 figures are based on data between March 2003 and February 2004. Figures for 
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SOURCE: UK Office for National Statistics (2007) 'Nomis official labour market statistics', Web site: 
www.nomisweb.co.uk. 
NOTE: The 2003 figures are based on data between March 2003 and February 2004. Figures for 
Scotland do not include one local authority (Eilean Siar), for which data were not available. 
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2.3.5 Benefits receipt levels and trends
IS caseloads for adults under 60 vary across the districts, from a low of around 
13,000 in the district in Wales to a high in the London district of about 39,000.60 
JSA caseloads are lower than IS caseloads overall and vary from about 5,000 in the 
Wales district to over 18,000 in the London district (see Table 2.1). The proportion 
of the population in each district receiving these benefits roughly correlates 
with district unemployment rates. Thus, the East Midlands, Scotland and Wales 
districts are at the lower end of the spectrum, with less than four per cent of their 
populations receiving IS and less than two per cent receiving JSA in 2006. North 
West England is on the high end, with eight per cent of the population receiving 
IS and almost 2.5 per cent receiving JSA. 
2.3. Summary of economic trends across the districts
Overall, the districts in the East Midlands, Scotland and Wales generally show 
stronger economic trends; their unemployment rates are relatively low, smaller 
proportions of the population claim IS and JSA benefits and the proportion of 
the population receiving IS has decreased somewhat since 2004. The district in 
North West England, by contrast, shows weaker economic trends; it has a high 
unemployment rate (though an improving situation in 2006) and a large proportion 
of its population claims benefits. The London and North East England districts fall 
in the middle.
2.4 The research sample for this report 
Reflecting the diversity of the districts included in the evaluation, the ERA sample 
exhibits considerable variation in a number of important background characteristics. 
Important differences also distinguish the NDLP and WTC target group samples, 
resulting in part from the differences in eligibility criteria for ERA and the way in 
which those sample members were recruited. The following sections describe the 
sample by target group and highlight some of the main differences across the 
districts. 
2.4. Characteristics by target group
Between October 2003 and April 2005, 6,787 people entered the ERA sample 
from NDLP and 2,815 people entered the ERA sample as WTC recipients across 
all six districts; however, only people from the WTC target group were enrolled 
during the last three months of this period. These two groups have relatively 
different social compositions, as the profile summarised in Table 2.2 shows.
60 DWP, Tabulation Tool.
Sample and sites
5
Table 2.2 Demographic profile of all customers randomly  
 assigned between October 2003 and April 2005
Sample and sites
 2.2 Demographic rofile of a l customers randomly ssigned
between October 2003 and April 2005
New Deal for Working





Under 30 42.1 17.0
30-39 39.3 47.1
40 or older 18.6 35.9
Age of youngest child (%)
No children 0.9 1.4
Under 7 58.2 36.8
7-11 25.0 31.8
12-16 15.4 25.9
17 or older 0.5 4.1
Race/ethnicity (%)
Ethnic minority 12.7 7.8
White 87.3 92.2














Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 53.5 19.1
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 46.5 80.9
No driving licence or lack of access to vehicle (%) 67.6 33.1
Has barriers to workc (%) 64.3 68.0
Severely disadvantagedd (%) 22.1 n/a
Moderately disadvantagede (%) n/a 37.3





NDLP customers are mostly young to middle-aged women; about 95 per cent are 
female. Over 80 per cent are under 40 and 13 per cent are racial/ethnic minorities. 
This generally aligns with the demographics of NDLP entrants nationwide.
NDLP customers face significant barriers to work. About a quarter have no 
educational qualifications and just under half have reached General Certificate 
of Secondary Education (GCSE) level. Two-thirds live in social housing (housing 
owned by the local government or a private housing association) and only about 
a quarter live in privately owned or privately rented accommodation.61 Over two-
thirds do not have a driving licence or access to a vehicle and almost two-thirds 
cite barriers to work (which can include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic 
skills or other problems). Nearly half did not work at all in the three years before 
random assignment and just over a quarter worked 13 months or more during 
this period. The children of the NDLP sample are quite young; the youngest child 
of 58 per cent of the sample is under the age of seven and only 16 per cent of 
sample members have a youngest child over the age of 12. 
61 The social housing sector now on the whole accommodates fewer than one 
in four British families with dependent children. Social housing provided 
by the Government is declining in the UK. However, housing subsidised 
by private housing associations is increasing, and demand for subsidised 
housing remains high, as the cost of private homes is rising.
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Table 2.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Sample includes all lone parent customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and 
April 2005.
aParticipants who have General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) qualifications 
refers to those who have passed a series of examinations in a variety of subjects, usually taken at 
age 15 or 16. Participants with A-level qualifications have passed a series of more advanced 
examinations usually taken around age 18 or older. Those with no qualifications have completed 
neither series of examinations. 
 bFamily housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other 
friends or relatives. Social housing refers to housing in which the Local Authority (local 
government) or a private housing association is the landlord. Private housing refers to owner-
occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately.
cBarriers to work include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic skills, or other problems.
dSeverely disadvantaged refers to those NDLP participants with GCSE qualifications or 
lower, no work in the three years prior to random assignment, and at least one barrier to 
employment.
eModerately disadvantaged refers to those WTC participants with GCSE qualifications or 
lower and at least one barrier to employment.
53
WTC	customers
Almost all of the WTC customers in the research sample are women. The WTC 
sample is older than the NDLP sample, as nearly half are in their 30s and another 
36 per cent are age 40 or older. As would be expected, the youngest child of 
members of the WTC sample is older than in the NDLP sample, with 62 per cent 
over the age of seven and 30 per cent over the age of 12. 
The lone parents receiving WTC differ from the NDLP group in ways that underscore 
the differences between groups of people who have worked more steadily and 
those who have been out of work. Nearly 90 per cent of the WTC group reported 
working 13 months or more in the three years before random assignment. As they 
had to be working at the time of random assignment to enter ERA in the WTC 
group, very few reported no work experience in the three years before random 
assignment. 
This group also reported better qualifications than the NDLP group – with only 
12 per cent having no qualifications at all and a greater percentage having 
qualifications beyond GSCE. Over half live in privately owned or privately rented 
housing, a proportion much greater than among the New Deal participants. They 
have fewer transport barriers as well; only one-third reported no driving licence 
or access to a vehicle, compared with two-thirds of the NDLP sample members. 
However, the WTC customers were equally likely to report that they faced barriers 
to work; in their case, they seem to have overcome these obstacles. 
It is difficult to compare the ERA evaluation’s sample of lone parents working part-
time and receiving WTC with their equivalents elsewhere, as Jobcentre Plus does 
not hold data on this customer group. However, an equivalent group interviewed 
for the 2001 Families and Children Survey (FACS) faced similar housing and 
transport barriers.
2.4.2 Characteristics by target group and district 
Part of the analysis in this report is conducted at the district level. In order to 
understand the characteristics of sample members across the districts, Table 2.3 
presents selected data regarding customers’ educational experience, housing 
situations, previous work experience and other characteristics broken down by 
target group and district. 
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Table 2.3 Selected characteristics of all customers by district at  
 the time of random assignment, October 2003- 
 April 2005
East North East North West
Characteristic Midlands London England England Scotland Wales
New Deal for Lone Parents
No qualificationsa (%) 21.9 18.8 25.0 28.2 21.3 26.7
Social housingb (%) 60.9 65.4 71.0 71.9 66.0 65.7
Ethnic minority (%) 7.4 37.8 1.2 26.4 1.1 2.3
No driving licence or lack
of access to vehicle (%) 61.5 65.5 76.9 71.5 75.5 55.0
Has barriers to workc (%) 77.1 59.6 61.3 64.6 61.5 61.6
Number of months worked in 3
years prior to random assignment (%)
None 46.4 59.0 48.9 53.7 39.7 40.4
1-12 22.3 19.0 23.0 23.1 26.6 31.2
13+ 31.2 22.0 28.1 23.2 33.7 28.5
Severely disadvantagedd (%) 25.3 23.5 24.0 25.8 16.7 17.3
Sample Size 1,645 1,529 1,298 1,022 629 664
Working Tax Credit
No qualificationsa (%) 11.7 6.6 11.9 18.0 14.1 12.7
Social housingb (%) 30.6 42.0 46.5 61.0 52.5 32.8
Ethnic minority (%) 4.7 36.4 1.8 26.8 0.0 3.8
No driving licence or lack
of access to vehicle (%) 26.0 29.6 48.9 53.0 52.0 25.0
Has barriers to workc (%) 71.0 68.1 59.7 80.3 50.7 70.8
Number of months worked in 3
years prior to random assignment (%)
None 0.9 0.4 2.2 2.2 2.6 n/a
1-12 8.3 12.4 12.2 19.7 21.9 12.7
13+ 90.8 87.2 85.6 78.1 75.5 87.3
Moderately disadvantagede (%) 37.5 35.8 37.1 44.3 28.1 44.1
Sample Size 1,586 226 278 183 306 236
(continued)
Table 2.3 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
        Sample includes all lone parent customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
aParticipants with no qualifications have not earned at least an O-level qualification.
bSocial housing refers to housing in which the Local Authority (local government) or a private housing 
association is the landlord. 
cBarriers to work include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic skills, or other problems.
dSeverely disadvantaged refers to those NDLP participants with General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE) qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to random assignment, and at least 
one barrier to employment. 
eModerately disadvantaged refers to those WTC participants with GCSE qualifications or lower and at least 




The NDLP group varies somewhat across the districts in terms of customers’ 
educational experience and housing situations and varies more so in terms of their 
previous work experience. However, none of the districts stands out as having the 
most or least disadvantaged NDLP customers. The Scottish district is notable for 
its relatively high percentage of customers with more extensive work experience, 
while London stands out for its high percentage of customers with little work 
experience. However, customers in London are generally better educated and 
customers in the Welsh district are the most likely not to have any educational 
qualifications. A higher proportion of customers in North East England and North 
West England live in social housing, while a lower proportion in the East Midlands 
live in social housing. 
WTC	customers
The WTC sample is not balanced evenly throughout the districts. Because there 
were challenges in recruiting WTC sample members (this target group was not 
previously served by Jobcentre Plus), WTC intake into the sample was relatively 
low across the districts. Various marketing measures were undertaken to increase 
intake, particularly in the East Midlands district. This district also saw the greatest 
response to its outreach efforts; hence, almost half of the entire WTC sample is 
concentrated there.
There is wider variation in WTC customers’ educational experience, housing status, 
and previous work experience across the districts than there is for the NDLP target 
group. Because the sample sizes were small in five of the districts, district-level 
analysis was not undertaken extensively for the WTC target group in this report. 
Compared with the other districts, WTC participants in the East Midlands district 
have somewhat more work experience and a relatively small proportion of the 
sample lives in social housing. The proportion of customers with no educational 
qualifications ranges from a low of seven per cent to a high of 18 per cent, with 
the East Midlands district falling in the middle when compared with the other 
districts. 
2.5 Data sources 
The ERA evaluation uses a rich and varied set of quantitative and qualitative data 
to assess ERA’s implementation and effectiveness. Table A.1 provides summary 
descriptions of each of these data sources. 
Researchers conducted multiple rounds of qualitative interviews with both staff 
and customers from 2004 to spring 2007. These data form the bulk of the 
implementation and process analysis of ERA but this analysis also relies on weekly 
diaries that Technical Advisers (TAs) kept from the beginning of random assignment 
through June 2005, as well as on data collected on site visits and observations 
made at various points throughout the course of ERA. 
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Most of the quantitative analyses rely primarily on a survey administered by phone 
or in person to a sample of programme and control group customers. This survey 
was administered to customers 12 months after their date of random assignment 
(between December 2004 and February 2006) and again at their 24-month 
anniversary (between November 2005 and March 2007). The survey provides a 
basis for assessing how much ERA customers used the services and incentives 
offered by ERA or Jobcentre Plus, how their service-use patterns differed from 
those of the control group and whether the ERA group’s earnings, employment, 
and benefits receipt patterns differed from those of the control group. For the 
NDLP target group, 87 per cent of the fielded sample responded to the 12-month 
survey and 77 per cent of that same fielded sample responded to the 24-month 
survey.62
For the WTC target group, 93 per cent of the fielded sample responded to the 
12-month survey, and of those contacted for the 24-month survey, 79 per cent 
responded.63 However, it is important to note that the WTC sample was expanded 
after the 12-month survey was completed, so some respondents to the 24-month 
survey were not interviewed in that earlier wave. 
The decision to increase the size of the WTC 24-month fielded sample was made 
to accommodate the fact that a large portion of this target group was not recruited 
into the sample until after the 12-month survey was administered, as well as to 
include more WTC cases from outside the East Midlands. To make this change 
without increasing overall survey costs, sample points were moved to the WTC 
target group from the ND25+ target group (which had a lower response rate than 
the lone parent samples) after the 12-month survey. Because of this decision, 
however, the WTC fielded sample is larger for the 24-month survey than for the 
12-month survey. 
The process study uses DWP administrative records data on bonus receipt to 
measure the proportion of ERA programme group customers who received 
the employment retention and training bonuses. These data supplement those 
obtained through the customer survey on the take-up of the financial incentives. 
Finally, the impact analysis uses data from DWP administrative records data, 
although in different ways for the two lone-parent target groups. Benefits receipt 
data available from DWP are used to add detail to similar measures obtained from 
the survey for both the NDLP and WTC target groups. Unlike the survey data, the 
administrative records data are available for all sample members. Employment and 
62 Sample members who did not respond to the 12-month survey were not 
contacted for the 24-month survey. The response rate on the 24-month 
survey for the 24-month fielded sample (not the original fielded sample) was 
88 per cent.
63 See Appendix B for more information on response rates. As discussed in this 
appendix, there is little evidence of response bias that would affect analyses 
based on the survey data.
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earnings administrative records data were obtained from the Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Survey (WPLS) maintained by Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) agency and used in some impacts estimates for the NDLP target group. 
As explained in Chapter 5, because of concerns about the quality of these data for 
the WTC sample, their use is limited to producing impact estimates for the NDLP 
target group. It should also be noted that the WPLS earnings data pertain only to 
the 2005-2006 tax year (which began in April 2005 and ended in March 2006). 
For many sample members, this roughly corresponds to the second relative year 
after random assignment but for some it largely covers their first relative follow-
up year. 
2.6 Summary and conclusions
ERA was launched in six regions across the UK during a period in which the British 
economy was relatively strong, although the economy as a whole has declined 
since. The districts varied considerably in size, population density and racial/ethnic 
composition. They also differed in their unemployment trends. The districts in the 
East Midlands, Scotland and Wales generally showed stronger economic trends, 
while the district in North West England showed relatively weak economic trends. 
However, all of the districts faced a similar pattern of a declining manufacturing 
base and a large and increasing service sector.
In general, ERA customers faced significant barriers to work, such as low educational 
qualifications and limited previous work experience. The majority of customers in 
both target groups had no educational qualifications or only a basic qualification. 
The NDLP group had little recent work experience; over half that group had not 
worked at all in the three years before random assignment. The WTC group had 
significantly more work experience. In addition, customers in the WTC group were 
far more likely than those in the NDLP group to live in privately owned or privately 
rented housing. By contrast, almost two-thirds of the NDLP customers lived in 
social housing. There were some similarities and some differences across the 
districts in the proportion of customers with these barriers but no district stood 
out, relative to the other districts, as having customers with distinctively higher or 




3 Implementing a post- 
 employment intervention
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the implementation of Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA), updating the more detailed exploration of this topic presented 
in an earlier evaluation report.64 It summarises the critical challenges encountered 
by the six Jobcentre Plus districts and highlights their key accomplishments as they 
learnt to operate a new post-employment service within an organisation whose 
central mission was helping unemployed benefit recipients enter work. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that ERA was largely implemented as designed, 
though imperfectly and unevenly, both over time and across districts. There 
were inconsistencies across, and also within, districts. Implementation improved 
considerably between the first and second years of operation, but the districts faced 
new challenges in the third year as the operational phase of the demonstration 
began to wind down.
This chapter is mainly based on data collected in qualitative interviews with ERA 
management staff in Jobcentre Plus offices and in focus groups and interviews 
with Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs). Other sources include interviews 
with other Jobcentre Plus and Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) staff and 
observations of ERA events. It is important to note that these data extend beyond 
the time period covered by the two-year survey impact data presented in Chapter 
5. Whereas those impact data cover the experiences of participants to November 
2006 (New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP)) and March 2007 (Working Tax Credit 
(WTC)), the qualitative data cover programme operations until the end of ERA, 
in October 2007 (see Box 3.1). The available impact findings do not yet capture 
the full effects of ERA’s operational phase or the last ten months of customers’ 
involvement in the programme. 
64 See Dorsett et	al., 2007, which provides an in-depth assessment of the first 
two years of operating ERA.
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Box 3. Periods of programme operations and data collection
3.2 Programme implementation and delivery 
Perhaps the biggest challenge ERA staff faced (principally the ASAs and their 
frontline managers) was learning how to help working customers meet employment 
retention and advancement goals while operating within an organisational culture 
in which the entry of customers into jobs was the primary measure of staff and 
office performance. It took considerable time and effort for the ERA districts to 
incorporate strategies that involved building a partnership with customers that 
extended into work. 
For advisory staff, retention and advancement support meant proactively engaging 
with customers beyond traditional Jobcentre Plus routines, anticipating the needs 
of working individuals and promoting job progression. It was evident that ASAs’ 
confidence in their ability to deliver post-employment support grew as they gained 
more experience in their roles. As the end of ERA grew closer, however, and the 
process of ending customers’ involvement in the programme began, an additional 
set of challenges arose. The first customers ended their time on ERA in July 2006, 
and a number of indicators suggest that ERA reached its peak performance level 
in most districts towards the end of 2005 and into the first half of 2006. (For 
a district-by-district summary of key implementation features, problems, and 
accomplishments and significant events, see Table C.1.) 
3.2. Operating within the context of Jobcentre Plus
In many ways, the difficulties encountered in delivering ERA were related to the 
context of Jobcentre Plus: ERA was a post-employment service, and Jobcentre Plus 
otherwise had a nearly exclusive focus on pre-employment support. Undeniably, 
ERA, which required new attention to customers after they entered work, posed a 
challenge to existing Jobcentre Plus delivery structures and staff skill sets. 
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ERA’s implementation was further complicated and challenged by a performance 
system focused on Job Entry Targets (JET) that applied to all Jobcentre Plus 
advisers, including ASAs. This particular target-driven system, which assessed staff 
performance according to job placements, detracted from the post-employment 
focus of ERA and undoubtedly encouraged district managers to give limited 
attention to ERA. The system meant that ERA staff were under pressure to 
contribute towards job entries, either by concentrating on ERA customers who 
were not yet working and/or by working with non-ERA customers.65
3.2.2 The structure and management of ERA
Because districts had autonomy in establishing a management structure for ERA, 
somewhat different models for programme delivery emerged. The extent to which 
ERA delivery was affected by the Jobcentre Plus context was partly determined 
by whether a district established a centralised or decentralised management 
structure for operating ERA (see Table C.1). The centralised system involved 
assigning to a dedicated ERA manager overall responsibility for ERA across the 
whole district (which included multiple Jobcentre Plus offices), with local ASA 
managers overseeing frontline ERA staff. This made it easier to guide staff and 
hold them accountable for delivering ERA’s retention and advancement agenda. 
In contrast, under the decentralised system, districts assigned non-ERA Jobcentre 
Plus managers responsibility for managing ERA frontline staff at the office level. As 
a consequence, frontline staff were more likely to feel the pressure of conflicting 
demands – meeting Jobcentre Plus’ job entry goals compared to delivering ERA’s 
post-employment services to employed customers. In this environment, there was 
a tendency to sideline ERA’s assistance to working customers. 
65 The approach to rewarding job entries was modified in April 2006 with the 
national introduction of Job Outcome Targets (JOTs) in Jobcentre Plus. Under 
this system, credit is earned for benefit recipients who move off benefits 
on their own, even without assistance from Jobcentre Plus and for non-
benefit recipients who obtained work through Jobcentre Plus self-help job 
search assistance. Evidence of job entry is obtained from Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study (WPLS) administrative records maintained by Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) (see Chapter 2). Points are awarded when 
someone enters a new job, with more points attached to job entries for higher-
priority customers. For example, helping an unemployed lone parent into 
work would earn 12 points, while helping an employed person change jobs 
would earn one point. Early evaluation findings indicate that the introduction 
of JOT has contributed to changes in the culture of delivery in Jobcentre 
Plus, including more team working and fewer competitive practices (Nunn 
et	al., 2007). By the time these modifications took place, other changes in 
the delivery of ERA (outlined below) had served to strengthen the delivery of 
the post-employment programme.
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Centralised management was applied in two districts: the East Midlands and Wales. 
A variant on the centralised structure involved adopting a Post-Employment Team 
(PET). This was designed to ring-fence staff66 (so that they would work only with 
ERA customers) to enable them to focus on delivering in-work support to working 
customers. This structure was implemented in two districts: London and North 
West England.
Other changes in Jobcentre Plus management policies that were not directly 
related to ERA nonetheless had significance for ERA delivery. For example, North 
East England and Scotland both experienced district reorganisation during 
the course of ERA, meaning that some local offices were reassigned from one 
Jobcentre Plus district to another. In North East England, several reorganisations 
of the management structure for NDLP ASAs were instituted. Indeed, some ASAs 
spoke of having 13 different line managers over a three-year period. Changes in 
management structures and in staffing often disrupted ERA delivery, particularly 
when new managers did not embrace the post-employment ethos of ERA, when 
inexperienced ASAs were introduced, or when ASAs took over the caseloads of 
advisers who moved off ERA.67 In contrast, in one district, delivery was seen to 
improve with the replacement of an unsympathetic district manager.
3.2.3 The promotion of ERA in the districts 
The context of Jobcentre Plus also posed problems for the way in which the districts 
promoted and supported ERA. Across all districts, it was acknowledged that 
ERA did not have a high enough priority within the remit of Jobcentre Plus. ERA 
staff attributed this to low senior management buy-in, but also to the mismatch 
between the job entry culture of Jobcentre Plus and ERA’s emphasis upon in-work 
support.
Over time, the situation improved, as awareness of ERA spread and in response to 
efforts by the DWP Project and Evaluation teams to lift the programme’s profile.68 
In general, local Jobcentre Plus staff perceived ERA as having low governmental 
66 From the start of ERA, the districts were given extra resources so that the 
project would not undermine the work of Jobcentre Plus. However, these 
resources were not ring-fenced in the first year, and were often used to 
fund non-ERA work. After ERA funds were ring-fenced, the District Manager 
could not use them for any other Jobcentre Plus work. Likewise, an ERA 
ring-fenced ASA should not be allowed to undertake any other Jobcentre 
Plus activities.
67 ASAs’ caseloads varied across districts and although the Project Team had 
specified an optimum caseload of 70 customers per ASA, some ASAs 
reported caseloads as high as 120.
68 As outlined in Chapter 1, DWP established a special Project Team to guide 
ERA’s implementation across the participating Jobcentre Plus districts and 
it assigned an Evaluation Team to work with the research contractors and 
monitor the evaluation.
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priority throughout its implementation, particularly in those districts that followed 
a decentralised management structure and in comparison with the Incapacity 
Benefit (IB) pilots that were operating at the same time in the East Midlands, North 
East England and Scotland.
3.2.4 The support given to staff
Continuing support was critical to advisory and management staff, because ERA 
demanded new skills and also because powerful demands on resources were 
emanating from Jobcentre Plus’ higher-priority job entry goals. Yet training on 
in-work support practices was not systematically delivered to advisory staff at each 
district until January 2005, when most advisers had been functioning in their 
ERA posts for approximately one year. ERA management and advisory staff alike 
identified this training as a significant turning point in programme delivery. 
As explained in Chapter 1, the deployment of a team of six non-DWP Technical 
Advisers (TAs) who worked closely with the evaluation contractors, was an 
important and distinctive feature of the ERA demonstration. One TA was assigned 
to each district. It was their responsibility to ensure not only that the evaluation’s 
random assignment procedures were properly implemented but also, alongside 
the DWP Project Team, to help train ASAs and to contribute ideas daily about 
good practice for delivering post-employment assistance to customers. In addition 
to their hands-on assistance, some TAs also supported ASAs by writing electronic 
newsletters and organising peer support through e-mail exchanges. 
The TAs worked with the districts from the summer of 2003 until June 2005. 
Some staff identified the departure of the TAs as a significant juncture for ERA. 
As detailed in previous reports,69 ASAs and local managers valued TAs not only as 
a key resource on programme rules and post-employment practices, but also for 
the support they provided to staff, particularly to ASAs in districts that followed a 
decentralised delivery model. In these cases, the TAs helped to compensate for the 
lack of standardised focus and direction that might otherwise have been provided 
by a centralised ERA management structure. The frequency of district-wide ASA 
meetings, which were often organised by the TAs, also declined in some districts 
after they left the demonstration. 
3.2.5 Evolving expertise on advancement
In the early days of the programme, ASAs were unfamiliar with what was entailed 
in providing post-employment support. As the programme progressed and they 
received specialised training, ASAs strengthened their skills and confidence in this 
area. A number of special guides, developed either by the TAs, the Project Team, 
or independently within districts, helped to improve staff delivery of advancement-
focused customer support. These included a ‘motivation sheet’, which aimed to 
identify an individual customer’s motivation and could be used as a ‘hook’ for 
maintaining engagement, and Advancement Action Plans, which were used to 
record customers’ goals and plans.
69 Hall et	al., 2005; Dorset et	al., 2007. 
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The use of Advancement Action Plans is a good example of how the delivery of 
ERA improved over time. Although these plans were to be used from the outset, 
advisers largely ignored them during the first year of operations. They viewed 
them as an unnecessary administrative burden, as they duplicated the New Deal 
action plans already required for pre-employment customers. Advancement 
Action Plans were completed for customers only as they entered work. During 
the programme’s second year of operation, the districts launched a big push to 
complete the plans for all customers, including those who were out of work, 
and to house them on a shared computer drive that was accessible to all ASAs 
and managers. As ERA matured, use of Advancement Action Plans grew into an 
essential part of its service delivery strategy. ASAs recorded decisions reached and 
advancement strategies agreed with customers at their meetings. They also used 
them to monitor their own work and to manage caseloads. 
By the end of ERA, Advancement Action Plans had three main functions: 
• Monitoring ASAs’ work: Initially, TAs and, latterly, managers, were able to use 
the action plans as a way of monitoring the post-employment services delivered 
by ASAs. The extent to which the managers utilised this opportunity varied 
across the districts, according to management structures and resources. It was 
generally more effective in centralised structures where time and expertise were 
available. In some districts, action plans were also reviewed to identify training 
support needs for staff development in conjunction with case conferencing and 
peer mentoring. 
• Managing caseloads: ASAs used action plans to remind themselves of 
customers’ details and to check whether agreed activities were being undertaken 
(by customers and staff). The action plans allowed customers to be transferred 
more effectively between staff, when necessary, and also provided a means of 
tailoring contacts with customers to their individual circumstances. 
• Working with customers on advancement: Some advisers also used action 
plans in their meetings with customers to develop advancement goals and 
collaboratively agree upon the steps needed to reach them. Goals and plans 
were then continually revisited, monitored, and revised, if necessary, at each 
contact. Staff felt that this built commitment and motivation among customers, 
and some ASAs, therefore, gave the customer a copy of the plan. ASAs also used 
the plans to develop creative thinking around advancement with customers and 
to ‘think outside the box’. 
3.2. When was ERA programme delivery at its best? 
Over time, several steps were taken which improved ERA staff’s capacity to assist 
their customers to meet their retention and advancement goals. In November 
2004, the DWP Project Team ring-fenced the districts’ ERA budgets and, in April 
2005, the Project Team set up a new financial accounting system and an ERA 
performance-monitoring system within each ERA district. These changes helped 
to ensure that ERA resources were channelled onto the programme. During this 
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time, PETs were also established in the London and North West England districts; 
some of the ASAs in the North East England, Scotland and Wales districts were 
protected from mainstream Jobcentre Plus tasks through ring-fencing; and in the 
East Midlands, a tier of ASA managers was introduced to provide more effective 
management support for ASAs. As mentioned previously, another important step 
was the specialised post-employment training for ASAs that the DWP Project Team, 
MDRC, and an outside training expert organised in January 2005 to strengthen 
ASAs’ capacity to engage and assist working customers. 
These and other efforts seemed to pay off. In staff interviews, ASAs and ERA 
managers expressed the view that their delivery of ERA greatly improved over time, 
as they continually built on their experiences and developed a better understanding 
of how to help their customers, especially in relation to their advancement in 
work. 
ERA’s implementation also benefited when an increased number of ASAs were 
assigned to the programme. For example, higher staff levels enabled some districts 
to re-engage customers who had drifted away from the programme and were 
not taking advantage of any of the ERA services or incentives. However, some 
districts, notably Wales, faced continual problems with low staffing levels. This 
posed an obstacle to re-engagement as ASAs focused on customers who were 
already participating in ERA. 
In many districts, changes in management structures influenced the strength 
of delivery over time. For example, ASAs in North West England felt that they 
reached a peak with their delivery in January 2006, helped by ring-fencing, a PET, 
and the basing of staff in one office. And in June 2007, the London PET said that 
the delivery of ERA in their district had constantly improved.
Overall, a number of operations, management, and advisory staff identified a 
period of approximately one year’s duration, spanning 2005 and 2006, as a period 
when ERA delivery was probably at its peak in most districts. However, in districts 
where the loss of the TAs in June 2005 was not compensated by additional ERA 
management, ASAs struggled to maintain momentum into 2006. 
Across all the districts, while the level of staff enthusiasm and understanding of ERA 
grew significantly over time, the delivery of ERA could still have been improved. 
Although by early 2006 staff largely understood the nature of the treatment they 
should be providing in ERA, they were still constrained by time. Resources being 
allocated to ERA had improved but these changes were fragile and varied across 
districts. 
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3.3 Programme delivery as ERA came to an end
The improvements observed in ERA operations extended to the months when the 
first customers started to flow off the programme in July 2006.70 Districts found 
that the structures that had been put in place for the successful delivery of ERA, 
such as PETs and ring-fenced staff, slowly dissolved as ERA approached an end. 
Many ASAs felt that the delivery of ERA weakened at that time.
One notable change to the delivery of ERA was the downsizing of the DWP ERA 
Project Team at the beginning of 2006. This made it more difficult to maintain 
central communication channels and contact between the districts began to 
decline. 
3.3. Weaning customers off ERA
All districts followed similar procedures for communicating to customers that their 
time on ERA was coming to an end. This was variously referred to as a ‘weaning 
off’ or ‘disengagement’ period. A letter typically relayed this at six months before 
the end date, again at six weeks before the end and again once ERA had ended. 
ASAs prepared personalised letters for active customers and standardised letters 
for inactive customers. This was a labour-intensive task and some ASAs felt that 
their time preparing correspondence for customers who were not engaged in 
the programme could have been better spent with those who were actively 
participating.
Across districts, ASAs gave varying levels of information and advice to departing 
customers. In North West England, they distributed a ‘disengagement folder’ 
that contained frequently-asked questions about job preparation, job hunting, 
budgeting or direct debits for utilities. The plan was to integrate this pack into 
mainstream Jobcentre Plus services. Some districts invited customers in for an 
interview at the six-month stage and it was often the case that ASAs personally 
communicated with customers with whom they were in more regular contact. In 
North West England, ASAs also called in pre-employment customers to meet at 
the time of their six-month letter. During the interview, ASAs informed customers 
of the in-work support available through ERA to act as a work incentive.
ASAs reported that customers who responded to the letters, most frequently 
requested support for training. Some ASAs actively marketed the unused training 
allowance to their customers. Some districts also made an active decision to push 
the training incentives towards the end of ERA. 
3.3.2 Post-ERA customer contact
The districts neither encouraged nor discouraged post-ERA contact with customers. 
Yet ASAs in all districts mentioned having continued contact with some customers 
who had completed their time on ERA, which was initiated by the customers 
themselves. This was more prevalent among NDLP than WTC customers. 
70 October 2006 in the North West England district.
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Although the volume of ASAs’ post-ERA contact with customers was low, advisers 
remarked that it was difficult to disengage, both for themselves and for the 
customers. The nature of the interaction varied depending upon the customer 
and was generally a continuation of previous support. For some customers, for 
example, this meant talking them through difficulties they might be having at 
work; for others, it might be discussing training outcomes and/or moving jobs. 
Often it was simply emotional support. Some advisers commented that they had 
spent a lot of time and effort building up relationships with customers and that 
it did not seem appropriate to end contact so abruptly. Most ASAs identified 
customers who were ‘particular favourites’, whom they treated more like a ‘friend’ 
and with whom they were genuinely interested in keeping in touch. Some ASAs 
also noted that some customers had become reliant on their relationship, and 
a small number were accustomed to consulting them on a regular basis. ASAs 
thought that such customers needed more time to disengage, for example:
‘I	think	it’s	either	the	ones	that	you’ve	built	up	a	long	relationship…the	ones	
that	went	 into	work	early	or	 the	ones	who	you’ve	had	a	particular	 lot	of	
input	with	or	a	lot	of	development	work	has	gone	on,	they	are	the	ones	that	
tend	to	want	to	keep	in	touch.’
3.3.3 Reductions in staffing
All districts cut staff resources on ERA as customer caseloads dropped, starting 
from summer 2006. This primarily affected advisory staff but in some districts, 
particularly those following a decentralised structure, ERA staff, including 
managers, were increasingly pulled off working on ERA to resume other duties in 
Jobcentre Plus offices. Senior management made decisions to reduce staffing and/
or the percentage of time spent on ERA in order to balance their staff resources. 
The message was clear that ERA was ‘running down’. For their own job security, 
ASAs also voluntarily moved to other posts (inside and outside of Jobcentre Plus) 
as they became available.
Because staffing was reduced, advisers had to take on the caseloads of departing 
ASAs. As a result, some reported that their caseloads became unmanageable. This 
was particularly evident in Wales, where, in March 2007, there was only one adviser 
peripatetically serving all 132 working ERA customers in the district. In addition, 
as customer caseloads dwindled, ASAs increasingly took on mainstream Jobcentre 
Plus tasks, which focused their attention away from programme delivery. This was 
more of a problem in the districts that followed a decentralised management 
model.
ASAs commented on how difficult it was for them to establish working relationships 
with their newly transferred customers and how this affected the quality of service 
they could provide. Some felt that the remaining time was too short for them to 
put a face to a name:




I’m	 looking	at	70	names	and	 they’re	names.	 I	don’t	 really	know	them	at	
all.	…If	 you	 take	 over	 somebody	 else’s	 customers,	 it’s	much	more	 of	 an	
administrative	process	rather	than	a	relationship.’
ASAs who specialised by ERA customer group commented that, with reductions 
in advisory staff, it was not always possible to assign customers to like advisers. 
This meant that some NDLP and WTC customers would be served by New Deal 
25 Plus (ND25+) advisers. Some ASAs were uncomfortable with this arrangement 
and found it difficult to adapt to a different customer group or way of working.
3.3.4 Staff morale
As more and more advisory staff returned to mainstream Jobcentre Plus service 
delivery, the remaining ASAs expressed concern about their future positions within 
Jobcentre Plus. Some were anxious because they were unsure about their future 
job prospects and others wished to preserve the ‘specialness’ of ERA and felt that 





The most significant challenge in the implementation of ERA was the establishment 
of an essentially post-employment programme outside the usual ethos and target 
structure of Jobcentre Plus. This meant that the new ERA staff – the ASAs – had 
to learn new skills to deliver the service and had to do so in a context in which 
they often felt that their efforts were not generally appreciated and rewarded. 
In an important sense, therefore, the ERA programme suffered because it was a 
demonstration project. 
Efforts were made, however, to improve implementation. The most important of 
these were to deliver specialised training to staff and to maximise the resources 
allocated to ERA. By mid-2005 to early 2006, to varying degrees, ERA was being 
delivered as planned, though still not to its full potential. The final year of ERA 
delivery was characterised by some problems caused by the demonstration coming 
to an end but also by some customers making renewed efforts to take advantage 
of the programme – particularly the support for training – before their time on 
ERA ended. This is discussed further in the next chapter, which explores patterns 
of customers’ participation in the programme and their receipt of ERA services 
and financial incentives. 
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4 Use of ERA’s post- 
 employment services and  
 financial incentives 
4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) customers’ 
involvement with Jobcentre Plus and, in particular, their receipt of ERA post-
employment adviser services and financial incentives. In addition, through 
comparisons with the control group, the chapter illustrates how ERA changed the 
experiences that customers normally had with Jobcentre Plus once they were in 
work. Thus, along with Chapter 3, it provides evidence on the extent to which the 
ERA treatment model was delivered as envisioned. 
The chapter focuses on the post-employment phase of ERA because the 
programme’s distinctiveness is to be found largely in the services and incentives 
offered to customers when they are in work. As described in a previous evaluation 
report on ERA,71 the use of pre-employment services offered through the New 
Deal programme, which primarily took the form of job search assistance and some 
access to training, was generally quite similar between the programme and control 
groups during the first year after sample members entered the study. This pattern 
continued in the second year of follow-up. (See Appendix D for further details on 
the delivery of pre-employment assistance.72)
71 See Dorsett et	al., 2007.
72 It should be noted that the focus of the chapter on post-employment services 
excludes services received when customers were ‘between jobs’ (i.e. if they 
entered work and then left). Programme group customers, unlike those in 
the control group, could receive continuing support from their Advancement 
Support Adviser (ASA) if they were between jobs, although the ERA financial 
supports and incentives would not be available to them.
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Most of the difference in service receipt between the programme and control 
groups is thus to be found among the working members of those groups. The 
chapter shows that, as expected, rates of in-work contact and support from 
Jobcentre Plus were much lower for control group customers. For the New Deal 
for Lone Parents (NDLP) control group, this is because the ordinary New Deal 
programme did not call for or fund advisers to maintain contact with participants 
after they secured jobs of at least 16 hours per week. Moreover, as Chapter 3 
explains, adviser performance incentives were based on ‘job entries’, which would 
not encourage the offer of post-employment support in the absence of a special 
intervention such as ERA. Contact rates for the Working Tax Credit (WTC) control 
group members were also very low because, as workers holding jobs of at least 16 
hours a week, they were not eligible for New Deal services and, consequently, did 
not have an established relationship with a Jobcentre Plus adviser. 
Still, contacts between Jobcentre Plus advisers and their former customers 
sometimes occurred after the customers took a job, though often informally and 
at the customers’ initiative. In addition, some working lone parents enrolled in 
education and training programmes in the community on their own, without 
assistance from Jobcentre Plus staff. This chapter shows the nature and degree of 
such contacts and the rates of participation in education and training that would 
normally occur in the absence of ERA, as reflected in the experiences of the ERA 
control group. 
Working people, especially lone parents, have busy lives and, for a variety of 
reasons, some might have chosen not to respond to ERA’s offer of in-work support 
or might not have been able to meet the conditions necessary to receive the 
incentive payments. Implementation problems, such as those described in Chapter 
3, might have also hindered take-up. A critical evaluation question, therefore, is: 
How much did working members of the programme group actually use ERA’s post-
employment support? This chapter addresses that question, showing the extent 
to which the programme group received in-work job coaching and other adviser 
support from Jobcentre Plus. As will be seen, receipt rates are quite substantial, 
although far from universal, and it is clear that workers in the NDLP and WTC 
programme groups had very different levels of involvement with Jobcentre Plus 
than workers in the control groups. 
The chapter begins by reporting on the extent and quality of the contact and 
engagement of working customers with Jobcentre Plus staff, comparing the 
programme and control groups to reveal the extent to which ERA generated 
patterns that differed from ‘business as usual’ for Jobcentre Plus. It then examines 
more closely the services working programme group members received, describing 
the types of help and support ERA advisers provided and the delivery, take-up, and 
uses of the programme’s various financial incentives.
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4.2 Patterns of engagement with Jobcentre Plus
4.2. In-work contact with Jobcentre Plus
Customer survey data (information collected in both the 12-month and 24-month 
surveys) show that virtually all of the WTC sample members and about three-
quarters of the NDLP sample members worked at some point within the first two 
years after random assignment. Most of this group had some form of contact with 
Jobcentre Plus while employed. Among NDLP working customers, 81 per cent 
of those in the programme group had contact with Jobcentre Plus staff when in 
work, which is nearly twice the control group rate of 42 per cent (see Figure 4.1).73 
Among WTC workers, the differential was nearly fourfold, with 84 per cent of 
those in the programme group and only 22 per cent of those in the control group 
having had such contact. The especially low rate among the WTC control group 
reflects the fact that, unlike the NDLP control group, they were already working 
when they entered the study and most did not have an established relationship 
with Jobcentre Plus at that time. 
For the NDLP and WTC programme groups, the above statistics reflect a pattern of 
contact with Jobcentre Plus that began in the first year of follow-up and continued 
into the second year. In contrast, contacts with control group members dropped 
off substantially in the second year. In other words, as anticipated, ERA generated 
sustained involvement with Jobcentre Plus after customers entered jobs. 
The survey also reveals other important differences in the nature and quality of the 
support received by programme group members while in work. Together, these 
findings suggest that the in-work engagement of the ERA programme group 
members was indeed different from ‘normal’ Jobcentre Plus practice. For example, 
while in work, programme group members were substantially more likely than 
those in the control group to meet with Jobcentre Plus staff face to face, as well 
as to speak by telephone; to meet at a place other than the Jobcentre Plus office 
(e.g. the customer’s home or workplace or a coffee shop), as well as at those 
offices; and to be contacted by an adviser without having requested contact 
(Figure 4.1). Their frequency of face-to-face in-work contact was also much higher. 
For example, compared with working control group members, workers in the 
NDLP programme group were five times as likely to have had ten or more contacts 
over the two-year follow-up period, and the WTC programme group saw a 20-
fold increase. (Table E.1). 
73 For a small number of control group members as well as ERA customers, this 
in-work contact may reflect contact during participation in the New Deal 
programme among working participants who were employed less than 16 
hours per week, rather than in-work support provided in a post-New Deal 
job. 
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Figure 4. Patterns of contact with Jobcentre Plus staff among  
 ERA customers who worked within two years after  
 random assignment
 
The quality of the contact also differed. Working control group members often 
spoke with any available adviser rather than their ‘own’ (for example, their 
previous New Deal adviser) or with receptionists or clerks. In contrast, workers in 
the ERA programme group almost always said that they spoke to their own ASA 
NDLP WTC
Had any contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while in work (%)
ERA group
Control group
Had telephone contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while in work (%)
ERA group
Control group
Had face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while in work (%)
ERA group
Control group
Among those who had face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff, met with staff
at Jobcentre Plus office while in work (%)
ERA group
Control group
Among those who had face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff, met with staff
away from the Jobcentre Plus office while in work (%)
ERA group
Control group
Received any help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff on retention
and advancement while in work (%)
ERA group
Control group
Jobcentre Plus staff offered help/advice without customer requesting it (%)
ERA group
Control group





















SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTE: Comparisons are non-experimental since they were calculated over a portion of the sample. Statistical 
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and rarely to anyone else.74 Most importantly, programme group members who 
worked were much more likely than those in the control group to report that they 
had received various forms of ‘help and advice’ from Jobcentre Plus staff to assist 
them with employment retention or advancement. On this measure, 61 per cent 
of workers in the NDLP programme group and 75 per cent of WTC programme 
group members said that they had received such help and advice while in work 
(see Figure 4.1). The rates were substantially lower among working control group 
members: 19 per cent of the NDLP control group and just seven per cent of the 
WTC control group. 
4.2.2 Patterns of engagement among the programme group
Qualitative data from customers and staff reveal three basic patterns of involvement 
with Jobcentre Plus.75 However, programme group customers also moved between 
these types of involvement over the course of their participation in ERA:
• those who maintained in-work contact with staff, often adviser-initiated, that 
was organised around receipt of the financial incentives (retention bonus, 
training fees, or training bonus);
• those who maintained contact with their advisers, primarily customer-initiated, 
because of difficulties they were having in their work or personal lives; and
• those who disengaged from the programme and had little contact.
The administration of the financial incentives provided a useful means for ASAs 
to organise their in-work contact with customers, as was in fact envisaged in the 
design of ERA. As described in Chapter 3, ASAs struggled with in-work contact, 
particularly in the early days of the programme. They were not sure how often 
to contact customers or how proactive they should be in cases where customers 
seemed uninterested. The administration of the financial incentives provided a 
convenient mechanism for them to maintain contact. The receipt of incentives 
required customers (in most cases) to come into the office to fill out paperwork, 
and (in the case of the retention bonus) this happened at regular intervals. It gave 
ASAs a specific ‘hook’ to encourage customers to come in and a specific reason to 
visit their ASA. For both, it was an obvious way to organise their contacts.
ASAs spoke of how contact organised around the retention bonus could be used 
as an opportunity to promote other retention and advancement services. They 
could, for example, remind customers about training incentives, find out how they 
were getting on at work, and talk about ways of advancing. This pattern was also 
reflected in customer interviews, in which they said that discussion with ASAs in 
74 These patterns are suggested by the responses of a small survey subsample 
who were asked additional questions about their contacts with Jobcentre 
Plus staff. See Table E.2.
75 The content of this engagement and the types of help and support received 
are discussed in a later section.
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meetings had prompted them to look into elements of the programme, such as 
training, that they might not otherwise have remembered.
As will be discussed more below, survey data suggest that about three-quarters of 
those receiving the employment retention bonus talked with Jobcentre Plus staff 
about work or work prospects when visiting the office to pick up their bonus. 
Those who were engaged in this way recalled discussing a range of advancement-
related topics with their ASAs, most commonly finding an education or training 
course, working out long-term career goals, getting a better job, or improving 
their skills or prospects in other ways. 
The extent to which ASAs maintained proactive contact with customers between 
the scheduled bonus meetings varied considerably across advisers and customers. 
Resource issues (staff shortages, heavy workloads) made it difficult for ASAs 
to reach out proactively to all customers on their caseloads. However, as ASAs 
became more experienced, they felt that the pattern of in-work contact should be 
individually tailored to customers’ needs. A benchmark of monthly contact for all 
working customers was set in some districts during 2005. It was quickly relaxed, 
however, as staff and customers developed their own routines. At the same time, 





Another pattern of engagement was organised around helping customers who 
had difficulties in their work or personal lives, including those who needed help 
settling into work, who became interested in a new job or who needed support 
coping with circumstantial events or personal difficulties. This type of customer-
initiated, in-work support is sometimes offered by NDLP advisers outside of ERA 
as part of ‘normal’ Jobcentre Plus business, although it is usually restricted to the 
early days of work. This is supported by survey data (not shown) indicating that 
in-work contact for NDLP control group customers was at a lower level in follow-
up year two than in year one, while for the programme group it remained at the 
same level across the two years. 
The qualitative data from customers and advisers suggest that it was primarily 
NDLP, rather than WTC, ERA customers who contacted advisers for help with 
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The perceived ‘neediness’ of the NDLP group customers, which was commented 
on by many advisers, presented both a challenge and an opportunity for advisers. 
On the one hand, it brought some employed lone parents into the office on a 
regular basis but on the other hand, advisers had to think creatively in order to 
use these contacts as opportunities to refocus the customer on the programme’s 
advancement goals. (This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2.)
Not all lone parents remained engaged with the ERA programme once they were 
employed. As indicated by the survey data presented in Figure 4.1, only a minority 
of ERA working participants (though not a trivial one) had no in-work contact 
with Jobcentre Plus at all over the two-year follow-up period: 19 per cent of NDLP 
workers and 16 per cent of WTC workers fell into this category. 
Given the heavy reliance on organising contacts with customers around the 
administration of the financial incentives, it is not surprising that the majority of 
working customers who disengaged from the programme were lone parents who 
were working only part-time and not undertaking training. However, ASAs were 
also responsible for the disengagement of some customers. Particularly in the 
early days of the programme, when ASAs were unfamiliar with in-work support 
and caseloads were sometimes higher than planned, customers who were not 
receiving any ERA incentives often ‘dropped to the bottom of the pile’ in terms of 
proactive outreach.
Some customers were also indifferent to continuing adviser support because 
they generally viewed Jobcentre Plus as an out-of-work service, not as a place 
they would turn to for help once they were employed. Hence, some customers 
expressed the view that they would not routinely contact their ASA once in work 
unless there was ‘a problem’:





When customers were re-engaged by their ASA, their views often changed and 
they became more positive about in-work support. However, ASAs found it quite 
difficult to re-engage customers once they had lost contact with them.
Although it was unlikely that customers would completely disengage, qualitative 
data suggest that large numbers of customers moved between engagement and 
disengagement over the course of their time in the ERA programme. Some of this 
movement reflected changes in customers’ circumstances which rendered contact 
with the programme more or less useful to them. These included, for example, 
increasing or decreasing work hours, which resulted in customers becoming 
eligible or ineligible for the retention bonus; taking up or finishing training; or 
retention problems like a job finishing or dissatisfaction with work which might 
prompt a customer to make renewed contact. Other changes related to Jobcentre 
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Plus capacity. For example, disengagement or re-engagement often coincided 
with staffing changes: Some customers had regular contact with an ASA which 
was disrupted if the adviser left; others were re-engaged when a new ASA took 
over their case.
4.2.3 Customer attitudes towards Jobcentre Plus staff
Programme group customers generally held positive views of their relationships 
with Jobcentre Plus staff. For example, according to the customer surveys covering 
the two-year follow-up period, over 60 per cent of NDLP and WTC programme 
group customers who had any face-to-face or telephone contact with a particular 
staff member at Jobcentre Plus while employed said that they got ‘a lot’ of support 
from that person while they were working. Only about 14 per cent said they got 
‘little’ or ‘no’ support. It is also noteworthy that, overall, customers who were in 
contact with Jobcentre Plus staff saw value in the interaction. For example, over 
80 per cent of programme group customers ever in work who had face-to-face 
or telephone contact with Jobcentre Plus staff rated the help and advice they got 
from Jobcentre Plus as ‘very helpful’ or ‘quite helpful’ (see Table E.3).
Qualitative data also suggest a high degree of satisfaction among customers with 
the support provided by ERA advisers, although the nature of relationships between 
staff and customers varied considerably. Some customers relied extensively on 
their ASAs for help dealing with a range of issues, including personal and family 
problems. Such customers might develop a very close relationship, as is evident in 
these comments from one customer:
‘I	contact	[my ASA]	almost	every	month	or	so,	or	more	often	than	that,	because	
I’m	having	a	 lot	of	problems	and	he	was	 there	 to	 support,	he	 supported	
through	 everything.	 He	 knows	 everything	 that	 I’m	 going	 through…just	
somebody	to	talk	to,	because	as	you	know	I	haven’t	got	nobody,	no	friends,	
nobody	to	talk	to.	It’s	only	me	and	my	children.’





Other customers were much more self-sufficient and interacted with their ASA 
more strategically for particular kinds of support and expertise (for example, for 
help accessing training). 
Customers generally valued the continuity of support from a single ASA who 
knew their circumstances and was able to provide individually tailored support. 
However, given the staffing difficulties referred to in Chapter 3, many customers 
had to change ASAs during the course of their participation in ERA. This was more 
difficult for those customers who had developed a very close personal relationship 
with an adviser, but in many cases such transitions proceeded smoothly, and 
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customers were more concerned about the quality of support than its continuity 
per se. As suggested earlier, transitions between ASAs did lead customers to 
disengage in some cases, but this tended to be when an overall staff shortage 
meant that it was difficult for them to contact any adviser for help or when they 
were passed between ASAs many times.
4.3 Types of in-work support provided by Jobcentre Plus
The types of in-work help and advice offered by Jobcentre Plus advisers can 
be broadly divided into retention-focused and advancement-focused support, 
although there is some overlap between the two. This section addresses each in 
turn, before examining the support provided through the Emergency Discretion 
Fund (EDF).
4.3. Retention-focused support
The survey asked customers whether Jobcentre Plus staff helped them deal with 
any personal or family problems that made it hard for them to keep a job and 
whether they had received help from staff in dealing with problems at work. 
While the receipt of such retention-focused support was generally low, it was 
substantially higher for customers in the programme group relative to those in 
the control group. For example, among customers who worked, 21 per cent of 
NDLP and 13 per cent of WTC customers in the programme group received help 
with personal or family problems while employed, compared with only seven per 
cent and two per cent, respectively, of those in the control group (see Table 4.1). 
Additionally, 13 per cent of NDLP and eight per cent of WTC working programme 
group members received help dealing with problems at work, compared with four 
per cent and one per cent, respectively, in the control group. 
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Table 4. Receipt of in-work help or advice from Jobcentre Plus  
 staff within two years after random assignment among  
 customers who worked
It is unlikely that these two survey items capture the full extent of retention-
focused assistance that customers received. Qualitative data provide fuller detail 
on the range of support provided. (The provision of financial support for retention 
is addressed in a later section.) For example, retention support also included:
• supporting the transition into work by helping with in-work benefit claims, 
childcare arrangements and payments, rent and housing benefit issues or 
transport to work. While customers’ need for such assistance tended to be 
greater when they first moved into work, it could also be continuing. For 
example, some customers had to renew WTC claims when their circumstances 
changed, to deal with overpayments and administrative errors or changes in 
their childcare arrangements;
• providing continuing job search assistance when customers wanted to change 
jobs (thus supporting both retention and advancement goals);
• providing continuing support (practical and emotional) in resolving personal 
problems (negative work relationships, debt, depression or domestic violence) 
that could undermine steady employment;
• providing one-off ‘crisis’ support – for example, financial assistance to cover 
time off work resulting from accident or injury.
ERA Control ERA Control
Outcome group group group group
While in work, received help or advice dealing with personal or family
problems that made job retention hard (%) 21.4 6.7 12.9 1.6
While in work, received help or advice dealing with problems at
work (%) 13.1 3.8 7.9 0.8
While in work, received any help or advice on (%)
Getting job with better pay or conditions 31.8 9.5 47.7 3.4
Increasing hours of work 30.2 9.2 52.8 2.5
Negotiating a pay rise 5.0 1.2 7.4 0.4
Negotiating  better job terms, e.g. more convenient hours 11.7 3.0 11.0 1.3
Getting a promotion in present work 11.8 1.6 15.0 0.9
Getting a more permanent job or contract 14.7 4.1 15.9 1.4
Working out long-term career goals 32.4 6.8 50.0 2.3
Finding an training or education course 44.4 9.7 65.1 3.1
Other type of help 11.6 3.4 19.3 1.3
Any in-work help/advice 61.1 19.0 75.2 6.9
Sample size 904 782 1,066 1,009
WTCNDLP
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Comparisons are non-experimental since they were calculated over a portion of the sample. Statistical tests were 
not performed. 
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Qualitative data from both staff and customers suggest that ASAs provided 
retention-focused assistance more commonly to NDLP rather than WTC customers. 
In particular, it was much more likely for NDLP customers to rely on ASAs for 
emotional support (either encouragement to stay in work or help with personal 
problems). This is supported by the survey findings cited previously. It reflects the 
fact that the WTC customers, owing to their previous work experience, were 
(generally) more settled in work when they entered the ERA programme and 
thus had less need for such assistance. In contrast, NDLP customers were often 
entering work after a lengthy period on benefits and required more help to become 
established in work. It also reflects greater acceptance of, and reliance upon, 
advisory support by NDLP customers, who were more likely to have established a 
relationship with an adviser while out of work, either during their participation in 
ERA or previously. 
Qualitative data also show that, while ASAs supported customers’ efforts to stay 
in work, they only rarely contacted employers or dealt directly with customers’ 
problems at work. ASAs generally felt uncomfortable intervening in the 
relationship between customers and their employers, and customers also mostly 
felt that this would be inappropriate. There were only occasional instances when 
ASAs contacted employers on a customer’s behalf. Customers did value advisers’ 
support, however, in discussing how to deal with problems in the workplace.
4.3.2 Advancement-focused support
According to the customer survey data, some NDLP and WTC control group 
members received various forms of in-work help and advice related to advancement 
from Jobcentre Plus staff. However, as expected, the rate of receipt was much 
higher for the programme group for almost every form of assistance specified in 
the survey (Table 4.1).76
The most common types of help or advice received by employed ERA programme 
group customers were help finding education or training, determining career 
goals, increasing work hours and getting a better job (Table 4.1). Least common 
were support in getting a promotion, negotiating better job terms and negotiating 
a pay rise. 
Qualitative data from staff and customers further suggest that, aside from 
encouragement to increase hours, the advancement goals that ASAs and 
76 Table E.4 presents estimates of ERA’s impacts on the combined likelihood of 
working and of receiving each of these different forms of in-work help and 
advice from Jobcentre Plus staff. All survey respondents in the programme 
and control group are included in the estimates in Table E.4, even if they 
did not work. The estimates are experimental ones and show ERA’s effects 
on sample members’ likelihood of meeting both outcome conditions (i.e. 
working and receiving help/advice). See Box 5.1 for further information on 
reading the impact tables in the report.
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customers were working towards usually related to moving into a different field 
of work. Hence, advisory support was oriented towards training, if that was 
required for the desired work, and/or job search. In some cases, when customers’ 
advancement goals were less clearly defined, ASAs encouraged them to increase 
their confidence and skills by pursuing training. As reflected in the survey findings 
above, it was relatively rare for ASAs to assist customers to seek advancement in 
their existing workplace, such as through promotion. Both ASAs and customers 
generally saw this as outside advisers’ area of competency. Moreover, ASAs had 
limited contact with employers and hence, did not feel confident negotiating with 
them directly about advancement opportunities for customers.
Both the survey and the qualitative data show that WTC customers in the 
programme group were more likely than NDLP customers to view contact with an 
ASA as primarily directed towards an advancement goal. Similarly, it was primarily 
WTC customers who were aware of having an Advancement Action Plan. This 
reflects the different way in which WTC customers were recruited onto the ERA 
programme: They were already working from the start, and their initial meetings 
with ASAs typically focused on advancement goals. When they maintained 
continuing contact, their meetings followed up on progress towards those 
goals. Because WTC customers were less likely to need and seek help retaining 
employment, their ASAs could focus more on advancement. In contrast, the first 
priority for NDLP customers when they entered the study was to find work. 
ASAs often deferred working on advancement with NDLP customers. These 
customers often needed help resolving crises that threatened work retention 
before advisers could begin to address advancement. ASAs also felt that it was 
necessary for customers to ‘settle’ in to work first. This can be seen in comments 







As suggested in Chapter 3, ASAs grew more confident over time in their ability 
to deliver advancement support to customers. This was very evident in qualitative 
interviews with ASAs. In the first round of interviews (spring 2004), the majority 
of ASAs, when asked about how they promoted advancement with customers, 
mentioned only their marketing of the training incentives. In later waves of 
interviews, however, many ASAs had developed a more sophisticated and nuanced 
understanding of advancement and how to promote it among customers, 
including among those who were initially unreceptive. These later understandings 
and practices included the view that advancement could potentially mean a range 
of different things for different people and hence, should be individually tailored, 
and also that advancement coaching could be effective if approached creatively, 
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in	 good	 stead	 for	moving	 on,	 increasing	 their	 hours,	 getting	 promotion,	
whatever,	so	start	small	and	hopefully	move	on	from	there.’	
With greater experience, advisers also recognised that the ‘right time’ for 
advancement was unique to customers; for example, some customers expressed 
a ‘deferred orientation’ to advancement, preferring to delay advancement steps 
until their children were older.77 Advisers recommended maintaining a line of 
communication so that they could discuss advancement once the time was ‘right’ 
for that customer.
4.3.3 EDF payments
ERA customers who entered work could receive assistance from the EDF to take 
care of minor financial emergencies that might prevent them from continuing in 
work. 
Take-up	of	EDF	payments
Financial payment records indicate that, respectively, 23 per cent and 18 per cent 
of NDLP and WTC programme group customers who worked during the two-year 
follow-up period received EDF assistance (see Figure 4.2). Seventy per cent of 
those who received a payment received just one, while only 11 per cent received 
three or more payments (Table E.5). For those who received EDF assistance, total 
per-person payments averaged £235 for NDLP customers and £206 for WTC 
customers.
77 See Hoggart et	al., 2006. 
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Figure 4.2 Receipt of EDF payments among ERA customers within  
 two years after random assignment
 
Delivery	of	EDF	payments
At the start of ERA, ASAs were uncertain about how best to use EDF monies, and, 
consequently, they did not proactively promote their availability to customers as 
part of the ERA package. However, as ASAs grew more confident in their role 
and learned how to use the EDF, they came to feel more comfortable exercising 
discretion in distributing the funds and using them as a retention tool. In the 
final focus groups (May 2007), many ASAs talked about how they had used the 





This change over time was also evident in the qualitative customer interviews. 
Early interviews (conducted in autumn 2004) suggested that very few customers 
knew of the availability of the EDF. Their accounts confirm that ASAs did not tell 
them about this element of ERA as a matter of course. Customers who received 
those funds learned about them only after having told their ASAs that they were 
in financial difficulty, at which point the advisers indicated that a flexible pot of 
money could be used to help them. By the second wave of interviews (in autumn 
2005), many more customers knew of the EDF and more had used those funds. 
Still, there remained a substantial group of customers who had no knowledge of 
the EDF, suggesting that many ASAs told customers about it only on a ‘need to 
know’ basis.
Customers’ attitudes to the EDF varied. Some who had received payments 
expressed disbelief and gratitude at the help received, seen in the comments of 
one customer whose car had broken down:
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Work status and measure NDLP WTC
A. All ERA customers (%)
Received EDF payments
Sample size 1,188 1,082
B. All ERA customers who
worked (%)
Received EDF payments
Sample size 904 1,066







Sometimes customers who had not received EDF payments expressed reluctance 
to request the money, with many saying ‘I	didn’t	need	it’. Some also talked about 
being embarrassed or not wanting to admit that they were struggling financially.
Despite ASAs’ growing confidence in using the EDF, some evidence suggests that 
they disbursed it unevenly and for different purposes:
‘I’ve	not	really	used	the	EDF;	I’ve	only	used	it	five	times.	…I	suppose	mine	
[incentive payments]	 have	 been	 retention	 bonuses	 and	 training	 fees	 and	
bonuses,	so	EDF	I’ve	probably	not	told	them	about.’
ASAs commented on some of the difficulties involved in having discretion over the 
payments. One ASA talked about how she had made a large payment to help a 
customer with her rent arrears. A few months later, the same customer once again 
had rent arrears and the ASA realised that what the customer really needed was 
help with household budgeting rather than emergency payments. Other ASAs 
indicated that this was not an isolated incident.
Uses	of	the	EDF
According to interviews with staff and customers, ASAs used EDF payments for a 
number of purposes, including:
• childcare costs, including unexpected costs arising from problems claiming tax 
credits;
• moving from benefits that were received weekly to a job that paid monthly, 
creating difficulty managing expenses during that transition;
• moving house and having to pay two amounts of rent;
• paying for petrol when settling into a new job; and
• covering childcare expenses during unpaid sick leave.
In general, the most common uses were for childcare and housing-related 
expenses.
4.4 Customers’ receipt of ERA’s in-work financial  
 incentives
In addition to in-work job coaching and financial assistance from the EDF, ERA 
offered a range of financial incentives designed to promote steady full-time 
employment and skills training while employed. Using survey and administrative 
records data, this section describes the extent to which ERA programme group 
members received those incentives. Using qualitative data, it also describes how 
staff marketed the incentives to customers, how customers viewed the offer and 
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responded to it and how those who received payments tended to use the extra 
money. 
4.4. Employment retention bonus
ERA customers could receive an employment retention bonus of £400, payable 
every 17 weeks, if they worked for at least 30 hours a week for 13 out of the 17 
weeks. They could claim a maximum of six bonus payments.
Knowledge	and	take-up	of	the	employment	retention	bonus
Most lone parents assigned to the programme group – 88 per cent among both 
NDLP and WTC customers – said that they had heard of the employment retention 
bonus (Figure 4.3). However, fewer actually received a bonus. For example, only 
30 per cent of all NDLP ERA customers and 37 per cent of WTC ERA customers 
received a bonus. To an important extent, this relatively low rate reflects the fact 
that most ERA customers did not work full-time. Indeed, the rates of bonus receipt 
climbed to 75 per cent and 76 per cent, respectively, for NDLP and WTC customers 
who did work full-time. (Of course, not all of those who worked full-time did so 
for the 13 out of 17 weeks necessary to qualify for the bonus.) 
Figure 4.3 Awareness and receipt of employment retention  
 bonuses among ERA customers within two years after  
 random assignment
Work status and measure NDLP WTC
A. All ERA customers (%)
Were aware of the employment 
retention bonus (%)a
Received any employment retention
bonuses (%)
Received more than one bonus (%)
Received all six bonuses (%)
Sample size 1,188 1,082
B. All ERA customers who worked
full time (%)
Received any employment retention
bonuses (%)
Received more than one bonus (%)
Received all six bonuses (%)
Sample size 440 442
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data and ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTE: aThe source for this outcome is the 12- and 24-month customer surveys. The source for all other outcomes 
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Those who received employment retention bonuses got an average of three bonus 
payments during the two-year follow-up period. About 25 per cent in both target 
groups received just one payment, while only six per cent of NDLP and four per 
cent of WTC customers received all six bonuses (see Table E.6). It is important to 
note, however, that bonus receipt rates continued to climb after the two-year 
follow-up period that is the focus of this report.78
Some customers who may have been eligible for the bonus failed to claim it. 
According to staff interviews, among the reasons for this might have been a fear 
among some customers that there was a ‘catch’ somewhere or a misunderstanding 
that the payment would affect their tax credit eligibility or that they would not 
be entitled to the payment because they had re-partnered. Some customers may 
not have been aware that they were eligible. Although awareness of the retention 
bonus was generally high (see Figure 4.3), it was not universal. Moreover, some 
recipients indicated in qualitative interviews that they had not known about the 
incentive until their ASA had reminded them. One lone parent, for instance, said 
that she had increased her working hours but was unaware of the bonus until her 
ASA phoned her ‘out of the blue’. Some customers may also not have claimed 
the bonus simply because they had disengaged from the programme and were no 
longer in touch with their advisers. 
How	customers	used	the	employment	retention	bonus
In the qualitative interviews, customers talked about using the retention bonus in 
a variety of ways. For example, some relied on the bonus to help them ‘get by’ 
financially; some used it for ‘treats’ or ‘extras’; and a few talked about using it for 
work-related expenditures, but this was uncommon.
To get by financially
For many lone parents, the retention bonus improved their financial well-being. 
This was more likely to be the case during the first few months of work and often 
because it helped address financial difficulties resulting from another income 
source drying up. For example, one WTC customer who had incorrectly received 
too much in tax credits (a common occurrence) used the money to pay back those 
overpayments: ‘I	was	struggling	and	it	bailed	me	out	a	bit	there’. Another WTC 
customer was using the incentive money to take the place of child maintenance 
payments that her ex-partner had stopped making. More commonly, customers 
used the bonus to pay off debts accumulated while out of work or sometimes 
while in work.
In some cases, the incentive was consciously used to supplement low-paid work. 
Customers who used it in this way talked about being able to accept a poorly paid 
job and still be better off in work.
78 For example, looking at the period of ERA operations through July 2007 
reveals that 32 per cent of NDLP and 42 per cent of WTC customers received 
a bonus over this extended period. In addition, 17 per cent and 11 per cent, 
respectively, received all six bonuses over this period (see Table E.6).
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To pay for ‘extras’
Some customers referred to the bonus as being used for ‘extras’ or ‘treats’, which 
generally revolved around family and home life – for example, going on a family 
holiday, taking the children out, decorating their homes or buying consumer 
goods, such as washing machines. Some customers started off using the payments 
to pay off debts and then later used them for ‘treats’. While not strictly essential 
to staying in work, a number of ASAs emphasised that using the incentive money 
for these purposes could enhance customers’ well-being. They felt that being able 
to afford such things was immensely important to lone parents and was a strong 
incentive to work full-time.
Did	the	retention	bonus	influence	customer	behaviour?
Chapter 5 provides statistical evidence on the effects of ERA on customers’ 
experiences in the labour market within the two years after random assignment. 
As will be seen, it shows that ERA was effective in increasing the likelihood that 
customers would work full-time. However, that impact analysis cannot easily 
isolate the effects of the retention bonus from the other features of ERA with 
which it is bundled. It is possible to gain some insight into the potential influence 
of the bonuses by exploring ERA staff and customers’ own views on the role of 
the incentives in influencing behaviour. In general, the findings suggest that the 
bonuses were a relevant influence but that that influence was also constrained by 
a number of competing factors. 
The customer survey data reveal considerable variety in whether customers felt 
that the bonus influenced their decision-making. Around two-fifths to half of 
customers who received a retention bonus said that it influenced their decision 
to work 30 hours or more per week, ‘a lot’ (41 per cent and 49 per cent for the 
NDLP and WTC groups, respectively). However, about another third said that it 
had no influence at all on their decision to work 30 hours (37 per cent and 34 
per cent for the NDLP and WTC groups, respectively) (see Table 4.2). Customers’ 
responses followed a similar pattern when they were asked whether the bonus 
offer encouraged them to stay in full-time work.
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Table 4.2 ERA bonus recipients’ assessments of the influence of  
 the bonuses on their decisions concerning employment  
 and training
 
Qualitative data indicate that how well the bonus worked as an incentive to retain 
work was influenced by a number of factors, such as what customers used the 
incentive for, how happy they were at work, how well their childcare arrangements 
were working and whether or not they wanted to undertake training. If the 
customer was happy with a job, for example, the bonus was less likely to make 
a difference. Some lone parents, however, talked about how the incentive gave 
them the impetus to work full-time, when they might otherwise have opted for 
part-time work:
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NDLP ERA WTC ERA
Outcome group group
A. Employment retention bonus
'How much did this bonus influence your decision to work 30 hours or
more per week?' (%)
A lot 41.3 49.2
A little 21.8 16.5
None 37.0 34.3
'How much did the bonus encourage you to stay in full-time work?' (%)
A lot 42.8 47.4
A little 18.7 19.1
None 38.5 33.6
Talked with Jobcentre Plus staff about work or work prospects when 72.1 77.6
claimed bonus (%)
Topic discussed, for those who talked with Jobcentre Plus staff when
claimed bonus (%)
Getting job with better pay or conditions 27.9 30.1
Increasing hours of work 11.9 24.3
How to negotiate a pay rise 5.3 4.2
How to get a promotion in present work 11.1 13.1
How to get a more permanent job or contract 13.3 4.0
Working out long-term career goals 38.9 36.4
Finding an training or education course 50.6 54.7
Other topics discussed 28.4 27.2
Sample size (bonus recipients) 354 409
B. Training completion bonus
'How much did this bonus influence your decision to start the training?' (%)
A lot 49.5 45.5
A little 25.5 27.2
None 25.0 27.4
'How much did the bonus encourage you to continue the training?' (%)
A lot 54.7 53.6
A little 16.8 23.6
None 28.5 22.9
Sample size (bonus recipients) 91 295




A number of lone parents who had increased their hours also found this quite a 
struggle and, in many such cases, looking forward to the bonus and knowing it 
could be spent on something that they would not otherwise be able to afford was 







When customers used the incentives to repay debts accumulated while out of 
work, the payments also seemed to help them remain in full-time work.
Some lone parents, though, did not want to work full-time and were indifferent 
to the incentive. In these cases, financial calculations were outweighed by other 
– generally family-based – considerations. These were lone parents who had other 
priorities: Either they wanted to spend time training and could not combine this 
with full-time work or they felt that their caring responsibilities were such that 
they were not willing to work full-time.
In some instances, lone parents were held back by the limited availability of full-
time work in their place of employment. But where they were able to, some took 
on a second, or sometimes a third, job in order to qualify for the bonus. Advisers 
confirmed that a number of their customers did this.
There was a noticeable change over time in the opinions of ERA staff about the 
efficacy of the bonus in moving lone parents into full-time work. Whereas many 
staff interviewed in the first year of the programme were sceptical about the 
possibilities of lone parents being ‘persuaded’ to increase their hours, by the end 
of the programme most staff said that this was the biggest change they had seen. 
They also talked about lone parents getting accustomed to working full-time and 
appreciating the lifestyle that went with it. They emphasised the role of the bonus 
in encouraging lone parents to take full-time work, although they also noted that 








Use of ERA‘s post-employment services and financial incentives
89
Customers’	reactions	to	the	bonus	ending
The predominant staff view on the effect of the bonuses ending was that customers 
had become accustomed to working full-time, had adopted a different lifestyle 
and perhaps taken on more financial commitments and were, therefore, likely to 
continue working full-time.
Customers’ thoughts about the payments coming to an end were clearly connected 
to their attitudes towards receiving the payments. Customers who were claiming 
the incentives but had expressed indifference to them also said that the payments 
coming to an end would not change their behaviour. Customers who saw the 
incentives as a ‘treat’ or an ‘extra’ had mixed reactions about their ending. Some 
said that they were dependent on the bonuses, while others said that it would not 
hurt financially when the payments stopped. Some of those who acknowledged 
that it was ‘spare cash’ nonetheless said that they would be disappointed when 
that extra money would no longer be available. 
Although there were customers who said that they would be upset by the bonuses 
ending, they mostly did not intend to leave work when their incomes fell. For 
example, one customer in a second interview, reflecting on the bonuses ending, 
said that she would ‘…really,	really	miss	it’ but was quite resigned: ‘…	oh	well,	
my	treats	have	gone’. Confirming the staff view, she said that when the bonuses 
ended, she would continue working 30 hours because she was used to it:
‘I	was	 then	 in	 a	 routine.	When	 I	 upped	my	hours	 I	 thought,	 “How	am	 I	
going	to	do	it?”	And	I	am.	I	mean	some	weeks	are	better	than	others	for	
babysitters,	but	you	do	it,	you	do	get	by.’
In cases where customers used the bonus for daily living expenses, there were 
different responses. Customers talked about wanting to look for a better job once 
the payments finished or about having to manage in other ways. When customers 
had repaid debts with the bonus, their ability to manage was improved.
4.4.2 Training fees and bonus
Two types of incentives were available in ERA to encourage the take-up of 
training. To be eligible for either of these training incentives, customers had to be 
working 16 or more hours per week. As the first incentive, ERA staff could pay for 
customers’ tuition for training courses, up to a maximum of £1,000 per person 
for all courses. As the second incentive, ERA customers could receive a training 
completion bonus. This incentive paid £8 for every hour of training completed, 
up to a maximum of £1,000 (or 125 hours of completed training). The latter 
was paid to customers once they had successfully completed training. Both forms 
of incentive payments were to be made only for courses approved by ERA staff 
and could not include employer-provided, on-the-job training. Customers could 
receive the completion bonus even for courses that did not charge a tuition fee. 
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Knowledge	and	take-up	of	the	training	fees	and	bonus
Financial payment records for the programme group customer survey sample 
members indicate that ten per cent of all NDLP customers and 27 per cent of all 
WTC customers received assistance with tuition fees within a two-year follow-
up period (Figure 4.4). Among those who had been in work at some point and 
reported that they had also participated in training while in work, 24 and 36 per 
cent, respectively, of the two target groups received tuition assistance. The amounts 
paid towards fees varied widely but, for those who received this assistance, the 
payments averaged £352 for NDLP programme group members and £279 for 
WTC programme group members (see Table E.7).
Figure 4.4 Awareness and receipt of ERA training fee assistance  
 and training completion bonuses among ERA customers 
 within two years after random assignment
Work status and measure NDLP WTC
A. All ERA customers (%)
Received training fee assistance
Were aware of the training
completion bonusa
Received training completion bonus
Sample size 1,188 1,082
B. For those who ever worked (%)
Received training fee assistance
Were aware of the training
completion bonusa
Received training completion bonus
Sample size 904 1,066
C. For those who ever participated
in training while in work (%)
Received training fee assistance
Were aware of the training
completion bonusa
Received training completion bonus
Sample size 419 741
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data and ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTE: aThe source for this outcome is the 12- and 24-month customer surveys. The source for all other outcomes 
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Turning to the training bonus, as of the year two survey, 72 per cent and 87 per 
cent, respectively, of NDLP and WTC programme group members were aware of 
this bonus, although far fewer received it (see Figure 4.4). Data from financial 
payment records show that eight per cent of all NDLP customers in ERA and 23 
per cent of all WTC customers received a bonus within the two years after random 
assignment, while 21 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively, of those who ever 
took up training while in work received it (see Figure 4.4). (As with the retention 
bonuses, receipt of the training bonuses continued to climb after the follow-up 
period used for this report.79) 
Among those who received a training completion bonus, the majority (64 per 
cent of NDLP bonus recipients and 63 per cent of WTC bonus recipients) received 
just one training bonus during the two-year follow-up period, while just ten per 
cent of NDLP and 15 per cent of WTC customers received three or more bonuses. 
The average amount of each bonus was approximately £340 for NDLP customers 
and £362 for WTC customers. The average total amount of all bonuses received 
was £436 for NDLP customers and £491 for WTC customers within two years 
(see Table E.7). 
Qualitative data from staff and customers suggest a variety of reasons that may 
help explain why more customers who worked and enrolled in training did not 
receive a tuition payment or bonus payment. Many of these customers enrolled 
in training that they had arranged themselves or that was made available through 
an employer rather than by Jobcentre Plus staff. In some cases, customers did 
not have to pay for the course and so they had no need to seek help with tuition 
fees. Others did not claim assistance because they had lost touch with their 
adviser, were unaware of the incentives or did not know that their training was 
eligible. A similar picture emerged for the training completion bonus. Those who 
had undertaken training independently were often not aware that they could 
claim a completion bonus. As described below, this also seemed to reflect some 
uncertainty on the part of staff regarding which courses were eligible for bonus 
payments. In addition, the training bonus could be paid only after the training 
79 Looking at the entire period of ERA operations, a higher proportion of 
customers received training fee assistance and/or a training completion 
bonus, compared with just the two-year follow-up period of the survey. 
Fifteen per cent of NDLP and 31 per cent of WTC programme group 
customers received fee payments and 13 per cent of NDLP and 28 per 
cent WTC customers received at least one training completion bonus. Both 
training fees and bonuses were particularly likely to be received towards the 
end of an individual’s eligibility. Of those who received payments, about a 
third in the NDLP group and a fifth in the WTC group received training fee 
payments for the first time in their last nine months of eligibility, while about 
two-fifths of NDLP bonus recipients and about a quarter of the WTC bonus 
recipients received the training completion bonus for the first time in the last 
nine months (Table E.7).
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was successfully completed, and some participants may not have completed the 
course or may have chosen not to take an examination. 
Delivering	the	training	incentives
ASAs were keen to promote the training incentives as part of their work with ERA 
customers. In the early days of the programme, when expertise on advancement 
was minimal, marketing the training incentives to customers was often the principal 
form of advancement support that staff offered. In early staff interviews (conducted 
in spring 2004), when ASAs were asked how they promoted advancement 
with customers, they often spoke simply of reminding them about the training 
incentives. This is evident also in the customer survey data presented earlier (Tables 
4.1 and 4.2), which showed that ‘finding an education or training course’ was 
the most common form of advancement support received by customers in work 
and also the most common topic discussed when customers were collecting the 
retention bonus.
As ASAs’ expertise on advancement grew, their delivery of the training incentives 
became more sophisticated. The incentives were still continuously marketed 
but alongside a more holistic package of advancement support. Some ASAs 
also reported that they improved over time in ensuring that the training was 
relevant to customers. In one focus group, ASAs said that in the early stages of 
the programme they were so keen for customers to undertake training that they 
did not always consider whether a customer was ready for the course or if it 
was the most appropriate. ASAs stressed that they would not pressure customers 
to undertake training; still, they felt that continuously promoting training was 
important so that lone parents would know that it was available when it was ‘the 
right time’ for them to advance, as suggested earlier.
As customers began to reach the end of their 33-month eligibility for ERA, staff 
would again encourage them to take up training before the incentives offer ran 
out. They usually began to remind customers of the offer six months before the 
end of their eligibility for the programme. Perhaps, in part, because of the strategy, 
between five per cent and seven per cent of all ERA customers in each of the 
target groups received their training fee or completion bonus for the first time 
within the last nine months of their enrolment in ERA (see Table E.7).
ASAs differed in the level of help they offered to customers in selecting training. 
Many offered a considerable amount of support in encouraging customers to take 
up training and assisting them to find and select appropriate courses. Customers 
spoke of ASAs helping them find a course or motivating them and ‘giving them a 
push’, as in these comments from a lone parent in a second interview, reflecting 
on the support she had received:




very	helpful.	 Even	 so	much	as	actually	phoning	 the	university	 to	find	out	
where	things	are	paid	and	things	like	that.	They’ve	been	exceptionally	good	
in	doing	that.’
ASAs also reported working with customers to find ways around their barriers to 
taking up training, such as lack of time. For example, this could include promoting 
home learning, which was easier for lone parents to co-ordinate with their caring 
responsibilities.
In other cases, ASAs’ role was restricted merely to administering payments for 
courses that customers had already sourced themselves. The level of support 
offered generally depended on the customer’s needs. Nonetheless, there were 
some customers who felt that their ASA could have done more to help them find 





This suggests that in some instances there was a mismatch between ASAs’ and 
customers’ expectations of the level of support they should receive regarding 
training.
There was also some evidence that ASAs differed in their interpretation of the 
eligibility requirements for training completion bonus payments. Many customers 
did not realise that they were eligible for a completion bonus if ERA did not pay 
for the training (e.g. employer-paid training or other training that was free of 
charge). Moreover, some customers reported that they had initially been told that 
they would receive the bonus, only to be told later that they would not. 
Did	the	training	incentives	influence	customer	behaviour?
Chapter 5 will show that ERA increased the extent to which the programme group 
combined work and training (relative to the control group rate), especially for 
the WTC group. As is true for the employment retention bonus, it is difficult to 
isolate the influence of the training bonuses themselves on these effects. However, 
data from the customer survey and from the qualitative interviews offer some 
insights.
As with their views on the retention bonus, customers varied in their responses 
when they were asked whether the training completion bonus had made a 
difference to their behaviour. Overall, though, in comparison with attitudes 
towards the retention bonus, greater numbers claimed that the training bonus 
had an influence and fewer reported that it had no influence. About half the 
customer survey respondents who had received the training bonus said that the 
bonus offer had ‘a lot’ of influence on their decision to start training (50 per cent 
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of NDLP bonus recipients and 46 per cent of WTC bonus recipients) (see Table 4.2). 
Around a quarter, however, said that it had no influence at all on their decision (25 
per cent and 27 per cent for the NDLP and WTC groups, respectively). Responses 
were similar when customers were asked whether the bonus had any influence on 
their remaining in training. 
Qualitative data similarly suggest that a substantial number of customers would 
not have undertaken training had it not been for the financial incentives, although 
this included the payment of training course fees as well as the completion bonus. 
As one customer explained: 
‘That’s	what’s	made	me	do	it,	having	the	money	there	to	do	it.	I’ve	wanted	
to	do	it	for	a	long	time.’
The financial incentives can be seen to have acted as an enabler, either by providing 
the money to take a course that had previously been seen as financially inaccessible 
or by enabling lone parents to reduce their hours or take time off work to complete 
the training but still allowing them to be paid for this time via the training bonus. 
For others, the financial incentives were more of a motivator and inspired the lone 
parent to consider training. Indeed, some lone parents joined ERA with specific 
training in mind or very quickly came to a decision about undertaking training, 
while others took more time to make that choice. 
Qualitative data also suggest that, as important as the incentives may have been, 
adviser support was also key. The ASAs ensured that customers knew about 
the financial incentives and in many cases helped to motivate and facilitate the 
movement into training. Some training participants stressed that their ASA had 
been pivotal in motivating them to begin a training course. In some cases, ASAs 
also provided continuing encouragement and support while participants were 
enrolled in their courses. 
Sometimes customers did not actually attend or complete a course they had 
enrolled in. Some attributed this to a lack of ongoing support and their need for 
more continued encouragement. However, some also felt that their ASA (and 
the incentives) had at least helped ‘plant a seed’ in making them think about the 
possibility of training, which they might pursue in the future. 
Of course, for lone parents who were working, lack of time was a major barrier 
to taking up training. Many simply could not fit it into their daily routine. One 




Another issue was the stage in the customer’s life course, with some customers 
expressing a wish to defer advancement through training.80 In many instances, this 
80 See Hoggart et	al., 2006, for further discussion of this issue.
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was because they had caring responsibilities but some customers also commented 
on the need to build up their experience in work before undertaking training. 
ASAs also noticed this. In the earlier interviews, they noted that many lone parents 
(particularly in the NDLP group) did not appear interested in training, but in later 






Financial concerns were another factor that limited training uptake, despite the 
availability of the financial incentives. Some customers talked about the difficulty of 
undertaking training as it meant forgoing income and in some cases also resulted 
in extra costs. A small number of customers felt that the incentives offered were 
not sufficient to make up for these costs. A related problem was that the training 
bonus was not paid until the end of the course, so if extra costs had to be paid, 
such as childcare during training, they would have to find a way of meeting those 
costs up front. 
Other customers who chose not to pursue training felt that their employer had not 
been supportive or would not allow them the time off from their jobs to attend 
courses. Sometimes practical issues, such as the course schedule conflicting with 
the customer’s work hours, made the desired training unfeasible. Some customers 
also believed that they did not need additional training in order to reach their 
desired job or goals. 
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has explored ERA customers’ receipt of in-work job coaching and 
support, as well as their use of the programme’s financial incentives for full-time 
work and for combining work and training. Along with Chapter 3, it provides a basis 
for assessing the ‘strength’ of the ERA ‘treatment’ delivered to lone parents. 
In general, the findings in this chapter suggest that customers in the ERA group 
who entered work within the two-year follow-up period received a substantial 
post-employment intervention through Jobcentre Plus. It differed in both content 
and intensity from what those customers would have experienced had ERA not 
existed (as evidenced by comparisons with workers in the control group). A 
substantial proportion of ERA customers received advice and guidance from staff 
on employment retention and advancement goals; help with personal and family 
problems that could interfere with work; and encouragement and assistance in 
accessing training while employed. Most customers were aware of the financial 
incentives the programme offered and many took advantage of them. Workers 
in the control group received much less assistance from Jobcentre Plus staff on 
retention and advancement issues and, of course, they were not eligible for ERA’s 
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financial incentives. Together these findings suggest that the implementation 
of ERA created a substantial post-employment ‘treatment contrast’ between 
the programme and control groups for the NDLP and WTC target groups alike. 
Chapters 5 and 6 show whether, as delivered, ERA improved both target groups’ 
success in the labour market. 
At the same time, the chapter points to a number of challenges that Jobcentre 
Plus staff encountered in operating the ERA model in the real world. For example, 
although most working ERA customers had some in-work contact with ASAs, 
the nature and quality of the support they received varied substantially, ranging 
from the simple processing of bonuses and perfunctory interactions to specialist 
advancement action planning. ASAs also varied in the extent to which they were 
proactive in reaching out to their customers; in keeping participants engaged in 
the programme and convincing them that they had something of value to offer; 
in their level of expertise and confidence in providing guidance to customers on 
advancement issues; and even in their marketing of the financial incentives offer. 
Over time, though, ASAs became more comfortable and skilled in delivering in-
work support and in administering the incentives. 
These observations suggest that perhaps with better staff training and management, 
customers’ receipt of in-work advice and support and take-up of the financial 
incentives might have been even higher. At the same time, there were hurdles 
that a better administration of ERA would not easily have overcome. For example, 
many participants simply did not want to work full-time, often because of their 
caring responsibilities, and so the employment retention bonus held no appeal 
for them. Many also found it too difficult to manage the extra time it would 
take to incorporate training into their busy lives or faced other practical obstacles 
that were beyond the programme’s control. Still others were new to work and 
understandably viewed advancement as a longer-term goal. (Chapter 7 takes a 
closer look at some of these issues.)
The findings in this chapter thus provide reasons to expect that ERA will indeed 
have positive impacts on customers’ labour market outcomes, but also reasons to 
expect that some of those effects may be modest. A number of findings, including 
the investment in training activities and the continuing increase in incentives take-
up rates after the end of the two-year follow-up period, also suggest that the full 
benefits of ERA will take more than two years to accrue. 
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5 Impacts of ERA on labour  
 market and other  
 outcomes
5.1 Introduction
The report on the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme‘s 
first-year impacts81 provided the first evidence of the effects of ERA on a range 
of outcomes that included employment, earnings, welfare benefits and training. 
The findings presented in this chapter build on those early results but go further, 
covering the first two years after random assignment and a broader set of outcome 
measures.82 The two-year focus allows more time for the effects of retention and 
advancement to be observed, these being intrinsically longer term in nature. It 
also makes it possible to capture ERA’s effects as it evolved into a more mature 
programme and overcame some of the start-up problems encountered during its 
first year of operations. However, it is important to remember that participation 
in ERA can last for up to 33 months – nine months beyond the two-year point. 
Consequently, the analysis in this chapter is not a post-programme assessment; 
rather, it provides an account of progress to date. Answering questions about 
what happens to individuals after ERA requires that outcomes be observed over a 
still longer period, which will be essential for determining more accurately whether 
ERA was successful in helping lone parents break the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle.
The impact estimates in the remainder of this chapter are presented separately 
for the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) group as a whole and the Working Tax 
Credit (WTC) group as a whole. For the NDLP group, the estimates are calculated 
81 Dorsett et	al., 2007.
82 For some individuals in the WTC booster sample (see Appendix B), the ‘year 
2’ survey in fact took place up to four months before the end of the second 
year. Such individuals accounted for only a small proportion – about 14 per 
cent – of the WTC group as a whole.
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as a simple average of the six district-level results, each of which provides a 
separate test of ERA under particular circumstances. The results for each district 
are given the same weight when calculating the overall summary effect, which 
can therefore be seen to represent the average effect of six separate tests of ERA. 
Variations across districts are considered in Chapter 6.
For the WTC group, the small sample size for some of the districts reduces the 
extent to which each district-level result can be viewed as a separate valid test of 
ERA. Consequently, the results for the WTC group as a whole weight the district-
level results according to the size of the districts. This means that the results for 
larger districts (which should be more reliable tests of ERA) contribute more to the 
overall average than the results for smaller districts (which will be less reliable). 
The chapter begins by examining ERA’s overall effects on a broad set of labour force 
and benefits outcome measures. It then takes a closer look at the programme’s 
effects on customers’ employment dynamics and advancement-related behaviours 
and achievements. Finally, it briefly examines ERA’s effects on selected measures of 
children’s well-being. 
Throughout the chapter, the presentation focuses first on the NDLP group and 
then on the WTC group. Intuitively, there is some appeal to viewing the NDLP 
and WTC customers as related, in the sense that one could envisage a particular 
trajectory for a lone parent that would encompass both NDLP and WTC. That is, 
lone parents at the stage of taking the first step towards re-entering the labour 
market may participate in NDLP and from there find part-time work that fits well 
with their childcare requirements and allows them to begin to receive tax credit. 
Seen in this way, the WTC group can be viewed as the NDLP group slightly further 
down the line. This is far from being a precise interpretation, of course, since 
many in the WTC group would never have participated in NDLP and some in the 
NDLP group may never work. Nevertheless, viewing the effect on the NDLP and 
WTC lone parents in tandem may offer a rough feel for how ERA might affect 
outcomes for lone parents after they become more established in work. 
5.2 The expected effects of ERA
Before presenting the impact estimates themselves, it is helpful to consider what 
effects one might expect ERA to have. There is an important distinction here 
between NDLP customers and WTC customers. Specifically, NDLP customers were 
out of work or working fewer than 16 hours per week at the time of random 
assignment, while WTC customers were already working from 16 to 29 hours per 
week at this time. This fact alters the ERA experience for the two groups. 
NDLP customers are first exposed to the pre-employment component of ERA. This 
may influence job search behaviour in two ways, relative to the services routinely 
provided as part of the New Deal. First, advisers may encourage customers to 
seek longer-lasting jobs that offer more potential for advancement. Restricting 
potential jobs in this way may have the effect of extending the period of job 
search. As explained in Chapter 3, however, there is little evidence that advisers 
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systematically offered such advice. More important is the fact that simply offering 
the ERA retention bonus alters the financial inducement to look for work. Because 
that bonus rewards any type of full-time work, it may encourage individuals to 
consider jobs that they might otherwise have regarded as too poorly paid. This 
may expand the pool of jobs deemed acceptable and thereby speed up the job 
search process. At the same time, because the retention bonus is payable only 
for full-time work (defined as 30 or more hours per week), ERA should prompt 
individuals to favour such jobs over part-time positions. 
An important consideration is the extent to which any change in employment 
caused by ERA might affect earnings. For individuals who start working as a result 
of ERA, the earnings impact will clearly be positive. The same is also true for those 
who increase their hours but keep the same hourly rate. However, there are two 
more complicated scenarios: First, ERA may cause some individuals to work more 
hours but at a lower wage than they would have otherwise. This may be because 
the combination of earnings and the retention bonus leaves them better off, such 
that they may be willing to accept lower-paying full-time positions or because 
the lower-paying jobs have attractive characteristics – perhaps they are more 
conveniently located or offer better employment benefits. For such individuals, 
the effect on earnings may be small or even negative. Second, for individuals 
who would otherwise work in excess of 30 hours per week, the availability of the 
retention bonus under ERA may allow them to achieve the same level of income 
while working fewer hours (although still more than 30). Should they choose to 
reduce their hours to a level closer to the retention bonus threshold, the effect on 
earnings is likely to be negative. Overall, it is not necessarily the case that ERA will 
increase earnings. 
As mentioned above, this report also considers the effects of ERA on children’s 
well-being. This is an area of clear concern but economic theory provides little 
guidance regarding what impact to expect.83 However, in policy debates over 
welfare-to-work programmes, concern is often expressed that increasing parents’ 
involvement in work may come at the expense of their caring responsibilities 
and, in turn, their children’s welfare. Past evaluations of North American 
welfare-to-work programmes that include wage supplements suggest that such 
programmes can have positive effects for young children but not necessarily for 
adolescents.84 In the case of ERA, it may still be too soon to judge whether altering 
83 Grogger and Karoly, 2007.
84 Morris et	al. (2001), in their synthesis of five evaluations, found some evidence 
that programmes that offered working parents financial incentives to work 
and subsequently increased their employment and incomes were associated 
with improved school achievement for younger children. By contrast, 
mandatory employment services that increased parents’ employment but 
had no effect on income had few effects on younger children, positive or 
negative. At the same time, findings from the Canadian Self-Sufficiency 
Project and Florida’s Family Transition Program point to the potential for 
small negative effects on some aspects of adolescents’ behaviour and school 
achievement.
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the employment pattern of lone parents has positive or negative effects on their 
children. Nevertheless, the results presented in this chapter offer an empirical 
contribution to the debate on the interaction between parental employment and 
child welfare in the UK.85 
Box 5.1 summarises both the main findings from the earlier report on first-year 
impacts and those from this report on second-year impacts.
 
Box 5. Summary of main year  and year 2 findings 
The report on first-year impacts shows that, for the NDLP group, ERA: 
• increased employment – 66.2 per cent of the ERA group worked at some 
point in the first year, compared with 61.7 per cent of the control group 
(an increase of 4.5 percentage points). The employment effect was not 
significant at the end of the first year;
• increased the hours worked – 22.3 per cent of the ERA group worked 
full-time at the end of the first year, compared with 14.9 per cent of the 
control group (an increase of 7.4 percentage points);
• increased earnings – average earnings in the first year were £3,594 for the 
ERA group, compared with £2,783 for the control group (an increase of 
£811);
• reduced reliance on Income Support (IS) – 45.6 per cent of the ERA group 
received IS at the end of year 1, compared with 49.5 per cent of the control 
group (a reduction of 4.0 percentage points).
For the WTC group, small sample sizes meant that it was possible to achieve 
a robust estimate only for the East Midlands, where ERA:
• did not affect employment (nearly all members of this target group worked 
steadily);
• did not affect total earnings;
• increased hours worked – 27.8 per cent of the ERA group worked full-time 
at the end of the first year, compared with 17.8 per cent of the control 
group (an increase of 10.1 percentage points).
Continued
85 For a recent contribution to this literature in the UK, see Dex and Ward 
(2007).
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Box 5. Continued
The current report on second-year impacts finds that, for the NDLP group, 
ERA:
• increased employment – 67.5 per cent of the ERA group worked at some 
point in the second year, compared with 62.9 per cent of the control group 
(an increase of 4.6 percentage points). The employment effect was not 
significant at the end of the second year;
• increased the hours worked – 25.4 per cent of the ERA group worked full-
time at the end of the second year, compared with 18.7 per cent of the 
control group (an increase of 6.6 percentage points);
• increased earnings – average earnings in the second year were £4,781 for 
the ERA group, compared with £4,108 for the control group (an increase 
of £673);
• reduced reliance on IS, based on analysis of administrative data – for IS at 
month 24, the survey data showed a statistically insignificant effect. With 
the larger number of observations available using administrative data, 
a small reduction of 2.2 percentage points was found (41.9 per cent of 
the ERA group received IS, compared with 44.1 per cent of the control 
group).
For the WTC group, in the second-year report, sample sizes were sufficient to 
achieve a robust pooled estimate for all six districts. ERA:
• increased the hours worked – 39.0 per cent of the ERA group worked full-
time at the end of the second year, compared with 26.4 per cent of the 
control group (an increase of 12.6 percentage points);
• increased earnings – average earnings in the second year were £8,962 for 
the ERA group, compared with £8,458 for the control group (an increase 
of £503).
This report also considers additional outcomes. The results suggest that 
individuals altered their behaviour in response to ERA: Relative to the control 
group, those in the ERA group found work more quickly, their first employment 
lasted longer, and their probability of working full-time for at least four months 
was higher. This matches very closely to the retention bonus criterion of being 
employed at least 30 hours a week for 13 out of 17 weeks. However, the 
fact that there was no significant employment effect two years after random 
assignment suggests that, while ERA may have prolonged employment, this 
has not been substantial enough to affect outcomes in the long run for the 
NDLP group. For the WTC group, retention is not such a pressing issue, given 
the high levels of employment in both the ERA group and the control group. 
For both the NDLP and WTC groups, it is the move from part-time to full-
time work that most clearly demonstrates the extent to which ERA increased 
advancement. Related to this, ERA increased training and also resulted in 
individuals in work taking steps to improve their employment position.
Continued




Lastly, the results do not provide any compelling evidence that ERA reduced 
children’s well-being as a side effect of its impacts on parents’ hours 
worked. It should be borne in mind that children are likely to share in the 
improved financial circumstances of the household that result from increased 
earnings.
5.3 ERA’s impacts on work and earnings
5.3. NDLP
Outcomes for the control group are the benchmark used to judge the effects 
of ERA because they represent what would have happened to the ERA group 
in the absence of the programme. Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of those in 
the NDLP control group who were employed in each month of the two years 
following random assignment. The proportion employed rose fairly rapidly over 
the first three months, from 24.0 per cent to 37.3 per cent. However, from around 
the fourth month, growth became more gradual, eventually reaching 53.4 per 
cent. Therefore, without ERA, just over half of the NDLP programme group would 
have been employed two years after random assignment. The fact that the 
proportion employed at any time during the follow-up period – 70.5 per cent – is 
considerably higher than the proportion in work in any given month indicates that 
many individuals enter work but do not work consistently. In fact, about a quarter 
of those who had worked at some point were not employed in month 24.86 This 
evidence is suggestive of the degree of employment retention within the NDLP 
customer group.
Table 5.1 summarises the impact of ERA on employment, based on responses to 
the surveys carried out at 12 and 24 months after random assignment. It shows 
that ERA increased the proportion of lone parents ever employed during each 
of the two years after random assignment. (For guidance on how to read the 
impact tables in this report, see Box 5.2.) The size of the effect was fairly similar 
in both years. Over the two-year period as a whole, ERA increased the probability 
of having worked from 70.1 per cent for the control group to 75.7 per cent for 
the ERA group, for a statistically significant impact of 5.6 percentage points. This 
translated to an additional 1.1 months in employment on average. 
86 Using the information from Figure 5.1: (.705-.534)/.705 = .243.
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Figure 5. Control group employment rates over the first two  
 years after random assignment
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New Deal for Lone Parents customers
Working Tax Credit customersa
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys. 
NOTES: aA total of 261 respondents were interviewed before 24 months had elapsed since random
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Box 5.2 How to read the impact tables in this report 
Most impact tables in this report use a similar format, illustrated below. The 
example below shows a series of employment outcomes for the ERA group 
and the control group for the NDLP customer group. It shows how many 
hours members of both the ERA group and the control group worked at 
month 24. For example, about 25 (25.4) per cent of ERA group members and 
about 19 (18.7) per cent of control group members worked 30 or more hours 
per week at month 24.
Because individuals were assigned randomly either to the ERA programme or 
to the control group, the effects of the programme can be estimated by the 
difference in outcomes between the two groups. The ‘Difference’ column in 
the table shows the difference between the two groups on several outcomes. 
These differences represent the programme’s impact on various outcomes. 
For example, the impact on working 30 or more hours per week at month 
24 can be calculated by subtracting 18.7 from 25.4, yielding 6.6 percentage 
points. Thus, ERA increased the likelihood that people would work 30 or 
more hours per week.
Differences marked with asterisks are ‘statistically significant’, meaning that it 
is quite unlikely that the differences arose by chance. The number of asterisks 
indicates whether the impact is statistically significant at the one per cent, 
five per cent, or ten per cent level (the lower the level, the less likely that the 
impact is due to chance). For example, as shown below, the ERA programme 
had a statistically significant impact of 6.6 percentage points at the one per 
cent level on customers working 30 hours or more. (One asterisk corresponds 
to the ten per cent level; two asterisks, the five per cent level; and three 
asterisks, the one per cent level.) The P-value indicates the probability that the 
difference arose by chance.
Some measures in Chapter 5 are shown in italics and are considered ‘non-
experimental’ because they include only a subset of the full report sample. For 
example, because workers in the ERA group may have different characteristics 
than workers in the control group, differences in these outcomes between 
those workers may not be attributable to the ERA programme. Statistical 
significance tests are not conducted for these measures. 
Continued











Hours worked per week at 
month 24 (%)
Did not work 44.6 47.3 -2.6 0.191
1 to 15 hours 4.3 4.9 -0.6 0.453
16 to 29 hours 25.6 28.9 -3.3 * 0.072




ERA’s effect on full-time employment was more pronounced. The ERA group 
worked full-time for an average of 5.2 months over the two years, compared with 
only 3.5 months for the control group. This is a statistically significant difference 
of 1.7 months. It is not surprising that much, if not all, of ERA’s employment 
effect appears to be driven by the effect on full-time employment, since working 
30 hours or more is a criterion for the retention bonus. There was no significant 
difference between the ERA group and the control group in the amount of time 
spent in part-time employment over this two-year period.
Figure 5.2 allows a more detailed insight into the evolution of the employment 
effect. The top panel plots the proportion in employment each month for the 
two years following random assignment. The solid line represents the ERA NDLP 
group, while the broken line represents the control group. The monthly impact 
is shown by the dashed line and a diamond marks the x-axis at those months for 
which the impact is statistically significant. The figure shows a small but statistically 
significantly positive employment effect for most of the first 18 months following 
random assignment but effects beyond this point were mostly not significant. 
Table 5.2 shows that by the end of the follow-up period (month 24), those in 
the ERA group were working, on average, 1.6 more hours per week than those 
in the control group. This was due largely to the shift from part-time to full-time 
work. ERA increased the proportion working 30 or more hours per week by 6.6 
percentage points. This represents a 35 per cent increase over the control group 
rate of 18.7 per cent. 
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Figure 5.2 ERA group and control group employment rate trends  
 over the first two years after random assignment
New Deal for Lone Parents customers
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Months after random assignment
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ERA group = _____ Control group = __ __ __ Impact = _ _ _ 
  Statistically significant impact at the 5 per cent level = __
Statistically significant impact at the 10 per cent level = __Figure 5.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys. 
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control
group.
     A white diamond indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. A black
diamond indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
aA total of 261 respondents were interviewed before 24 months had elapsed since random
assignment. These respondents are not included in this figure.
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By encouraging employment and, in particular, full-time employment, ERA 
increased earnings. These impacts were sizeable, averaging £1,550 over the two 
years. Excluding bonus payments, the ERA group earned an average of £8,049 
over this period, compared with £6,498 for the control group. These effects 
represent large increases in percentage terms. In the first year, the earnings impact 
was 31 per cent of control group earnings. Put another way, the ERA group’s 
earnings were 31 per cent higher than they would have been in the absence of 
the programme. In the second year, their earnings gain relative to the control 
group was smaller but still sizeable at 16 per cent. For the entire two-year follow-
up period, the ERA group’s earnings were 24 per cent higher than they would 
have been without ERA. 
The earnings impacts persisted through the end of the two-year follow-up period. 
In month 24, the increase in weekly earnings of £13.10 is 16 per cent higher 
than the control group’s earnings (£81.30).87 This pattern of earnings effects 
appears to fit well with the observed employment effects. As shown above, ERA 
increased the proportion of people in work in nearly all months in the first year 
and, furthermore, encouraged a move from part-time to full-time employment. 
In the second year, the effect on the proportion employed became statistically 
insignificant halfway through the year and thereafter most of the earnings effect 
was a result of increased hours alone. Because the employment effect faded in the 
second year, a reduction in the earnings effect is not surprising.
Alternative	results	using	administrative	data
The results discussed so far are based on survey data. Estimates have also been 
made using administrative data. Administrative data have the advantage of being 
available for the entire NDLP customer group, which was randomly assigned 
between October 2003 and April 2005. Maximising the size of the estimation 
sample in this way allows the most statistically precise impact estimates possible.
The advantage of administrative data relative to survey data is that they do not 
suffer from either survey non-response or respondent recall error. However, there 
are also important limitations: First, the range of employment outcomes available is 
much narrower than in survey data. Second, and more important in some regards, 
administrative data do not capture all employment spells and sometimes not all 
relevant details are available for those spells that are captured (see Box 5.3). 
87 The national minimum wage for adult workers (age 22 or over) was £4.50 
per hour from 1 October 2003; it increased to £4.85 per hour on 1 October 
2004, to £5.05 on 1 October 2005 and to £5.35 on 1 October 2006 
(www.lowpay.gov.uk). On 1 October 2007, it rose to £5.52.
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Box 5.3 A note on administrative employment data
There are two caveats relating to the use of administrative employment data in 
the UK: First, these data cover only individuals whose employers participate in 
the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system (a method of paying income tax whereby 
the employee receives wages with the tax already deducted by the employer). 
This means that self-employment spells are not captured and that there is 
only partial coverage of employees who earn less than the PAYE threshold 
(currently £100 per week). Second, the employment data require extensive 
cleaning to be suitable for evaluation purposes. In a significant number of 
cases, the start and/or end dates of employment are unknown.
 
The extent to which employment is recorded differently in the survey and 
administrative data is best seen by considering employment at month 24 among 
survey respondents. Since this equates to roughly the time of the wave 2 survey, 
month 24 outcomes in the survey data are free from the recall error that might 
be relevant when considering retrospective outcomes. This means that the 
survey data can be viewed as providing a reliable indicator of the true level of 
employment at month 24. This can be compared with employment at month 24 
as suggested by the administrative data. Doing so, sizeable differences are evident. 
Employment as indicated by the survey data (53.4 per cent for the control group 
in Figure 5.1) is considerably higher than that indicated by the administrative data 
(39.5 per cent for the control group in Table 5.3). This difference can arise from 
two sources: First, part of the difference may be attributable to the fact that the 
administrative data exclude low earners, the self-employed and, indeed, those 
working informally. Second, it may be that the inconsistencies in the administrative 
data and the prevalence of unknown start and end dates mean that the indicators 
of employment at a point in time are subject to error. In any event, the fact 
that there is a difference calls for caution with regard to estimates based on the 
administrative data. 
In line with this, impacts on employment estimated from the administrative data 
tend to be smaller, showing little effect. Similarly, when the administrative data 
analysis was extended to include all NDLP customers who were randomly assigned, 
not just the survey respondents, no statistically significant effects were found in 
any given month over the two years following random assignment (Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3 Effects of ERA on employment and earnings within  
 two years after random assignment for NDLP  
 customers, estimated using administrative records
ERA Control Difference
Outcome group group (impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 56.2 55.3 0.9 0.451
Year 2 55.6 53.8 1.8 0.125
Years 1-2 66.1 64.6 1.5 0.179
Average number of months employed during 
Year 1 4.5 4.4 0.1 0.377
Year 2 4.9 4.9 0.0 0.989
Years 1-2 9.4 9.3 0.1 0.648
Employed during month 24 (%) 39.7 39.5 0.2 0.844
Average earnings during 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,676 3,315 361 *** 0.005
Time to first employment (%)
Employed in month of RAa 24.9 24.6 0.4 0.732
1 to 6 months 24.8 22.3 2.5 ** 0.018
7 to 12 months 7.5 9.3 -1.8 *** 0.009
13 to 23 months 8.8 8.4 0.5 0.509
Never employed in first 24 months 33.9 35.4 -1.5 0.179
Length of first employment spell (%)
0 months 33.9 35.4 -1.5 0.179
1 to 6 months 23.1 21.3 1.8 * 0.076
7 to 12 months 12.2 12.3 0.0 0.970
13 to 23 months 20.5 20.4 0.0 0.968
24 months 10.3 10.6 -0.3 0.672
Worked in year 1 and worked consecutively for (%)
Less than 6 months 9.8 9.3 0.6 0.409
6 to 12 months 12.7 12.2 0.5 0.510
12 or more months 33.6 33.9 -0.3 0.825
Sample size = 6,787 3,365 3,422
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey employment 
records.
NOTES:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-
random assignment characteristics of sample members.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and 
*** = 1 per cent.
     Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
aRA refers to random assignment.
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The administrative and survey data were more consistent in revealing a positive 
impact on earnings. Figure 5.3 allows for a side-by-side comparison of survey-
based and administratively recorded earnings impacts for NDLP customers. It 
shows that, according to the administrative data, ERA increased average earnings 
for survey respondents in the 2005-2006 tax year by £615.88 Reassuringly, 
this administrative data-based impact estimate is very close to the £673 impact 
in the second year after random assignment that is estimated from survey data 
collected for the same sample.89 Figure 5.3 also shows the earnings impact based 
on administrative data for the full NDLP sample (i.e. all those randomly assigned 
between October 2003 and April 2005). Like the other earnings impact estimates, 
this one is also positive and statistically significant, providing further assurance of 
ERA’s success in increasing earnings. However, at £361, it is somewhat smaller than 
the two estimates for the survey sample. This may partly reflect differences between 
the types of people in the survey sample relative to the full random assignment 
sample;90 or it may reflect the fact that for many people in the full sample the 
2005/06 tax year fell relatively soon after their date of random assignment – or a 
combination of both factors. (See Table 5.3 for estimates of ERA’s effects on other 
outcomes measured by administrative data.) 
88 Administrative data on earnings relate to the UK tax year, which runs from 
April through March. 
89 The degree to which the 2005-2006 tax year matches the second follow-up 
year after random assignment for any particular sample member depends 
on her date of random assignment (see Chapter 2). For those randomly 
assigned in March 2004, this corresponds to the second year following 
random assignment. For those randomly assigned earlier (or later) than this, 
the 2005-2006 tax year relates to a later (or earlier) period relative to their 
date of random assignment.
90 Due perhaps to survey non-response or that the survey cohort differs in 
some way from the full randomly assigned population.
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Figure 5.3 Earnings impact estimates for NDLP customers,  
 by sample and data source
5.3.2 WTC
Monthly employment among the WTC control group is shown in the bottom 
panel of Figure 5.1.91 Nearly all members of the control group worked at some 
point over the two-year period, which reflects the fact that only those who are 
in work receive WTC. Furthermore, the proportion in work remained fairly stable, 
suggesting that advancement may be a more important concern than retention 
for individuals in the WTC group. 
Because all WTC customers should have been employed at the time of random 
assignment, it is not surprising that ERA did not increase the proportion ever 
employed during the follow-up period. For this group, it is much more important 
to focus on the amount of time employed. As Table 5.1 shows, both the ERA 
group and the control group worked about 22 months over the 24-month follow-
up period, leaving little room for improvement. However, ERA caused a significant 
91 The analysis of employment and earnings effects for the WTC group is based 
entirely on survey data. This is because Work and Pensions Longitudinal 
Study (WPLS) administrative data are available only for WTC customers who 
at some stage received benefits payments and not for the full WTC sample. 
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys and Work and Pensions
Longitudinal Survey earnings records. 
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random
assignment characteristics of sample members.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control
group. Statistical significance levels are are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per
cent.
Impact on earnings in 
2005-2006 tax year
615
Impact on earnings in 
2005-2006 tax year
361
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shift from part-time to full-time work. In particular, it caused a reduction of two 
months in the amount of time spent in part-time employment and this was fully 
accounted for by a similar-sized increase in the number of months spent in full-
time employment (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.2 shows that, for the programme group, ERA increased by 1.6 the average 
number of hours worked at month 24. This impact is identical to that produced 
for the NDLP programme group. However, this was from a higher base: Whereas 
the NDLP control group worked an average of 13 hours per week at this time, the 
corresponding level for the WTC control group was 22 hours. The higher base for 
the WTC group, in turn, reflects their higher rates of employment relative to those 
in the NDLP group. Considering the distribution of hours for the WTC group, a 
strong move from part-time to full-time work is clearly visible. The increase of 
12.6 percentage points in the proportion working full-time at month 24 is almost 
entirely accounted for by the reduction of 11.8 percentage points in working part-
time.
As seems most likely with an increase in full-time work, ERA also raised earnings 
for WTC customers in ERA. Over the two-year period, earnings were greater by 
£874 as a result of ERA, reflecting a gain of 5.3 per cent over the control group’s 
earnings of £16,392. 
5.4 ERA’s impacts on benefits receipt
The aim of this section is to demonstrate the effect of ERA on benefits receipt. In 
designing ERA, the expectation was that by encouraging lone parents to stay in 
work, to work full-time and to advance, over the long-term they would have less 
need to claim benefits. This section assesses whether, in the two years following 
random assignment, ERA did indeed reduce the proportion of lone parents claiming 
benefits or the amount of benefits received. 
5.4. NDLP
Lone parents in the NDLP group were all claiming IS at the time of random 
assignment. Table 5.4 shows that, according to the responses given by NDLP 
customers, ERA had no impact on the proportion receiving IS two years after 
random assignment. This is consistent with the finding that ERA had little effect 
on customers’ employment rate at this point. The fact that ERA caused a shift 
from part-time work (16-29 hours per week) to full-time work (30 plus hours per 
week) should not have any effect on receipt of IS, since it is payable only for those 
who are out of work or who are working fewer than 16 hours per week. It is also 
interesting to note that for both the ERA and the control groups, receipt of IS had 
fallen dramatically to a level of just over 40 per cent within two years. 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impacts of ERA on labour market and other outcomes

Table 5.4 shows that ERA had little effect on other benefits, with the exception of 
Housing Benefit (HB). ERA reduced the proportion claiming HB at month 24 from 
56.5 per cent to 50.4 per cent. This reduction of 6.1 percentage points is very 
similar to the reduction of 6.8 percentage points after 12 months found in the 
report on first-year impacts.92 This reduction may be due to the increased earnings 
caused by ERA.
5.4.2 WTC
The results in Table 5.4 for the WTC group are quite similar to those for the NDLP 
group. Again, the only significant effect relates to HB. ERA caused a reduction of 
4.6 percentage points in the probability of claiming HB at month 24. As with the 
NDLP group, the effect appears stable over time; the report on first-year impacts 
showed a reduction of 4.9 percentage points at month 12.93 Again, this may 
reflect the higher earnings brought about by ERA.
5.4.3 Alternative tests using administrative data
As in the case of the employment and earnings outcomes, it is possible to 
observe benefits information (other than HB) using administrative data. Benefits 
information taken from administrative data is of high quality and can reliably be 
used to observe benefit status over time. The results below pertain to the full 
random assignment sample. 
Table 5.5 shows that, using administrative data, the effect of ERA on IS receipt in 
month 24 is estimated to be a reduction of 2.2 percentage points. This is similar 
in size to the estimate based on survey data (1.7 percentage points), although 
the result based on administrative data achieves statistical significance, perhaps 
due to the larger number of observations available for estimation. With regard to 
outcomes calculated over a longer period of time, ERA reduced the number of 
months NDLP customers spent on IS in both the first and second years following 
random assignment. It also reduced IS payments by around five per cent, or £282, 
over this period. However, it had no statistically significant effects on receipt of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Incapacity Benefit (IB), benefits received by very 
few NDLP customers in the follow-up period. 
Table 5.5 also shows a consistency with the survey-based results in the estimated 
effect on benefit receipt in month 24. Both datasets suggest a statistically 
insignificant effect in month 24. In fact, there were almost no significant effects 
for any benefit outcomes. The exception is a marginally statistically significant 
reduction in the likelihood of receiving IB for the WTC group. 
92 Dorsett et	al., 2007.
93 Dorsett et	al., 2007.
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Table 5.5 Effects of ERA on benefits receipt within two years  
 after random assignment, estimated from  
 administrative records
ERA Control Difference ERA Control Difference




Year 1 7.4 7.8 -0.4 *** 0.001 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.797
Year 2 5.4 5.7 -0.3 ** 0.018 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.941
Years 1-2 12.8 13.5 -0.7 *** 0.002 1.9 1.9 0.0 0.931
Receiving benefitsa in
month 24 (%) 41.9 44.1 -2.2 * 0.061 8.1 8.0 0.1 0.949
Average total amount of
benefitsa (£) received in
Year 1 2,909 3,063 -155 *** 0.004 186 198 -12 0.543
Year 2 2,002 2,129 -127 ** 0.028 220 222 -2 0.945
Years 1-2 4,911 5,192 -282 *** 0.007 406 420 -14 0.726
Number of months
received JSA in
years 1-2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.987 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.880
Average total JSA
received in
years 1-2 (£) 84 83 1 0.952 39 37 2 0.858
Number of months
received IS in
years 1-2 12.8 13.5 -0.7 *** 0.002 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.889
Average total IS received
in years 1-2 (£) 4,911 5,192 -282 *** 0.007 367 383 -16 0.688
Number of months
received IB in
years 1-2 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.522 0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.241
Ever received IB in
years 1-2 (%) 8.4 7.7 0.7 0.317 4.0 5.4 -1.4 * 0.077




SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records.
NOTES:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
     Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
     JSA = Jobseeker's Allowance; IS  = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
aBenefits refers to Income Support for New Deal for Lone Parents customers, and a combination of  Income 
Support and Jobseeker's Allowance for Working Tax Credit customers.
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5.5 Retention and advancement
The preceding analysis has shown the overall effect of ERA over the two years 
following random assignment. As noted already, it is not possible to examine 
directly the effect of ERA on retention or advancement for the NDLP group, since 
differences between the ERA group and the control group may partly reflect an 
effect of ERA on job entry. However, considering other outcomes may provide 
clues as to the extent of any retention effect: 
• the number of employment spells gives an indication of the amount 
of movement from job to job. This could be indicative of advancement if 
changing jobs is motivated by progression but could also indicate employment 
instability;
• the number of non-employment spells gives a further indication of the 
success of ERA in reducing lone parents’ likelihood of returning to benefits after 
having found work;
• the amount of time taken to find employment could demonstrate ERA’s 
success in assisting lone parents to find work quickly or the motivating effects 
of the retention bonus. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is also possible 
that ERA might increase the time taken to enter work;
• the duration of the first employment could suggest which of these scenarios 
was more likely, as a longer first employment would be consistent with seeking 
out a better job match, while a shorter period of initial employment might 
indicate that the first job was regarded as a stepping stone to employment with 
better prospects;
• the amount of time spent in continuous employment shows whether the 
retention bonus and/or other assistance from ERA had an impact on encouraging 
lone parents to stay in work;
• the characteristics of jobs are examined, since these can provide a clue as to 
whether individuals are progressing into ‘better’ jobs. Grading the quality of jobs 
is challenging, not least because jobs may score differently for different measures, 
but examining the characteristics directly can help give some understanding of 
advancement.
5.5. NDLP
Table 5.6 shows that ERA caused a slight increase in the number of employment 
spells experienced among the NDLP group but the average number of spells over 
the two years following random assignment was slightly less than one. In view of 
this small number, it is possible that this result is simply capturing the effect on 
employment that has already been discussed. There were no statistically significant 
differences between the ERA group and the control group in the number of spells 
out of employment. 
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ERA reduced by a month and a half the average amount of time taken to find 
work by those in the NDLP group. It also increased the likelihood that they found 
work within the first six months following random assignment. This suggests that 
ERA did not lead its participants to take more time searching for jobs (in the 
hope of finding a ‘better’ job), a concern that was raised at the beginning of this 
chapter. Instead, it appears that ERA accelerated job entry. 
Table 5.6 also shows that the first employment lasted 11.3 months for the ERA 
group, which is a month longer than for the control group. ERA also raised 
the likelihood of being employed continuously for the entire two-year period 
following random assignment from 14.6 per cent to 17.8 per cent. This suggests 
that ERA may have encouraged lone parents to find work quickly, without having 
a detrimental effect on the quality of the job match. 
Reflecting the impact of ERA on increasing the amount of time spent in full-
time employment, the ERA group was substantially more likely than the control 
group to have worked full-time for at least four consecutive months. This was 
important, as respondents were eligible for the retention bonus only if they 
worked at least 30 hours a week for 13 out of every 17 weeks. In the ERA group, 
33.6 per cent had worked continuously for at least four consecutive months, 
compared with 25.0 per cent among the control group. This 8.7 percentage point 
gain represents an increase for the ERA group of 35 per cent over the control 
group rate. Interestingly, most customers (about 90 per cent) who began full-time 
jobs worked consecutively for at least four months, whether they were in the 
ERA group or the control group; thus, ERA’s effect here was on increasingly the 
likelihood of taking on such work in the first place.94
Advancement is a more complex concept whose interpretation is partly subjective.95 
The outcomes considered in Table 5.7 focus on particular dimensions of job 
quality, including job stability, responsibilities, fringe benefits (broadly defined), 
customers’ own assessment of their jobs and employment costs. The overriding 
impression from the results is that there was little effect on these dimensions of 
advancement. 
94 Other data in Table 5.6 show that consecutive employment begins to fall 
noticeably between six and 12 months after starting work for the NDLP 
group.
95 Hoggart et	al., 2006.
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Overall, while individuals appear to have reacted to ERA by favouring full-time 
work over part-time work, there is little evidence as yet of a substantial effect 
on employment retention. This is consistent with the fact that the differences 
between the ERA group and the control group in their rates of employment 
were not significant at the end of the two-year period. The move to full-time 
employment represents a form of advancement. However, other outcomes related 
to advancement showed little effect of ERA. Possibly, it is unrealistic to expect a 
substantial effect on advancement within two years for the NDLP population. 
Many of them will have been out of work for some years and may want to 
re-acquaint themselves with the practice of working before focusing on progression 
in employment. Alternatively, it may be that the dimensions of job quality covered 
in the questionnaire, while thorough, miss those qualities that are most important 
to the NDLP population.96
5.5.2 WTC
As previously noted, retention is a less important issue than advancement for the 
WTC group. In view of this, the most important result in Table 5.6 is the finding 
that ERA raised the probability of working full-time for at least four months by 
10.3 percentage points – a 36 per cent improvement over the control group rate 
of 28.9 per cent. 
Table 5.7 shows that there were few statistically significant impacts on the types 
of jobs ERA customers held. (In general, the WTC group held better-quality jobs 
than did NDLP customers, probably reflecting their higher skill levels and stronger 
attachment to the labour force.) 
5.6 ERA’s impacts on training
This section assesses whether ERA had an impact on the amount of training 
undertaken by lone parents and on the qualifications that they acquired. The 
ability of ERA to influence training activity is important as a potential mechanism 
for enhancing the prospects of lone parents advancing in work by developing 
their human capital. ERA was expected to induce training through two types of 
incentives: First, ERA staff could pay for customers’ tuition for training courses, 
up to a maximum of £1,000 per person for all courses, provided that customers 
took the courses while they were working 16 or more hours per week. Second, 
ERA customers could receive a training completion bonus. This incentive paid £8 
for every hour of training completed, up to a maximum of £1,000 (or 125 hours 
of completed training). Again, customers had to be working 16 or more hours per 
week to be eligible for the training completion bonus.
5.. NDLP
Table 5.8 shows that ERA increased the likelihood that NDLP customers would 
participate in training or education by 4.7 percentage points. This was from a 
96 These issues are returned to in Chapter 7.
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high base: 55.8 per cent of the control group participated in training or education 
at some point during the two years, even without ERA’s assistance. This was not 
confined to training while out of work, since the results show an increase in the 
probability of combining work and training of 5.6 percentage points above a 
control group rate of 29.7 per cent.97
Table 5.8 also shows that training was often arranged by Jobcentre Plus. ERA 
increased participation in such training by 7.1 percentage points. There is no 
evidence yet of an effect of this increased training on qualifications gained over 
the two-year period. 
When the first and second years after random assignment are considered separately, 
it emerges that ERA increased the proportion of the NDLP group participating in 
education or training over the first 12-month period but there were no statistically 
significant impacts in the second year. While this appears to suggest that the 
training and education activity induced by ERA diminished over time, the effect 
on the proportion that combined employment and training was positive in both 
years (not shown in the table). Together, these results suggest that ERA may have 
reduced the proportion receiving training while out of work in the second year. A 
possible interpretation of this might be that those in the ERA group received the 
training they desired in the first year and so became less likely to undergo further 
training in the second year, relative to the control group. Alternatively, out-of-work 
lone parents in the ERA group may defer training until they find employment, 
perhaps in the knowledge that this might entitle them to compensation for their 
studies. 
Table 5.8 also shows that ERA increased, by 6.8 percentage points, the probability 
that an individual worked full-time at some point in the two years since random 
assignment and undertook training while employed. There was no effect on the 
probability of an individual working part-time at some point and undertaking 
training while employed. Overall, it is striking that of those in the programme group 
who worked full-time at some point, half undertook training while employed (the 
corresponding level among the control group was 43.4 per cent). Also impressive 
are the high rates of training among employed control group members.98
97 This does not imply directly that ERA increased training for those in work. 
It could equally be the case that employees are more likely to participate in 
training and that the observed increase in training while in work is simply 
capturing the increase in employment due to ERA. However, the same 
pattern is observed for the WTC group, for which there was no employment 
effect, thus supporting a conclusion that ERA did directly increase training 
among those in work.
98 Because the types of people who worked full time in the programme group 
may differ in systematic ways from those who worked full time in the 
control group, comparing these two groups of workers does not yield a 
pure experimental impact estimate. For this reason, the difference in training 
between these two groups is not presented as an impact in Table 5.8.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results in Table 5.9 show that ERA caused a small but significant increase 
in the number of courses taken. Those in the ERA group who did participate in 
some training courses took an average of just under three courses over the two 
years, amounting to almost 270 hours. Among the control group, those who 
participated in training took a similar number of courses but spent an average of 
304 hours in training. This suggests that those in the NDLP group responded to 
ERA by taking more and shorter courses.
Table 5.9 Effects of ERA on number and duration of training or  
 education courses taken by customers within two years 
 after random assignment
5..2 WTC
For the WTC group, ERA’s effect on training was stronger. Table 5.8 shows that, 
while the WTC control group’s participation in training or education over the 
Impacts of ERA on labour market and other outcomes
ERA Control Difference ERA Control Difference




All customers 1.7 1.5 0.2 ** 0.023 2.1 1.8 0.3 *** 0.001
Those who
participated in any
training or education 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.0
Average number of
hours spent in training
or education courses
All customers 158 167 -9 0.556 161 137 24 0.132
Those who
participated in any
training or education 268 304 230 232
Average number of
weeks spent in training
or education courses
All customers 16.9 16.5 0.3 0.776 23.5 16.7 6.8 *** 0.000
Those who
participated in any
training or education 28.5 29.9 33.1 28.4
Sample size 1,188 1,109 1,082 1,037
WTCNDLP
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTES:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
     Italics indicate comparisons that are non-experimental since they were calculated over a portion of the sample. 
Statistical tests were not performed.
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two years was only somewhat higher (at 59.6 per cent) than the rate among 
the NDLP control group (55.8 per cent), ERA’s impact of 12.6 percentage points 
was considerably larger. A similarly sized effect was evident when considering the 
effect of ERA on combining training and employment. Furthermore, these effects 
were sizeable and statistically significant in each of the two years after random 
assignment (13.3 percentage points in year 1 and 11.7 percentage points in year 
2). The role of Jobcentre Plus is very strongly evident. Participation in training 
arranged by Jobcentre Plus was almost non-existent among the control group. ERA 
increased such training by nearly 20 percentage points. As with the NDLP group, 
there is no strong evidence yet of improved training or educational qualifications 
as a result of ERA. 
Those in the ERA group who undertook training enrolled in an average of three 
courses over the two-year period considered and spent an average of around 
230 hours in courses. ERA increased the number of courses taken but not the 
number of hours spent on them (Table 5.9). At the same time, ERA resulted in 
an additional 6.8 weeks in which customers participated in training. Again, the 
results appear to suggest that those in the WTC group reacted to ERA by taking 
more and shorter courses. 
Table 5.8 also shows that ERA increased, by 14.2 percentage points, the proportion 
of WTC customers who worked full-time at some point in the two years since 
random assignment and undertook training while employed. In addition, in 
contrast to the findings for the NDLP customers, there was also a statistically 
significant, though small, impact (3.7 percentage points) on the proportion that 
worked part-time at some point in the two years since random assignment and 
undertook training while employed. The fact that this impact is found despite the 
marked shift away from part-time work that was brought about by ERA, strongly 
suggests that ERA acted to encourage training among those in work. Further 
supporting this inference is the finding among those in the programme group 
who worked full-time at some point: 74.6 per cent undertook training while 
employed, compared with 54.6 per cent for the control group. For those who 
worked part-time at some point, the corresponding levels are 65.0 per cent and 
55.2 per cent.
5.7 ERA’s impacts on taking steps towards advancement
In addition to assessing how much advancement customers have already achieved, 
it is useful to consider whether ERA has influenced the particular steps individuals 
have taken so far to try to advance. These might include, for example, negotiating 
a pay rise or looking elsewhere for better employment. It has been suggested 
already that advancement is likely to be a more immediate concern for the WTC 
group than for the NDLP group. NDLP customers might be expected to have a 
stronger focus on achieving sustained employment (something already achieved, 
for the most part, by the WTC group). However, one might also expect NDLP 
customers to become more interested in advancement once they overcome the 
initial employment retention hurdle.
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Chapter 4 shows that for both the NDLP and WTC lone parents, those in the ERA 
group who worked were much more likely to receive in-work help or advice from 
Jobcentre Plus than those in the control group who worked and that this advice 
was typically more frequent and provided by more specialised staff. The following 
sections examine whether, because of this assistance or any other programme 
features, ERA increased the likelihood that programme group members would 
take advancement steps (in addition to pursuing full-time work) to improve their 
jobs or earnings. 
5.. NDLP
The top panel of Table 5.10 presents some descriptive statistics showing that, 
among customers in the ERA group who ever worked within the two years following 
random assignment, 77 per cent reported taking at least one of a variety of steps 
to improve their work situation or earnings. Moreover, 38 per cent actively looked 
for another job while working. These rates were higher than the rates observed 
for workers in the control group but not by much.
The bottom panel of Table 5.10 shows ERA’s impacts on whether customers in 
the programme group both worked and took steps to advance. It shows that 
ERA increased the likelihood of both working and taking steps to advance by a 
statistically significant 6.6 percentage points over the control group rate of 52.1 
per cent (a gain of nearly 13 per cent). It also increased the likelihood of working 
and actively looking for another job by 4.5 percentage points over the control 
group rate (an 18 per cent gain). 
The increased level of help and advice provided by Jobcentre Plus as a result of 
ERA covered a wide range of advancement topics. It is perhaps most informative 
to consider how this translated into specific actions. The main effects of ERA 
in this regard were to increase efforts to work more hours, to negotiate better 
terms, to find a different type of employment with the same employer or to look 
for a better job with another employer. Those individuals looking for a better job 
elsewhere accounted for 30 per cent of the ERA group. They used a range of 
methods in their job search. Most commonly, individuals looked for another job 
on their own. ERA increased the proportion who worked and searched elsewhere 
for another job on their own from 24.4 per cent to 28.6 per cent. ERA also had 
small but statistically significant effects on a number of less common job search 
channels. The proportions working and looking for a better job by using a private 
recruitment agency, by going to a careers office and by some other method, were 
all increased slightly by ERA.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Workers in the WTC programme group were slightly more likely than those in 
the NDLP programme group to try to improve their employment circumstances. 
And, since more WTC customers overall were working, a higher proportion of the 
entire WTC group was focused on advancement. Table 5.10 (top panel) shows that 
almost 83 per cent of workers in the WTC ERA group took steps to improve their 
work situation or earnings while they were employed, and 41 per cent took steps 
to find another job. The bottom panel shows that ERA increased by a statistically 
significant 4.5 percentage points the proportion that took steps to improve their 
work situation or earnings. This is from a high starting point – more than three-
quarters of the control group reported taking such steps. 
ERA spurred WTC customers’ efforts to increase their working hours and to find 
work with a different employer. It also increased the use of a range of job search 
channels, at least by a small amount. However, it did not increase efforts to 
negotiate better terms or to find different work with the same employer. 
5.8 ERA’s impacts on children’s well-being
Children share in the improved financial circumstances resulting from their parent’s 
increased earnings and, in this regard, their welfare is closely linked to that of 
their parent. The non-financial aspect of children’s welfare is also important. It is 
perhaps unrealistic to expect ERA to have had any effect on children’s well-being 
so soon after its introduction. However, it is clear that encouraging lone parents 
to participate more fully in the labour market may have consequences for their 
children. As discussed previously, there is little theoretical or empirical evidence to 
inform expectations here. The most relevant studies – evaluations of welfare-to-
work programmes in the US and Canada offering financial incentives to work – do 
appear to find some positive impacts on young children’s school performance. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that such findings will apply in the UK. 
Although positive effects on children would be welcome, it is also important 
to assess any detrimental effects associated with encouraging lone parents to 
increase their hours of work. Seen in this light, the absence of any effects on 
children’s welfare in the current study may be regarded positively, since it would 
indicate that children were not harmed, especially as a consequence of ERA’s 
positive effects on the take-up of full-time employment. 
The analysis, thus, considers a range of outcomes relating to children’s general 
well-being, social activities, academic performance and behaviour.99
99 It should be borne in mind that these indicators of child well-being are based 
on the responses of the child’s parent.
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5.8. NDLP
Overall, there were very few statistically significant effects of ERA for the children 
of NDLP customers (Table F.2). It is important to treat the handful of significant 
findings with caution, given the large number of measures considered and the 
small magnitude of the effects observed. It is still possible, of course, that more 
substantial effects of ERA could emerge in the longer term. 
5.8.2 WTC
As with the NDLP group, there were few statistically significant effects for the 
children of those in the WTC group (Table F.2). Again, it may be that effects will 
emerge with time.
5.9 Conclusions
In attempting to draw conclusions from the results presented in this chapter, an 
important point to bear in mind is that they do not capture the full effects of ERA. 
In total, an individual’s ERA experience could span a full 33 months, so participants 
were still eligible to participate in the programme after this report’s follow-up 
period ended. Thus, it is not possible yet to say whether ERA’s effects will grow 
stronger in the longer term or whether they will fade quickly after the in-work job 
coaching, support and financial incentives are withdrawn. 
Summarising the main results, the impression is of an intervention that has had 
considerable success in influencing the labour market behaviour of lone parents. 
Among those on NDLP, ERA increased the chances of being in work and this 
positive effect was sustained for a year and a half. Importantly, ERA increased 
the take-up of full-time work. This is a particularly noteworthy result, since it 
appears so far to have been a sustained increase – it remained visible at the latest 
period for which information is available. It was also the increase in hours that 
was the most notable ERA effect among the WTC group. Greater labour market 
engagement resulted in positive earnings impacts for both groups. There was a 
reduction in IS receipt for the NDLP group over the 24 months but this was close 
to zero by the end of the two years.
It is interesting to note how the effects appear to have altered over time. ERA 
increased employment among the NDLP group in the first year following random 
assignment to a greater extent than in the second year. Correspondingly, the 
effect on earnings was greater in the first than in the second year. However, the 
main impact was to increase the proportion working full-time. This effect was, if 
anything, greater in the second year than in the first. The impact on earnings over 
time reflected these opposing influences – the impact on earnings in the second 
year was slightly lower than in the first year. For the WTC group, the effect on 
employment is of less interest since all individuals should have been working when 
randomly assigned. As with the NDLP customers, it is the move from part-time 
to full-time work that is most impressive. Interestingly, the size of the ERA effect 
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for each of the two years was very close to that for the NDLP group. Importantly, 
the positive effect was visible in both years. Furthermore, the positive effect on 
earnings was statistically significant in the second year, unlike the first year where 
the effect was positive but not significant. To summarise, ERA appears to have had 
a positive effect on hours and earnings that has been sustained across the two 
years considered.
The question of how these effects arose is central to understanding whether ERA 
might achieve its core aims of promoting employment retention and advancement. 
This is a complicated issue to unravel. Disentangling the effect on job entry from 
the effect on retention for the NDLP group is far from straightforward. (Retention 
is not a significant issue for the WTC group.) Most telling is the fact that there 
was no difference in the probability of being employed two years after random 
assignment. This suggests any positive effect on retention that ERA might have 
had (and note that some results are at least consistent with the possibility that it 
had such an effect – for example, those in the ERA group had longer employment 
spells than those in the control group) was not substantial enough to alter longer-
term employment rates. 
There is little evidence so far of ERA having had a direct effect on customers’ 
advancement in ways other than their moving from part-time to full-time work. 
However, there is some evidence that ERA encouraged individuals to take steps 
to improve their position in work. In both the NDLP group and, especially, the 
WTC group, those in work were more likely to participate in education or training 
and were also more likely to try to improve their work situation in other ways. It 
may be that these efforts in time will translate into more concrete evidence of 
advancement.
Overall, the results point towards an intervention that has so far been successful 
in encouraging greater labour market participation among lone parents. The 
key question is whether and for how long the results will persist, a question the 
evaluation will continue to study over the next few years. 
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6 ERA’s impacts across  
 districts and subgroups
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the impact of the Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme varies across districts and across 
different subgroups of lone parents. The possibility that there might be district-
level variation arises because differences in local labour market conditions, staffing 
patterns and implementation practices could be expected to have an impact on 
the effectiveness of the programme. Chapter 5 presented impacts for the New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) group as a whole, with a weighting scheme that 
provided the average effect of ERA as if six separate tests (one for each district) 
had been carried out. This chapter considers whether ERA had a positive impact 
on NDLP customers across all districts regardless of local circumstances or whether 
its effects were highly dependent on local circumstances. 
Because of smaller sample sizes, reliable impacts for the Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
group cannot be computed separately for each district. Consequently, the district-
level analysis in this chapter concentrates on differences between the East Midlands 
region, which had the largest sample size, and all other districts combined. Such 
a comparison, rather than identifying variation in impacts across specific districts, 
provides an indication of the extent to which the effects for the East Midlands 
might hold more broadly.
The chapter begins by considering variation in effects across districts for a range 
of economic outcomes, including employment, earnings and benefits receipt, 
followed by impacts on selected programme outcomes, such as the receipt of 
in-work advice and the training and retention bonuses. Subsequent sections assess 
variation in these effects across a range of subgroups of lone parents. Although 
the chapter makes use of both survey and administrative data, as already described 
in Chapter 5, administrative data on employment and earnings are not used for 
the WTC group. 
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6.2 ERA’s economic impacts across districts
When the effects of ERA are considered for individual districts, it is apparent that 
the programme had different impacts in some districts compared with others. 
However, smaller sample sizes at the district level mean that a given impact is 
more uncertain and less likely to be statistically significant. For this reason, the 
primary focus in the following analysis is not whether the impact in a given district 
is statistically significant but whether the variation in effects across districts is 
statistically significant. If this variation is not statistically significant, then there is 
no evidence to conclude that the effects of ERA differed across districts. 
.2. NDLP
Table 6.1 presents impacts by district for the NDLP group based on customer 
survey data. Overall, the effects of ERA look strongest in North West England, 
Scotland, and Wales. Effects on earnings over the first two years, for example, are 
£3,125 in North West England, more than a 50 per cent increase over the control 
group’s earnings of £5,816. Effects in North West England also seem qualitatively 
different from those in the other districts, in that ERA led to a substantial increase 
in employment rates. 
At the same time, however, it is not possible to infer from these data that the 
effects are different across districts from a statistical standpoint. None of the cross-
district differences for these outcomes is statistically significant, as indicated by 
the final column in the top panel of the table. Although North West England 
seems to stand out, it is not possible to conclude that ERA ‘worked’ in some 
districts and ‘did not work’ in others. A glance at the effects in the table supports 
this conclusion. In each district, there is some positive effect on earnings, although 
many of these differences are not statistically significant (in part owing to small 
sample sizes). Most districts also saw an increase in the fraction of NDLP customers 
working full-time in month 24, from 3.6 percentage points in North East England 
to 12.1 percentage points in Scotland. 
Turning to the administrative data for all NDLP customers randomly assigned, 
Figure 6.1 shows that ERA increased the number of months spent in employment 
over the two years following random assignment in North West England but 
did not have a statistically significant impact in any of the other districts. This 
is consistent with the survey data showing that ERA’s main effect in most other 
districts was not to increase employment rates, but to increase hours worked. 
This difference in effects across districts is statistically significant. In contrast, ERA’s 
effects on average earnings in the 2005-2006 tax year did not significantly vary 
across districts. The two data sources taken together suggest that North West 
England stands out, in terms of increasing employment rates. Overall, however, 
the findings do not support a conclusion that ERA worked in some districts but 
not in others. 
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Table . Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits  
 receipt within two years after random assignment for  
 NDLP customers, by district
ERA‘s impacts across districts and subgroups
P-value for
ERA Control Difference differences
Outcome group group (impact) P-value across districts
East Midlands
Employment and earnings
Ever worked during years 1-2 (%) 72.9 73.9 -1.0 0.811 0.163
Working at month 24 (%) 53.4 58.0 -4.6 0.320 0.519
Average hours worked per week at month 24 13.8 14.0 -0.2 0.895 0.628
Working 30+ hours per week at month 24 (%) 24.5 19.7 4.8 0.228 0.611
Number of months worked full time in years
1-2 4.2 3.6 0.6 0.368 0.216
Total average earnings in years 1-2 (£) 6,965 6,489 476 0.617 0.440
Benefits
Receiving IS at month 24 (%) 43.2 37.4 5.7 0.215 0.212
IS amount amount per week (£) 33 28 4 0.324 0.290
Receiving WTC at month 24 (%) 38.6 46.2 -7.5 0.110 0.172
WTC average amount per week (£) 20 20 0 0.924 0.882
Sample size = 428 221 207
London
Employment and earnings
Ever worked during years 1-2 (%) 67.1 63.0 4.1 0.403
Working at month 24 (%) 50.6 48.8 1.8 0.729
Average hours worked per week at month 24 13.9 11.9 2.0 0.212
Working 30+ hours per week at month 24 (%) 24.6 18.1 6.5 0.121
Number of months worked full time in years
1-2 4.7 3.2 1.5 ** 0.037
Total average earnings in years 1-2 (£) 8,435 7,595 840 0.485
Benefits
Receiving IS at month 24 (%) 47.2 48.5 -1.3 0.796
IS amount amount per week (£) 34 36 -2 0.701
Receiving WTC at month 24 (%) 35.1 31.9 3.2 0.531
WTC average amount per week (£) 15 13 2 0.569
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Table 6.1 (continued)
P-value for
ERA Control Difference differences
Outcome group group (impact) P-value across districts
North East England
Employment and earnings
Ever worked during years 1-2 (%) 74.9 67.4 7.4 * 0.086
Working at month 24 (%) 57.5 51.0 6.4 0.186
Average hours worked per week at month 24 14.1 12.8 1.3 0.372
Working 30+ hours per week at month 24 (%) 22.5 19.0 3.6 0.380
Number of months worked full time in years
1-2 4.3 3.7 0.6 0.425
Total average earnings in years 1-2 (£) 6,670 5,960 709 0.419
Benefits
Receiving IS at month 24 (%) 34.0 43.3 -9.2 ** 0.049
IS amount amount per week (£) 28 32 -3 0.456
Receiving WTC at month 24 (%) 49.7 41.5 8.2 * 0.095
WTC average amount per week (£) 24 20 4 0.371
Sample size = 408 214 194
North West England
Employment and earnings
Ever worked during years 1-2 (%) 78.0 63.8 14.2 *** 0.002
Working at month 24 (%) 56.5 49.8 6.7 0.186
Average hours worked per week at month 24 15.4 12.7 2.7 * 0.071
Working 30+ hours per week at month 24 (%) 29.5 20.6 8.9 ** 0.041
Number of months worked full time in years
1-2 6.5 3.9 2.7 *** 0.001
Total average earnings in years 1-2 (£) 8,940 5,816 3,125 *** 0.004
Benefits
Receiving IS at month 24 (%) 41.0 46.4 -5.4 0.283
IS amount amount per week (£) 32 38 -6 0.227
Receiving WTC at month 24 (%) 45.5 39.2 6.3 0.214
WTC average amount per week (£) 23 18 5 0.192
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Table 6.1 (continued)
P-value for
ERA Control Difference differences
Outcome group group (impact) P-value across districts
Scotland
Employment and earnings
Ever worked during years 1-2 (%) 79.9 75.9 3.9 0.374
Working at month 24 (%) 53.8 51.1 2.7 0.618
Average hours worked per week at month 24 15.3 12.8 2.5 0.135
Working 30+ hours per week at month 24 (%) 27.7 15.5 12.1 *** 0.006
Number of months worked full time in years
1-2 5.8 3.4 2.4 *** 0.002
Total average earnings in years 1-2 (£) 9,028 6,860 2,168 * 0.054
Benefits
Receiving IS at month 24 (%) 41.2 37.8 3.5 0.512
IS amount amount per week (£) 27 24 2 0.570
Receiving WTC at month 24 (%) 47.2 47.9 -0.7 0.898
WTC average amount per week (£) 24 25 -1 0.764
Sample size = 349 178 171
Wales
Employment and earnings
Ever worked during years 1-2 (%) 79.9 79.7 0.2 0.961
Working at month 24 (%) 58.3 60.0 -1.7 0.753
Average hours worked per week at month 24 14.5 14.6 0.0 0.984
Working 30+ hours per week at month 24 (%) 22.8 20.5 2.3 0.601
Number of months worked full time in years
1-2 5.4 3.7 1.8 ** 0.030
Total average earnings in years 1-2 (£) 8,135 6,913 1,222 0.261
Benefits
Receiving IS at month 24 (%) 36.5 34.2 2.3 0.659
IS amount amount per week (£) 31 23 8 * 0.092
Receiving WTC at month 24 (%) 47.5 51.7 -4.2 0.441
WTC average amount per week (£) 26 23 3 0.463
Sample size = 357 181 176
(continued)Table 6.1 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
     A statistical test was conducted to measure whether impacts differed significantly across districts. Statistical 
significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 1 per cent.
     IS = Income Support; WTC = Working Tax Credit.
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Figure . Employment, earnings and benefits receipt within  
 two years after random assignment for NDLP  
 customers, estimated from administrative records,  
 by district
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Figure 6.1 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study benefits receipt, employment, 
and earnings records.
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random
assignment characteristics of sample members.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control
group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
     Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
     A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across districts. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 1 per cent.
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One concern with analyses by district is that positive effects in one district may 
stem from any number of factors that vary across districts, some having to do 
with the types of people served, implementation practices or local economic 
conditions. For example, the large, positive effects on employment seen for North 
West England may not be related to the programme’s performance in the district 
per se, but to the fact that this district’s sample included a higher representation of 
a certain type of NDLP customer who, in general, benefited greatly from ERA. As 
a hypothetical example, consider NDLP customers with higher education levels. If 
ERA had larger effects for these lone parents and if North West England contained 
a disproportionate share of this group, the larger effects observed for this district 
relative to the others would simply be due to compositional variation across the 
districts. It is possible to address this issue to some extent with analyses that 
account for this variation.100 Although not shown here, the results suggest that the 
relatively strong performance in North West England is not due to differences across 
districts in customers’ characteristics, circumstances or previous work experience. 
However, there is also no strong evidence from the implementation research that 
North West England stood out in terms of programme implementation. The lack 
of a strong hypothesis about why the effects on months worked should differ in 
North West England, coupled with the finding that district-level impacts do not 
vary significantly for most other labour market outcomes, reinforce the conclusion 
that there is no evidence of cross-district variation in ERA’s effect. 
Figure 6.1 shows ERA’s impacts on the average number of months receiving 
benefits, either Income Support (IS) or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), by district, 
based on administrative data. The cross-district difference in impacts is not 
statistically significant. Survey data, reported in Table 6.1, also suggest little cross-
district variation in impacts on benefits receipt across several different benefits 
outcome measures.
.2.2 WTC
Table 6.2 presents results for the WTC group. With the exception of the modest 
increase in employment rates in the other districts, as compared with the East 
Midlands, the overall story is similar. In the East Midlands, ERA was associated 
with WTC customers working longer hours on average during the two years 
after random assignment and this was also the case in the other districts. ERA 
significantly raised the proportion of respondents working full-time at month 24 
by 13.7 percentage points in the East Midlands and by 10.6 percentage points in 
the other districts combined. Effects on earnings over the two-year period are also 
roughly similar, although the independent effects are not statistically significant 
(in contrast to the statistically significant earnings effect observed for the pooled 
100 Technically, accounting for this variation (in what is sometimes referred to as 
a ‘conditional‘ impact analysis) involves regressing the outcome of interest 
on treatment status interacted with district and interacted with a range of 
demographic variables that define various subgroups of interest.
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sample, as shown in Chapter 5). In general, the labour market effects for the 
East Midlands generalise more broadly to the other districts. This finding provides 
support for the results in Chapter 5, which are based on a sample that gives 
relatively more weight to the East Midlands.
Effects on benefits receipt are shown in the bottom panel of Table 6.2 (for survey 
data) and Table 6.3 (for administrative data). Both sources tell a similar story and 
illustrate a divergence in effects. As shown in Table 6.3, ERA raised the likelihood 
that WTC customers in the East Midlands received benefits (either JSA or IS) 
24 months after random assignment by 2.4 percentage points over a very low 
control group rate of only 5.0 per cent. (It is not clear why ERA would increase 
benefits receipt for this group, although this effect does match the slight reduction 
in employment rates at month 24.) By contrast, ERA appeared to reduce, somewhat, 
the likelihood of claiming these benefits in the other districts. These differences 
between the East Midlands and the other districts are statistically significant.
In sum, there is no evidence to suggest that ERA’s effects differed across districts. 
For the NDLP group, North West England stood out with respect to ERA’s effect 
of increasing employment rates. However, this district did not appear to stand out 
from the others in terms of implementation. The difference in North West England 
should not be overemphasised, given that ERA’s effects on earnings and other 
labour market outcomes did not vary significantly across districts. For the WTC 
group, the employment effects presented for the East Midlands, although not the 
benefits receipt effects, were found to generalise broadly to the other districts. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.3 ERA’s impacts on receipt of services and incentives  
 across districts
The evaluation report on ERA’s first-year impacts documented a fair amount 
of variability in programme implementation across districts. Although it was 
not possible to rank the districts according to one composite measure of 
implementation, the participation analysis also showed some variation in effects 
on key measures of customers’ interaction with the programme and Jobcentre 
Plus. This section considers district variation in effects over two years for several 
summary participation outcome measures: receipt of in-work help and advice 
on employment-related issues, combining work and training and receipt of the 
training and employment bonuses.101
.3. NDLP
The top panel of Table 6.4 shows ERA’s effects by district on the likelihood that NDLP 
customers would both work and receive help and advice from Jobcentre Plus while 
employed and on their likelihood of both working and taking on training while 
in work. ERA’s effects on the first of these measures are statistically significantly 
different within, as well as across, districts (as indicated by the daggers). In other 
words, the programme substantially increased the receipt of in-work help and 
advice for NDLP customers in all districts, but by a larger degree in some districts 
than in others. It is important to note that these in-work outcomes are calculated 
over all customers, regardless of whether they worked during the two-year period. 
Since the outcome measure is a combination of having worked and having received 
help or advice, some differences in impacts across districts might be driven by 
variation in the rates of having worked. However, a look at employment rates 
across districts from the earlier section shows that these rates do not vary enough 
or in ways that account for the differences in the combined measure. For example, 
the impact of 36 percentage points in the East Midlands, relative to the impact 
of 25.4 percentage points in Scotland, is not due to a difference in employment 
rates, since employment was slightly higher in Scotland. 
ERA produced a positive impact on the likelihood of combining work and 
training. However, the variation in this effect across districts was not statistically 
significant. 
The top panel of Figure 6.2 presents rates of bonus receipt for the NDLP 
programme group. (The control group had no access to bonuses). This analysis 
uses administrative data for the full sample. Results are very similar to those based 
on responses to the survey for the survey sample.
101 See Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of these participation measures.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure .2 Receipt of ERA work and training bonuses within two  
 years after random assignment, estimated from  
 administrative records, by district (ERA group only)
As Figure 6.2 shows, receipt of the employment retention bonus is much higher 
than receipt of the training bonus and the two rates do not seem to be positively 
correlated across districts. (In fact, there seems to be a slight inverse relationship 
between the two rates, in that districts with a higher rate of receipt of the retention 
bonus tend to have a lower rate of receipt of the training bonus.) Receipt rates for 
the retention bonus range from a high of 35 per cent in North West England to a 
low of 22 per cent in the East Midlands and this variation in receipt rates, which 
is statistically significant, does not appear to be due to variation in employment 
rates across districts (see Table 6.1). The average individual who received retention 
bonuses received about three over the two-year period (not shown). There is less 
district variation in the receipt of the training bonus.
.3.2 WTC
Results on participation-related measures for the WTC group are shown in the 
bottom panel of Table 6.4. As in earlier sections, results here are shown only for 
the East Midlands compared to all other districts combined, given the small sample 
ERA‘s impacts across districts and subgroups
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
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sizes across the other five districts. Not surprisingly, rates of in-work support are 
much higher for the WTC group than for the NDLP group, given the former group’s 
much higher employment rates. Across all districts, ERA produced substantial 
impacts on receiving in-work help or advice. However, the East Midlands appears 
to stand out: The receipt of in-work help or advice increased by 73 percentage 
points relative to the control group, compared with about 59 percentage points 
in the other districts combined (ranging from 39.8 per cent in London to 70.7 per 
cent in Scotland). (The difference in impacts between the East Midlands and the 
other districts is statistically significant.) London also had the lowest rate on this 
outcome for the NDLP group. 
The results show no significant difference across districts in the rate of combining 
work and training. Large and statistically significant impacts on this measure were 
observed in the East Midlands as well as the other districts combined. 
The bottom panel of Figure 6.2 presents findings on bonus receipt for the WTC 
programme group. Receipt of the retention bonus is fairly similar – 33 per cent in 
the East Midlands compared to 37 per cent in all other districts. As found for the 
NDLP sample, the East Midlands seems to have somewhat higher rates of training 
bonus receipt: 23 per cent in that district, compared with 15 per cent for all other 
districts, a difference that is statistically significant. 
6.4 ERA’s economic impacts across subgroups
The subgroup analysis seeks to explore whether ERA had different effects for 
particular groups of lone parents. Evaluations of employment and training 
programmes in the US have found that some programmes work better for particular 
types of individuals. The Texas site in the US ERA evaluation, for example, has 
shown larger effects for individuals with recent work experience.102 In contrast, the 
effects of a welfare-to-work programme with financial work incentives for welfare 
recipients in Minnesota were larger and more lasting for relatively disadvantaged 
parents.103 Aside from the empirical evidence, it is easy to imagine that ERA’s 
effects might vary across subgroups of customers who have, for example, different 
skills, views of work or family circumstances that might affect their prospects in 
the labour market, even in the absence of ERA. 
For example, earlier work as part of the ERA evaluation examined work and care 
orientations for a subsample of participants and found that some lone parents 
prioritised care for their children and were not focused on advancement issues.104 
Thus, lone parents with young children and a care orientation may be less likely 
to take up ERA’s offer than those with older children. Similarly, those with higher 
education levels may be more likely to take up training in response to the training 
102 Martinson and Hendra, 2006.
103 Gennetian, Miller, and Smith, 2005.
104 Hoggart et	al., 2006.
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bonus. In other cases, those who are expected to have a more difficult time in the 
labour market, such as ethnic minorities, those who have little work experience, 
and those who face other employment barriers, might respond differently to ERA. 
Should the findings suggest that the programme is more effective for certain 
subgroups of customers, policymakers might consider giving those types of 
individuals priority for post-employment services and incentives like those offered 
by ERA. On the other hand, finding little variation across subgroups would also 
be encouraging, since this would indicate that ERA works for a wide range of 
people. 
Where possible, the analysis is based on administrative data for the full random 
assignment population, in order to maximise the available sample size. In the 
case of the WTC group, concerns about the reliability of the administrative 
employment and earnings data mean that it is necessary to restrict the subgroup 
analysis to survey respondents and the items available from the survey interviews. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that the smaller number of cases available 
for analysis reduces the likelihood of identifying statistically significant differences 
between subgroups. 
As with the district-level analyses, the primary focus in this section is on subgroups 
for whom differences in impacts are statistically significant, denoted by daggers in 
the tables.105 In addition, one difficulty in interpreting subgroup differences is that 
individuals fall into multiple groups. For example, the number of months worked 
before random assignment is likely to be correlated with the age of the youngest 
child, in that those with children under the age of seven might be expected to 
have spent less time in employment over recent months than those with older 
children. Therefore, if the impact of ERA appears to differ depending on the age 
of the lone parent’s youngest child, this may be partly because the parent had less 
work experience before random assignment, rather than solely because of the age 
of the youngest child. Where appropriate, conditional impact analyses are used to 
address this issue (see the first footnote in this chapter). 
.4. NDLP
Table 6.5 and the top panel of Table 6.6 present the results for the NDLP group. 
Table 6.5 presents results based on Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) 
administrative data for the full sample, while Table 6.6 presents results using survey 
data for the survey sample.106 In addition to the subgroups mentioned above, 
also included are a cohort subgroup to capture improvements in programme 
implementation over time and two subgroups measuring employment barriers or 
105 These tests for differences in impacts across subgroups do not account for 
the fact that when multiple subgroup differences are tested, a few will be 
statistically significant simply by chance. These results should be interpreted 
with this caution in mind.
106 No equivalent to Table 6.5 is provided for the WTC group, given that 
administrative data are not used for this group.
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labour market disadvantage. The barriers to employment include problems with 
access to transport or childcare and problems with health, housing, basic skills, 
or anything else identified as important by the respondent. NDLP customers were 
regarded as being severely disadvantaged if their educational qualifications were 
at General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) level or lower, they had not 
worked in the three years before random assignment and they faced at least one 
barrier to employment.
The tables show a few differences across groups. For example, ERA increased the 
average numbers of months employed during the two-year follow-up period for 
ethnic minority107 NDLP customers by 1.2 months over this two-year period but 
had no significant impact on the amount of time that white108 lone parents spent 
in employment (Table 6.5). The analysis using survey data to estimate impacts on 
months in full-time work tells a similar story (Table 6.6). In contrast, the analysis 
of earnings effects based on survey data shows a large difference in impacts by 
ethnicity, while the administrative data analysis does not.109
Another difference in effects occurs across subgroups defined by educational 
qualifications. For NDLP customers with higher qualifications, relative to those 
with lower qualifications or none, ERA had larger effects on the average number 
of months worked during the follow-up period (although not on full-time work) 
and on earnings. Finally, despite improvement in the ERA programme over time, 
there is no evidence to date that it has been more effective for the later-entering 
cohort.
Overall, aside from these few noteworthy differences in impacts across subgroups, 
the results suggest that ERA had positive effects across a wide range of NDLP 
customers, including those who, by various measures, could be considered more 
disadvantaged or less disadvantaged when they entered the programme. 
107 Ethnic minority lone parents included the following groups: Asian or Asian 
British-Bangladeshi; Asian or Asian British-Indian; Asian or Asian British-Other 
Asian; Asian or Asian British-Pakistani; Black or Black British-African; Black or 
Black British-Caribbean; Black or Black British-Other Black; Chinese or Other 
Ethnic Group-Other Ethnic Group; Mixed-Other Mixed; Mixed-White and 
Asian; Mixed-White and Black African; Mixed-White and Black Caribbean.
108 The definition of white lone parents included the following groups: White-
British; White Irish; White other. 
109 Separate analyses suggest that the effects of ethnic minority status are 
not accounted for by its correlation with other factors, such as district, 
qualifications, work history, etc.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The second panel of Table 6.6 presents results from the survey for the WTC group. 
In contrast to the NDLP findings, the WTC data suggest no differences in effects 
across subgroups. In other words, none of the subgroup differences is statistically 
significant. Even the pattern of (non-significant) effects is, in some cases, quite 
different from that for the NDLP group. For the NDLP group, for example, ethnic 
minorities showed consistently more positive impacts. For the WTC group, 
although the effect on earnings is larger for ethnic minority customers, the effect 
on months employed full-time is higher for white customers. Similarly, ERA did not 
have larger effects for WTC customers with higher qualifications, as it did for the 
NDLP group.
6.5 ERA’s impacts on receipt of services and incentives  
 across subgroups
It is easy to imagine that different demographic groups might have more or less 
interaction with the programme. Women with young children, for example, might 
be less interested in advancement in the short term and less willing to participate 
in services. This section presents effects for subgroups on several key measures of 
programme involvement.
.5. NDLP
Table 6.7 presents impacts by subgroup for NDLP customers. It shows some 
subgroup differences in impacts on receipt of in-work help and advice and fewer 
subgroup differences in impacts on combining work and training. For many 
of the differences on these two measures, the story seems to be one of larger 
effects for subgroups that are less disadvantaged or more work-ready. However, 
it appears that the variation in impacts on the two measures is driven more by 
variation in employment rates than by differences in levels of engagement with 
the programme among customers who are employed. For example, ERA led to 
larger effects on in-work help and advice for more educated individuals. For those 
with fewer employment barriers, there were also large effects on in-work help 
and advice, as well as on the likelihood of combining work and training.110 But 
these results are driven mostly by higher rates of work during the two-year period 
among those with more education and fewer employment barriers. In contrast, the 
larger effects for women with older children do not seem to be related to higher 
employment rates. These women may simply be at a stage in their lives when they 
are more likely to take up the programme’s offer of advice and training. 
110 The size of the impacts on these outcomes will depend on the level of 
employment among the programme group and also on the size of the impacts 
on employment. For a given percentage effect on combining work and 
training, for example, the size of the impact will be larger for a programme 
group with a 70 per cent employment rate than for a programme group 
with a 30 per cent employment rate.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Another subgroup difference of note is that ERA had larger effects on the two 
participation measures for ethnic minority NDLP customers. This difference is 
not a result of employment differences but may be due to the very low rate of 
service receipt for the control group. The data suggest that, in the absence of ERA, 
ethnic minority customers in the NDLP group have very low rates of contact with 
Jobcentre Plus advisors while in work and fairly low rates of training. Finally, the 
later cohort tends to show larger effects on both outcomes, a result that supports 
the earlier findings that programme implementation improved over time. 
Table 6.8 presents results for bonus receipt. Rates of receipt of the retention bonus 
are somewhat higher for the less disadvantaged groups, including NDLP customers 
with higher education levels, fewer work barriers and older children. At the same 
time, as with receipt of in-work advice, retention bonus receipt is higher for ethnic 
minorities. Variation in the receipt of the training bonus follows a similar pattern.
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Table .8 Bonus receipt rates among NDLP customers, estimated  
 from administrative records, by subgroup
All participants 28.1 7.2 3,365
Race/ethnicity †††
White 27.0 7.3 2,833
Ethnic minority 34.7 6.5 519
Age of youngest child ††† †††
Under 7 years 23.6 5.9 1,905
7 to 11 years old 28.0 8.8 805
12 to 16 years old 44.0 9.7 476
Number of months worked in 3
years prior to random assignment ††† †††
None 22.3 4.9 1,656
1-12 31.0 7.0 774
13+ 36.2 11.7 935
Housing status † †††
Family 25.3 5.3 251
Social 27.4 6.1 2,220
Private 31.1 10.8 854
Qualifications ††† †††
None 20.0 3.5 778
GCSE 26.3 6.6 1,602
A-Level or above 41.4 12.0 738
Cohort †† †††
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 26.5 5.8 1,756
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 29.9 8.9 1,609
Number of barriers to employment †††
None 32.0 7.3 1,197
One 26.9 7.0 1,269
Two or more 24.3 7.5 899
(continued)
Ever received work 
retention bonus within 
24 months follow-up
Ever received training 








Table 6.9 presents results for the WTC group, showing relatively few significant 
differences across groups. For the receipt of in-work advice, ERA led to larger 
effects for WTC customers with older children and those in private housing. These 
effects do not seem to be due to differences in employment rates over the follow-
up period. 
For combining work and training, only the difference across cohorts is statistically 
significant, with the earlier cohort showing larger effects. This finding is 
counterintuitive, given the implementation findings pointing to the programme’s 
improvement over time. However, the earlier section also showed somewhat 
larger effects on earnings for the early cohort, although this difference was not 
statistically significant.
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Table 6.8 (continued)
Severely disadvantaged ††† †††
Yes 15.4 2.8 769
No 31.9 8.6 2,596
Child under 7 and no work in 3
years prior to random assignment ††† †††
Yes 18.9 4.1 923
No 31.4 8.5 2,299
Sample
size
Ever received work 
retention bonus within 
24 months follow-up
Ever received training 
bonus within 24 months 
follow-up
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data and baseline information forms 
completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
     A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across subgroup 
categories. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 
1 per cent.
     Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other 
friends or relatives. Social housing refers to housing in which the Local Authority (local government) 
or a private housing association is the landlord. Private housing refers to owner-occupied housing or 
housing that the customer rents privately.
     Barriers to employment include transport, childcare, health, housing, basic skills, or other self-
identified problems.
     Severely disadvantaged refers to those participants with General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE) qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to random assignment, and 
at least one barrier to employment.
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Table 6.10 presents results for bonus receipt. There is less significant variation 
in receipt of the retention bonus than for the NDLP group, probably because 
nearly all of the members of the WTC sample worked at some point during the 
follow-up period. Key differences are that women with older children were more 
likely to receive the retention bonus, as were those who were not moderately 
disadvantaged. The early cohort again shows a more positive effect on retention 
bonus receipt. Rates of training bonus receipt vary more often across the subgroups, 
with less disadvantaged individuals more likely to receive a bonus. For example, 
rates of receipt are higher for women with older children, those with more recent 
work experience and those with more education (a particularly large difference). 
Table .0 Bonus receipt rates among WTC customers, estimated  
 from administrative records, by subgroup 
All participants 34.5 19.5 1,415
Race/ethnicity
White 34.4 19.8 1,295
Ethnic minority 36.1 16.0 119
Age of youngest child ††† †††
Under 7 years 29.2 15.0 498
7 to 11 years old 32.2 20.3 427
12 to 16 years old 44.0 23.3 379
Number of months worked in 3
years prior to random assignment †††
None 29.4 13.9 18
1-12 33.6 10.7 150
13+ 34.6 20.7 1,247
Housing status †††
Family 25.4 12.2 88
Social 35.7 16.1 532
Private 34.2 22.7 781
Qualifications †††
None 29.4 13.8 172
GCSE 35.5 16.6 645
A-Level or above 34.7 24.9 424
Cohort ††
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 40.4 16.4 271
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 33.1 20.2 1,144
Number of barriers to employment
None 37.3 16.8 470
One 33.2 21.1 638




Ever received work 
retention bonus within 24 
months follow-up (%)
Ever received training 
bonus within 24 months 
follow-up (%)




The results suggest that ERA’s effects, documented in Chapter 5, were fairly 
consistently spread across districts and across a range of subgroups. For the NDLP 
group, ERA appears to have had effects across all districts, although North West 
England stood out as having increased employment rates. However, this district 
did not stand out in terms of programme implementation. For the WTC group, 
the results suggest that ERA’s effects in the East Midlands were generally similar to 
those in the other districts. Although rates of in-work contact were higher in the 
East Midlands, the economic impacts were no larger in that district.
In terms of variation across subgroups, the overall conclusion is that the programme’s 
effects did not vary substantially by the characteristics of the lone parents. The 
exceptions to this rule for the NDLP group were larger effects for ethnic minority 
lone parents and for more educated lone parents. In addition, for both the NDLP 
and WTC groups, there was no pattern suggesting that ERA had larger effects for 
either more or less disadvantaged parents. 
Effects on interaction with the programme did seem to be larger for less 
disadvantaged groups but this pattern appears to be due to their already higher 
employment rates. Higher rates of programme interaction for these groups did 
not translate into larger economic impacts.
Table 6.10 (continued)
Moderately disadvantaged †
Yes 31.3 18.0 518
No 36.4 20.4 897
Ever received work 
retention bonus within 24 
months follow-up (%)
Ever received training 




SOURCE: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data and baseline information forms 
completed by DWP staff.
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
     A statistical test was performed to measure whether impacts differed significantly across subgroup 
categories. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; and ††† = 
1 per cent.
     Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other 
friends or relatives. Social housing refers to housing in which the Local Authority (local government) 
or a private housing association is the landlord. Private housing refers to owner-occupied housing or 
housing that the customer rents privately.
     Barriers to employment include transport, childcare, health, housing, basic skills, or other self-
identified problems.
     Moderately disadvantaged refers to those participants with General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE) qualifications or lower and at least one barrier to employment.
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There were two exceptions to these broad patterns: First, ERA had larger effects 
on programme interaction for women with older children, for both groups of 
lone parents. These effects did not seem to be due to their higher employment 
rates, but may be the results of their desire and readiness to move into work and 
advance. There is no evidence so far, however, that they benefited more from the 
programme in terms of employment and earnings. 
Finally, the most intriguing result is for the ethnic minority customers in the NDLP 
group. ERA had quite large effects for this group, on both interaction with the 
programme and subsequent labour market outcomes, especially as captured by 
the survey data. It is not clear what particular barriers ERA may have addressed for 
this group to help them improve their employment and earnings but the results to 
date are encouraging and warrant further investigation.
ERA‘s impacts across districts and subgroups
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7 Lone parents’ work  
 journeys and ERA’s  
 effectiveness 
7.1 Introduction
The findings on the Employment Retention and Advancement‘s (ERA’s) 
programme two-year effects presented in Chapters 5 and 6 are broadly positive. 
Compared with their control group counterparts, New Deal for Lone Parents 
(NDLP) participants more quickly entered work and both NDLP and Working Tax 
Credit (WTC) participants were more likely to work 30 or more hours per week, 
with a corresponding increase in average earnings. They were also more likely 
to participate in training while employed, which might contribute to additional 
earnings gains in the longer run. Some impacts are fairly large and, therefore, 
impressive, especially given the limited British and international knowledge base 
on effective post-employment strategies. At the same time, ERA has yet to show 
much effect on other aspects of advancement and its impacts on employment 
retention are not particularly large or clear-cut. As many participants were still in 
the programme when the two-year follow-up period for this report ended, it is 
too soon to draw final conclusions about the programme’s overall effectiveness. 
However, it is worth considering at this time why ERA had the effects it did and 
why some of its effects so far have not been larger. 
This chapter explores those questions. To do so, it draws heavily upon the process 
study’s intensive longitudinal qualitative research with a number of NDLP and WTC 
customers in the ERA programme group. These individuals have been followed over 
a two- to three-year period (see Table A.1). By examining their attitudes towards 
and experiences in work over an extended time – for example, how they manage 
their transitions to work, how they view full-time work and how they think about 
other aspects of advancement – the analysis reveals some of the special challenges 
that lone parents faced in striving to remain employed and progress in work and 
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what these imply for ERA’s ability to help them succeed. The chapter includes 
numerous brief vignettes to ‘get behind the numbers’ and convey more of a ‘real-
life’ flavour of participants’ experiences in the labour market and their interactions 
with the ERA programme. 
The exploration starts by considering how customers responded to some of 
ERA’s primary goals of promoting sustained employment, full-time work, and 
skills building through training or education while employed. The next few 
sections discuss these topics. The chapter then presents a broader framework for 
understanding customers’ pathways towards advancement, with some illustrations 
of ERA’s role in those work journeys.111
7.2 ERA’s goals and participants’ experiences in work 
.2. Retaining employment
As Chapter 5 shows (Table 5.1), a majority (76 per cent) of the NDLP customers 
in ERA worked at some point within the two years after random assignment. 
However, many of these workers did not remain employed. For example, only 
55 per cent were employed at the time of the 24-month interview. 
Previous qualitative research on ERA explored reasons for work exits among NDLP 
customers.112 It observed that common obstacles to retaining work included 
temporary contracts, redundancy, inability to coordinate childcare with work, 
breakdown of childcare arrangements, dissatisfaction with working conditions, 
poor family health, problems with budgeting and debts and difficulties with 
transport to work. The research suggested that work retention is a process that 
individuals move through at different rates and it is not uncommon for customers 
to experience spells out of work before achieving steady employment. In addition, 
obstacles to work entry could recur as threats to work retention. 
The qualitative longitudinal research undertaken for this report confirms these 
earlier observations but it also suggests that issues that may threaten work 
retention can, and do, occur even later when lone parents may have been in 
work for two or more years. One NDLP customer, followed over three interviews, 
is a case in point. Shortly after beginning ERA, she started working part-time at a 
local shop with a schedule that was compatible with her children’s school hours. 
The work suited her and her three primary and secondary school-age children. 
After two years, however, she was made redundant when the shop changed 
hands. She received Income Support (IS) until she found another job in a different 
shop. By then, however, her time on ERA had ended. At the third interview, she 
was working in yet another job, this time at a local school. While this job was 
111 Other research tracking lone parents in work has identified similar patterns 
characterised by spells in work and out of work. See, for example, Millar, 
2006; Ray et	al., 2007; and Stewart, 2007.
112 Hoggart et	al., 2006.
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also compatible with her caring responsibilities, a drawback was that she would 
not receive a work income during school holidays and was concerned about the 
viability of this during the summer break. While she enjoyed working, she wished 
to work only part-time within school hours and was resistant to the idea of using 
formal childcare. As this case illustrates, retention can be a continuing issue that 
extends well beyond the first few years in employment. 
Some lone parents managed to retain their work despite events in their lives that 
may have posed a threat to their employment. It was also evident that some 
working lone parents were able to overcome personal circumstances to maintain 
their work at a steady rate. However, these circumstances could make their 
progression in work more challenging. One NDLP customer found that holding 
onto her job working weekly shifts of 16 to 20 hours at a call centre was not 
easy. Her child was diagnosed with a disability during the course of ERA and she 
required additional time off for hospital appointments. Her employer was not 
sympathetic to her taking time off from work, so she needed to restrict her work 
hours in order to attend to her child’s needs: 
‘I	 suppose	 everything	 does	 go	 around	 work.	 Everything	 revolves	 around	
work,	so	you	have	to	make	sure	anything	that	you’ve	got	planned	doesn’t	
go	in	your	working	hours.’	
.2.2 Taking on full-time work
ERA was designed to improve employment outcomes in part by encouraging full-
time work. The ERA retention bonus, conditional on work of 30 hours or more per 
week, was intended to act as an incentive to work full-time for those who may 
not otherwise choose to do so. Advisory staff had a responsibility to encourage 
consideration of full-time work and remind customers of the financial incentives. 
By the time of the second customer survey, participation in work of 30 or more 
hours per week was close to seven percentage points higher for the NDLP 
programme group and 13 percentage points higher for the WTC programme 
group, compared with their control counterparts. Many lone parents started 
out working part-time (16 to 29 hours per week), so advancement could also 
be construed as increased work hours, specifically to 30-plus hours per week. 
The qualitative evidence, along with the impact findings in Chapter 5, identified 
moving into full-time work as the most common form of advancement. Most 
of these customers were able to increase their hours in their current job. Some 
workplaces offered limited opportunities for full-time work and, in these cases, 
customers moved to a different employer or took on additional hours elsewhere. 
Still, despite ERA’s success at increasing rates of full-time employment, only 25 per 
cent of all NDLP customers (and about 46 per cent of those employed in month 
24) were working full-time (Table 5.2). Among WTC customers, only 39 per cent 
(about 44 per cent of those employed in month 24) were working full-time. Why 
were these rates not higher? 
Lone parents‘ work journeys and ERA‘s effectiveness
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To address this question, the qualitative data point to certain patterns among those 
who remained in work and did not increase their work hours. These individuals 
were more likely to lack one or more of the following conditions that can facilitate 
full-time employment:
• stable childcare;
• a work environment that enabled increased hours; 
• a strong interest in working more at this time;
• some qualifications;
• other support mechanisms facilitating informal childcare; and
• growth in confidence through their work experience.
Three factors in particular were seen to set the parameters for work advancement 
of this type: the nature of employment, the point of time in the family life course 
and personal circumstances. 
The type of job was significant for advancement opportunities. There were 
instances where lone parents felt that their potential to advance was restricted by 
employers who could not offer more hours or posed conditions on added hours. 
In one instance, a WTC customer who worked as a home care worker was told 
she could work more hours only if she took on a night shift, something she did 
not wish to do. The nature of the job could also pose restrictions on progression. 
Many lone parents in the qualitative sample worked in part-time, low-skilled jobs 
(e.g. domestics, care workers, retail, school assistants) that are characterised by 
poor working conditions and limited opportunities for advancement.113 Others 
worked for smaller employers that offered few positions and no real career path. 
The point at which ERA was introduced into a lone parent’s life was also significant. 
Limitations were often tied to the age of the children. Some parents said that 
they wanted to wait until their children were older before they increased their 
work hours. One NDLP customer, with a preschool-age child, had taken extended 
maternity leave with a spell on IS before starting ERA. She re-entered work as a 
part-time administrator. As a new mother, it was important to her to provide a 
working role model for her child but with work hours that suited her family. This 
balance was important and contributed to her ability to continue working. She 
preferred to wait until her child was in school before increasing her work hours. 
Earlier qualitative research on ERA114 found that lone parents’ attitudes towards 
work advancement were influenced by how they identified themselves in the roles of 
carer and worker and how they envisioned combining these roles. Understandably, 
those with a stronger orientation towards care were more inclined to defer their 
aspirations for advancement to a future time. In these cases (as also explained 
113 Millar et	al., 2006, discuss the limited opportunities offered by such jobs.
114 Hoggart et	al., 2006.
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in Chapter 4), financial incentives and advisory support were unlikely to sway 
parents from their decision to work part-time hours. Orientations to family care 
set boundaries on the amount of time lone parents wished to spend away from 
their children. Generally speaking, although lone parents with younger families 
often chose to balance their time in favour of their children, there were notable 
exceptions to this pattern. Some lone parents with younger children increased 
their work hours, while others insisted on being available for their teenagers. 
Indeed, Chapter 6 showed that for parents of younger children and older children 
alike, ERA had positive impacts on the average number of months spent working 
full-time (see Table 6.6). 
.2.3 Combining training with work
ERA also aimed to improve employment outcomes by supporting the acquisition 
of new qualifications and skills. Financial support for training fees and a training 
completion bonus were intended to encourage the take-up of training and many 
customers looked to their ERA advisers to help them arrange appropriate training 
courses. Results reported in Chapter 5 suggest that ERA substantially increased 
the likelihood that lone parents would combine work and training, particularly 
among WTC customers. 
The survey findings also suggest that programme group parents were more likely 
to have participated in training and to have worked an average of 30 or more 
hours over an employment spell. As shown in Table 5.8, among full-time ERA 
workers, 51 per cent of NDLP customers and 75 per cent of WTC customers 
participated in a training or education course while working. In contrast, among 
part-time ERA workers, 40 per cent of NDLP customers and 65 per cent of WTC 
customers took on training or education while employed. (The corresponding 
rates among the control groups were lower for these working groups.) Some 
of this training was offered by employers and affirms differences between the 
development opportunities offered in part-time and full-time employment.115 Yet, 
the results show that support from ERA had a positive impact.
Training may be viewed as a step towards advancement and it is notable that 
such high proportions of lone parents made efforts in this regard, especially those 
working full-time. Still, the qualitative evidence suggests that some lone parents 
found it difficult to participate in education or training in addition to (and outside 
of) full-time work; they simply could not find the time to fit both activities into 
their busy lives, despite ERA’s incentives and support. In these cases, they had to 
choose between devoting extra time to work or to training but not to both. One 
WTC customer illustrates this challenge. Before entering the ERA programme, 
she had been working part-time in a local supermarket. With help from her ERA 
adviser and financial support for equipment from the Emergency Discretion Fund 
(EDF), she established a business of her own on a casual basis (in addition to her 
supermarket work), which supplied enough extra hours to allow her to draw the 
115 Millar et	al., 2006.
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ERA retention bonus as well as increase her earnings. She eventually decided to 
grow her business but realised she needed more qualifications to do so. She found 
a suitable training course at the local college but decided her work arrangement 
would be too difficult for her to manage. She then stopped her business and used 





This customer also justified her approach to combining work and training on a 
financial basis. She reasoned that the training bonus would compensate for most 
of her lost wages and foregone income from the retention bonus, which she 
would no longer receive. After completing her college course she was keen to 
work full-time again but was undecided whether to resurrect her business or to 
find similar work with an employer. 
The research also shows that many individuals had not completed their ERA-
funded training during the study observation period or, if they had completed it, 
they had not yet applied their new skills or qualifications in the work world. Some 
were awaiting qualifications before moving on. Others had taken steps to improve 
their work through training but it was not known if they had carried through 
any plans to apply their new skills in their current jobs or in a new vocation. This 
finding is also apparent in the relatively low numbers who received the training 
completion bonus, as reported in the customer survey (see Chapter 4). This may 
be an artefact of the study’s time frame and, arguably, had the observation period 
been longer, there may have been greater opportunities for lone parents to apply 
their training and improve their employment position. The qualitative data also 
show that some customers had difficulty converting training into advancement at 
work. For example, one NDLP customer talked about how she had not completed 
all her training until after her time on ERA had finished. At that point she was 
very disappointed that she did not get any help converting the training into work 
advancement, which in her case would have meant becoming self-employed. 
All these findings underscore the importance of time needed for work changes 
to occur. Two or three years may not be sufficient for people to enact change, 
especially those with low skills or limited work experience. 
7.3 Work journeys and ERA support
A more summary way to understand the myriad pathways towards advancement 
represented by ERA customers’ experiences, is through the framework of ‘work 
journeys’. This concept is offered here as an heuristic device for conceptualising, in 
broader terms, the diversity of customers’ employment trajectories and changes in 
work patterns over time. People who travel on different work journeys experience 
very different kinds of struggles in the work world and, thus, present different 
sets of challenges to programmes like ERA that aim to help them advance. These 
journeys can be categorised into three general groups:
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• Steady: Customers entered work, remained in work throughout the follow-
up period, and finished ERA holding a job with hours and conditions similar to 
those of the job in which they started;
• Broken: Customers entered work but also experienced at least one spell out of 
work while on ERA; and 
• Advanced: Customers entered work, remained in work, and furthered their 
work position (in any one of a variety of ways) while participating in ERA.
The analysis presented here uses this framework to understand the evolving work 
experiences and interactions with ERA of 36 NDLP and WTC programme group 
working customers who participated in the qualitative longitudinal study. Some 
of these individuals had completed the ERA programme by the time of their last 
interview, and all had at least some experience working since they had entered 
the study. Of course, the reality of lone parents’ working lives is more complicated 
than the classification scheme implies. Thus, although these categories are useful 
as an analytical tool, it is important to recognise that considerable diversity exists 
within each of the groups, and individual journeys overlap categories. A boxed 
case study is used to illustrate each of these journeys.116 
.3. Steady work journeys
Steady journeys were the most common type of work pattern found in the 
sample. The WTC customers in this category were working when they entered 
ERA and remained with the same employer throughout the study (see Box 7.1). 
NDLP steady workers frequently returned to the type of employment that they 
had been previously undertaking, reasserting their qualifications and experience. 
Common work patterns in this group were: 
• same employer and hours;
• changed employer, same hours;
• increased part-time hours;
• increased, then decreased, work hours.
 
116 Aliases are used in these case studies.
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Box . Steady work journey: Leah
Leah illustrates a steady-journey pattern. Before entering the ERA programme, 
she had trained and worked as a nurse but took time out to raise her family 
after her marriage failed. On ERA, she returned to nursing and also worked 
part-time as an assessor for social care students. Her children were now older, 
the youngest a teenager. She remained with the same employer during the 
research observation period. 
She received the retention bonus while on ERA and found it useful to keep 
her motivated in a job that, at times, she found difficult. Leah’s employer 
paid her fees to undertake a degree course that she had identified. She also 
received an EDF payment to help her with finances when she entered work. 
Leah wanted to advance and took steps towards that goal through her 
training but she felt that her place of employment created a barrier to further 
progress. She attributed this to a lack of senior jobs and some difficulties 
with her manager. She felt that the continuing support she received from her 
ERA adviser kept her motivated and enabled her to talk through her work 
problems: 




This emotional support was very important to her, especially because her 
social networks were limited. 
 
.3.2 Broken work journeys
Broken journeys were less common in the qualitative sample and were observed 
only among the NDLP group. Some of these cases were women returning to work 
who had spent a number of years out of the labour market raising their children 
before joining ERA. Others were trying to break into a different line of work. While 
all had a spell out of work while on ERA, the work journeys of the individuals in 
this group were diverse: 
• single job exit followed by steady employment;
• single long-term job exit;
• multiple spells in and out of work;
• work advancement followed by a job exit.
The case presented in Box 7.2 provides an example of a broken work journey that 
was shaped by limited work skills, family circumstances and parental decisions 
about combining work with care. 
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Box .2 Broken work journey: Fiona
Fiona experienced numerous starts and stops in three different lines of work 
and at the end of the ERA study period, she was no longer in employment, due 
to personal circumstances. She had a history of unskilled work and personal 
illness that rendered her unable to work. When she started on ERA, she had 
two pre-school-age children and had not worked since becoming a parent. 
On ERA, Fiona started her own business in the leisure industry. She reasoned 
that self-employment would allow her the flexibility she needed to care for 
her children. But business was poor and she had to stop after three months. 
She then found a job as a home carer, working half days around her childcare 
arrangements. She left this job after a few weeks because she was struggling 
financially and found she was not better off compared to when she was not 
working. She returned to IS. 
Ultimately, Fiona wished to organise her work around her children. She 
enjoyed the autonomy she had had with her own business and decided to go 






Because her business income was unreliable, she took on a part-time job 
with a media company and with the extra hours, she was able to receive 
two retention bonuses. She primarily wanted to earn enough income to ‘get 
by’ in a job that would enable her to personally care for her children. Fiona 
continued to combine the two jobs until she left employment to have another 
baby. 
This customer reported that she had little contact with her ERA adviser apart 
from meetings around the retention bonuses. She was not interested in 
training and any plans for advancement were long term.
 
.3.3 Advanced work journeys
Advanced journeys were more common among WTC customers, confirming how 
those lone parents who were relatively established in employment were more 
receptive or prepared to advance. Within these journeys there was also diversity, 
incorporating different ways of progressing in work: 
• higher earnings through increased hours or a job promotion (same or different 
employer);
• extra responsibilities;
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• increased job satisfaction;
• improved work-care balance;
• self-employment.
There was considerable overlap among the work journeys. Some of the respondents 
with broken journeys also advanced by eventually moving to better jobs or they 
advanced before losing their jobs. Some of those with steady journeys either 
advanced subjectively through training or advanced in terms of increasing their 
hours before dropping back. Box 7.3 illustrates a case in which a lone parent with 
a history of broken employment (before ERA) succeeded in finding a job which 
represented advancement in more than one way. 
 
Box .3 Advanced work journey: Emily
Emily was the mother of three children aged 17, 15, and 13. Before starting 
on ERA, she had had a history of low-paid, low-skilled jobs that she formed 
no attachment to and tended to leave because they paid the minimum wage. 
After starting ERA, she moved to a better job as a train guard, which she 
enjoyed. Along with better pay, she had more responsibilities, greater security, 
and an employer-supported pension:
‘It	was	nice	to	be	able	to	have	a	secure	job	which	pays	well,	knowing	I	got	
a	pension	with	this	job	which	I	didn’t	with	the	other	jobs.’	
The security that she valued was put to the test when she became ill and 
needed to go on sick leave for six months. At the time of the third interview, 
she was able to return to work. It is very unlikely that this would have been 
possible in her previous jobs.
The primary drivers pushing her into better work included her desire to find a 
job with pension rights, and financial considerations that encouraged her to 
pursue work full-time. She was ready to move into full-time work when she 
started ERA because her children were older and no longer needed childcare. 
In the third interview, she talked about how she had moved from organising 
work around her children, to trying to fit her family responsibilities around 
work. Interestingly, she attributed this change to the nature of her work rather 
than changing attitudes towards her caring responsibilities. She enjoyed her 
job more, had more responsibilities and felt more committed to it. She also 
noted that her parents lived in the local community and were therefore able 
to provide back-up support. She was very positive about the way ERA had 
helped her with work matters and noted that support from her Advancement 
Support Adviser (ASA) was especially important.
Continued




Emily is a good example of a lone parent who benefited from her involvement 
in the ERA programme, for whom it came along at ‘the right time’ and 
expedited her journey. Her advancement journey incorporates multiple 
elements of advancement: more pay, a ‘better’ job and improved personal 
satisfaction. Her own personal definition of advancement focused on doing a 
job she enjoyed, and she thought ERA had helped her achieve this:








Classified this way, the journeys can be seen as processes that the ERA intervention 
would be expected to have an impact upon. For example, the retention support 
offered through ERA is designed to prevent broken journeys and assist in moving 
individuals out of ‘the low pay, no pay cycle’; while the advancement support 
offered through ERA is designed to promote advanced journeys. Steady journeys 
might be seen as an intermediate stage between broken and advanced; as 
discussed in Chapter 4, advisers often found it easier to promote advancement 
with customers once they had become established in work. 
Respondents differed both in the extent of ERA support they utilised and the extent 
to which it made a difference to their work journeys. There were some customers 
who did not receive any of the financial support; others had not maintained 
much contact with an adviser. Some expressed a sense of self-reliance and did 
not want to be dependent on advisory support; others felt that ERA had little to 
offer them, either because they were working part-time or did not feel ready to 
progress. In the case of those with broken journeys, the majority of job exits were 
involuntary (dismissal, redundancy, temporary contracts). Hence, there was little 
ERA or advisers could do to prevent these situations but they could play a role in 
helping customers find new jobs. In some cases, as for example in the case of one 
NDLP customer, advisers helped ensure that customers did not revert to benefits 
but ultimately advanced into a better job. By the same token, some lone parents 
who advanced in their work may have done so of their own accord, relying on 
their past experience and qualifications. Others, such as Emily, were clearly aided 
by the ERA intervention. 
In some of these cases, therefore, it is possible that continuing support might have 
made a difference in customers’ work trajectories: by facilitating movements back 
into work after work exits, by supporting customers to find new employment where 
they were not happy in their work or by starting discussions on advancement that 
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customers could act upon when they were ready. Consistent and flexible adviser 
support over time was important and, as the longitudinal analysis illustrates, the 
directions customers take in work are liable to change. A three-way categorisation 
of work patterns can oversimplify a complex story. 
.3.4 Changes over time 
Evidence from the longitudinal in-depth interviews with customers underscores 
the importance of the temporal dimension – that retention and advancement 
are dynamic processes that unfold and change over time. While the research 
respondents recounted their experiences between the interviews, it was clear that 
the final interviews were occurring at one point in work journeys that were still 
unfolding. These journeys involved pauses, halts and reversals and they rarely 
flowed in a linear progression. Some work achievements were unstable and were 
undermined by unexpected changes in work or family situations, resulting in 
reduced work hours or a job exit. In time, though, individuals often recovered and 
moved beyond such setbacks. It, thus, stands to reason that more individuals in 
the qualitative study might have shown evidence of advancement had they been 
observed over a longer period of time. A longer-term view would also accommodate 
the fact that a substantial number of lone parents were still undertaking training 
within the first two years after random assignment, as captured in the survey data, 
and might eventually see a payoff from that investment. 
The longitudinal study of lone parents in work enabled the researchers to observe 
changes that occurred within individuals as well as to compare and contrast across 
different individuals. Two work behaviour patterns that emerged from this analysis 
warrant discussion because they hold implications for the future delivery of in-
work support to the lone parent population. These changes correspond to the 
ageing of the family and exposure to work over time. 
Lone parents’ concerns about their children’s well-being were always paramount. 
With the passage of time, many lone parents stated that it became easier for 
them to establish themselves in work as their children became older, became 
more independent and assumed responsibility for themselves and sometimes 
for their siblings. Many lone parents in the sample had youngest children who 
were teenagers or became teenagers as the study progressed and this placed 
fewer immediate time pressures on the parent. Correspondingly, the relationship 
between lone parents’ care and work orientations changed over time, often 
becoming more congruent with efforts to advance in work. In fact, over time, it 
was common for lone parents to switch from trying to construct their work lives 
to accommodate their caring responsibilities, to organising care arrangements to 
suit the needs of their working lives. As part of this evolution in perspectives, lone 
parents began to prioritise moving into work they enjoyed or that would provide 
a better standard of living, rather than, for example, planning for jobs that fitted 
in with school hours. 
Another distinct pattern noted among working lone parents (primarily among 
those who had re-entered work through ERA) was increased dissatisfaction with 
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their jobs or a desire to change jobs after an extended time in work. This mainly 
occurred once they had settled their families into a stable work routine and 
had proved to themselves they could do it. The analysis has shown that it was 
common for lone parents to experience what could be termed a ‘honeymoon’ 
period during the early stages of work and this tended to positively influence their 
attitudes towards the job. It was not uncommon for NDLP customers to begin 
work with low expectations of the types of jobs they could perform, particularly 
if they had few skills and little experience to offer. Stable employment provided 
a sense of achievement and an initial high level of satisfaction with a job that 
actually might have been poorly paid or unsatisfactory in other ways. Over time 
and with growth in self-confidence, customers’ expectations in work tended to 
rise and they became more critical of their jobs. 
There were a number of reasons why the longer customers had been at their 
jobs, the more anxious they were to move on, including being unhappy at work, 
feeling unfulfilled, wanting to move in another direction and the realisation that 
they could progress. Dissatisfaction with work could act as a catalyst for change 
– and for seeking new help from ERA. An example of this was provided by a lone 
parent customer who started a full-time job in retail after devoting some years 
to caring for her children. At first, she enjoyed her new job, but then became 
frustrated, partly because she was required to work anti-social hours, but also 
because she felt she was being treated unfairly. In addition, she was dissatisfied 
with the amount of pay she was getting, given her responsibilities. By the second 
interview she had moved to another job as a day carer which she enjoyed and the 
hours were more suitable for her family. 
These behavioural changes observed among ERA lone parents complement the 
advancement ethos of the programme. As stated in previous findings on ERA,117 
lone parents assert different preferences for how they balance their working 
and caring roles. The current research has found that individuals can shift their 
priorities on care and work over time, and this will affect the desired balance. 
Time spent as a worker, alongside the ageing of the family, enabled lone parents 
to concentrate on developing their working roles. These findings provide further 
insights into the psychology of deferred work advancement. They suggest that 
lone parents and their families need time to adapt and adjust to the life changes 
brought on by work, perhaps more time than was offered in the design of the 
ERA programme. The implication for an in-work intervention like ERA is that tools 
that support progress in work need to be flexible enough to accommodate these 
changing needs and perspectives. 
7.4 Conclusions
The in-depth longitudinal interviews with working lone parents offer a reminder 
that work advancement is often a lengthy and evolving process, commonly 
117 Hoggart et	al., 2006.
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involving a change in employer and requiring time for a person to learn a new skill 
or acquire a qualification. The two-year time available to date for the ERA impact 
evaluation may not be sufficient to fully capture the effects of these changes. 
Other processes may also have tempered the impacts of ERA, including experiences 
relating to changes in lone parents’ views of themselves as capable workers. There 
is every reason to believe that these same individual processes were occurring 
among control group NDLP and WTC lone parents, so that as time passed in work, 
these individuals were also taking steps to improve their employment outcomes. 
Indeed, Table 5.10 shows high proportions of working control group members 
‘taking steps’ on their own to advance. 
A heightened self-esteem among lone parents was one of the outcomes reported 
by both customers and advisory staff. This often came about as lone parents and 
their families bedded into a working routine and began to realise their potential. 
As they spent time in work, developed heightened confidence in their capabilities 
as a worker, established routines as a working family and as their children aged, 
lone parents began to demand more from their jobs. The ‘honeymoon period’ 
was over. 
When the conditions were right, employers might have recognised their employees’ 
potential with added responsibilities and a possible pay rise. But it was more often 
the case that lone parents took steps to improve their work and pay independent 
of their employers, such as by looking for a new job. Some were helped by their 
ERA advisers in this process. 
One might also argue that the passage through a ‘honeymoon period’ in work, 
an attendant shift to a working-carer identity and movements towards sustainable 
employment, are processes that occur in many work trajectories among mothers. 
These changes may act as drivers for progression in work. The research has shown 
that by identifying and then capitalising on such drivers, a post-employment 
programme such as ERA can play an important part in helping lone parents 
advance towards better and sustainable employment. 
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8 Next steps in the ERA  
 evaluation
This latest report on the implementation and effects of the Employment Retention 
and Advancement (ERA) programme offers further promising evidence that 
Jobcentre Plus can effectively deliver a post-employment intervention that combines 
substantial in-work adviser support and financial incentives. Although building the 
capacity of staff and managers to implement ERA proved very challenging, the six 
pilot districts showed that it could be done: They delivered the core features of the 
ERA model, with practices that improved over time. Their experiences thus offer 
important lessons on operational approaches, both pointing to some approaches 
that are worth emulating in future programmes like ERA and others that should 
be avoided. 
Is ERA achieving its ultimate objectives? The results so far are encouraging. Lone 
parents in the ERA group worked more than they would have in the absence of the 
programme – especially in full-time jobs – and this led to substantial improvements 
in their average earnings during the two years after they entered the programme. 
Moreover, these effects are larger than most of those observed within a similar 
time frame among pilot retention and advancement programmes in the US. There 
is little evidence so far that ERA has helped participants succeed any more than 
they would have without the programme in obtaining or advancing to higher-
wage or ‘better’ jobs (according to other criteria). However, ERA did increase their 
participation in training or education while employed. That effect, along with the 
continuing career advice and assistance that participants received while in work 
during the second follow-up year, might help them achieve better jobs in the 
future.
All participants were still enrolled in ERA at the end of the two-year period covered 
by this report’s impact analysis and would remain enrolled for another nine months. 
Some were still in training programmes. Therefore, the findings available so far are 
necessarily of an interim nature. This fact, plus the recognition that retention and 
advancement can take a long time to unfold, makes a longer-term perspective 
essential for producing a full and fair assessment of ERA’s potential. 
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Fortunately, the evaluation of ERA will continue for several more years. Administrative 
data on employment, earnings and benefits receipt will be collected for three 
additional years, allowing researchers the opportunity to estimate ERA’s impacts 
on those outcomes for a total of five years after sample members entered the 
study. This will show whether ERA’s early positive impacts grow, remain the same 
or decline over time. In addition, a fifth-year customer survey will be administered, 
allowing for an assessment of the programme’s longer-term effects on a broader 
range of advancement outcomes, as well as on child poverty and family quality-of-
life indicators. Efforts will also be made to learn more about the relative influence 
that particular ERA components, such as its financial incentives, may have had on 
ERA’s impacts. 
The continuing evaluation will include a full benefit-cost analysis. Interim benefit-
cost estimates, showing the return on the Government’s investment in ERA, along 
with the overall economic gain or loss experienced by ERA’s participating families, 
will be issued beginning in early 2009. These estimates will be updated and 
refined as more data become available. In addition, special analyses may attempt 
to estimate the costs and benefits likely to be observed in a national roll-out of 
ERA. The final results from the impact and benefit-cost analyses will be available 
in early 2011. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, ERA’s two-year impact findings for the New Deal 25 
Plus (ND25+) target group are presented in a separate report. Those findings are 
less positive than the results for the lone parent customer groups. Overall, there is 
less reason at this time to expect that ERA will turn out to be a worthwhile strategy 
for assisting that customer group, although the interim results do include some 
indications that effects might grow stronger over time. For the ND25+ customers, 
as for the two lone parent groups, a more definitive assessment will be made after 
longer-term follow-up data are collected. 
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Table A. Data sources used for the ERA process and impact  
 studies
Data source Sample Time period and coverage
Qualitative data
Four rounds of in-
depth staff interviews 
(87 interviews in total)
Round 1 : 3 staff interviewed per site. 
Round 2 : 6 staff interviewed per site; plus ERA 
manager interviews (one per site)
Round 3 : One small focus group of 3-4 staff per site.
Round 4 : One small focus group of 3-4 staff per site; 
plus interviews with 8 ERA managers.
Round 1 : May/June 2004. 
Round 2 : May/June 2005. 
Round 3 : May/June 2006.
Round 4 : May/June 2007.
Interviews with key 
informants
Technical Advisers : Two rounds of interviews and a 
two-day debriefing.
DWP Project Team : Two rounds with 6 interviews 
each.
Technical Advisers : March 
2004 and June 2005. 
DWP Project Team:  March 
2004 and May 2006.
Technical Adviser 
diaries
Weekly diaries detailing ERA implementation issues. September 2003 to June 2005.
Site visits and 
observations
Several rounds of site visits conducted in conjunction 
with the staff in-depth interviews and on an ad-hoc 
basis.  The qualitative team also observed managers' 
meetings and continuous improvement workshops.
Visits to each site in March 
2004, May 2004, May 2005, 
and June 2006.  Several other 
visits to individual sites 
occurred throughout 
programme implementation.




Round 1 : 8 customers interviewed per site.
Round 2 : 15 customers interviewed per site.
Round 3 : 22 customers interviewed per site.
Round 4 : 6 customers interviewed per site.
Round 5 : Follow-up interviews with some customers.
Round 1: March 2004.
Round 2: November 2004.
Round 3: Autumn 2005.
Round 4: Autumn 2006.
Round 5: Spring 2007.
Staff surveys
Two rounds of staff 
surveys
Round 1 : 74 Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs) 
and 165 Personal Advisers replied to the survey.
Response rate across both groups of 70 per cent. 
Round 2 : 90 ASAs replied to the survey.  Response 
rate of 81 per cent.
Round 1 : January 2004.
Round 2 : January 2006.
(continued)




Data source Sample Time period and coverage
Customer surveys
Surveys administered 
to programme and 
control group 
customers 12 months 
after random 
assignment
A randomly selected subsample of programme and 
control group sample members randomly assigned 
between December 2003 and November 2004.
NDLP group:  2,604 respondents, representing a 
response rate of  87 per cent.
WTC group : 1,344 respondents, representing a 
response rate of  93 per cent.
Surveys were administered 
between December 2004 and 
February 2006 and covered 




to programme and 
control group 
customers 24 months 
after random 
assignment
A subsample of programme and control group sample 
members randomly assigned between December 2003 
and November 2004 that responded to the 12-month 
customer survey.
NDLP group:  2,297 respondents, representing a 
response rate of 76.7 per cent.
WTC group:  2,119 respondents, representing a 
response rate of 78.9 per cent.
Surveys were administered 
between November 2005 and 
March 2007 and covered the 




DWP benefits receipt 
data from the Master 
Index database, the 
Generalised Matching 
Service (GMS) 




All NDLP and WTC sample members. Benefits receipt records :
October 2001 to March 2007.
DWP employment data 
from the Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal 
Study (WPLS).
All NDLP sample members. Employment  records:
October 2003 to March 2007.
DWP earnings data 
from the WPLS. 
All NDLP sample members. Earnings records:
April 2005 to March 2006.
(continued)
Tabl  A.1 (continued)
Data source Sample Time period and coverage
Bonus receipt data
DWP data on ERA 
customers' receipt of 
the retention and 
training bonuses




All sample members. October 2003 to April 2005




Non-response analysis for the 
two-year customer survey
The analysis in this report focuses on the 9,602 Jobcentre Plus customers who were 
randomly assigned to the programme or control group in the UK Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) study between October 2003 and April 2005. 
This group is referred to as the full sample in the following tables. Many of the 
impacts presented in this report come from responses to a customer survey. The 
first wave of the survey covered the first 12 months since random assignment and 
the second wave covered the second 12 months. Due to the time and resources 
required to conduct the survey, not every customer was selected to participate. 
Instead, a subset of the full sample was randomly selected to participate in 
the survey and represent the larger group. This subset came from the pool of 
customers randomly assigned between December 2003 and November 2004. This 
group is referred to as the fielded sample. However, several customers selected 
to participate in the survey could not be located, refused to participate or could 
not be interviewed. Sample members who were unable to participate in the survey 
are referred to as non-respondents, while those members who completed the 
survey are referred to as respondents. Those customers who did not respond 
to the first wave of the survey were not approached in the second wave. Since 
a large proportion of Working Tax Credit (WTC) customers were not recruited 
into the sample until after the 12-month survey was administered, the first wave 
survey sample was relatively small; therefore, a second sample was fielded from 
the WTC group customers who were randomly assigned between December 2004 
and January 2005 and added to the original fielded sample for the 24-month 
survey. These customers were asked about their experiences during the first two 
years since random assignment and were included in most of the survey outcomes 
presented in this report118.
118 These survey respondents are omitted from estimates of participation in 
activities or services that examine the first and second years of follow-up 
separately since these customers were only asked about their experiences 
over the full two-year period.
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This appendix assesses the extent to which the respondent sample is representative 
of the full sample and whether the impacts estimated using the responses to the 
survey can be regarded as applying equally to the full sample. To preview the key 
results, the level of survey response was very high and tended to be particularly 
associated with certain characteristics. However, there was no evidence of bias 
resulting from basing estimates on the respondents sample; on the contrary, the 
available evidence suggests that estimates based on the respondent sample agree 
with estimates based on the full sample.
B.1 Response rates
Response rates are very high by conventional standards, especially considering 
that those who did not respond to the first wave of the survey were not contacted 
for the second wave. This increases confidence that the results estimated for 
respondents will hold for the full sample. Table B.1 shows that there are 6,787 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) customers in the full sample. Of those, 2,995 
were selected to be in the fielded sample and 2,297 of these responded to the 
second-year survey, yielding a 77 per cent response rate. The WTC group has a 
full sample of 2,815, a fielded sample of 2,686, a respondent sample of 2,119 
and a response rate of 79 per cent. (Survey sample sizes by target group, research 
group, and district are presented in Table B.2.)
Table B. Survey response rates for the 24-month customer  
 survey










Full sample size 6,787 3,365 3,422 2,815 1,415 1,400
Fielded sample size 2,995 1,482 1,513 2,686 1,342 1,344
Respondent sample size 2,297 1,188 1,109 2,119 1,082 1,037
Non-respondent sample size 698 294 404 567 260 307
Response rate (%) 76.7 80.2 73.3 *** 78.9 80.6 77.2 **
NDLP WTC
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from the ERA 24-month customer survey.
NOTE: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
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Table B.2 Survey respondent sample size, by customer group  
 and district
B.2 Comparison of impact estimates from  
 administrative records
Despite these high response rates, it is still possible that impact estimates for the 
group for which survey data are available may not agree with impact estimates 
based on the full sample. Although survey data are not available for the full sample, 
employment, earnings and benefits data from administrative records are. Using 
these administrative records, estimates based on the full and fielded samples can 
be compared with estimates based on the respondent sample. This provides an 
insight into whether estimates based on the smaller (respondent) sample can be 
regarded as unbiased estimates for the full sample. Should this be the case for 
the outcomes held in administrative records, we can be more confident that the 
impact estimates for the outcomes available only in the survey data also apply to 
the full sample.
Table B.3 contains impact estimates from the administrative records data for the 
number of months receiving benefits and the number of months employed in the 
first and second years after random assignment, as well as average earnings for the 
2005-2006 tax year for the full and respondent samples. The NDLP group shows 
negative impacts on benefits for all time periods and sample groups. While all 
three time periods show statistically significant impacts for the full and respondent 
samples, only the first-year outcome is statistically significant for the fielded 
sample119. The three samples show statistically significant impacts on earnings, 
though the magnitude of the impact is slightly larger for the respondent sample. 
119 However, the impact on the number of months employed in the two years 
of follow-up for the fielded sample is nearly significant with a p-value of 
.128.
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ERA Control ERA Control
District group group group group
East Midlands 221 207 616 607
London 194 176 79 74
North East England 214 194 102 98
North West England 200 185 69 61
Scotland 178 171 121 109
Wales 181 176 95 88
Total 1,188 1,109 1,082 1,037
NDLP WTC
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from the ERA 12-month customer survey.
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This is due to a higher level of earnings in the programme group but also a lower 
level of earnings in the control group for the respondent sample when compared 
to the other samples. There are no impacts on employment for any sample. The 
WTC group shows consistently statistically insignificant impacts on benefits across 
samples. Employment and earnings data from administrative records were not 
available for the WTC group, due to reasons mentioned in Chapter 2. Overall, the 
comparison of administrative records shows very similar impact estimates for the 
full sample and the respondent sample for both customer groups. This is the best 
available test of whether the respondent sample is capable of delivering unbiased 
impact estimates and the strong suggestion is that it is reasonable to generalise 
the survey response findings to the full sample.
Table B.3 Comparison of impacts on the benefits receipt and  
 employment of the full sample and the respondent  
 sample, estimated using administrative records















Number of months on benefits
1-12 months post-RAa 7.4 7.8 -0.4 *** 0.9 0.9 0.0
13-24 months post-RA 5.4 5.7 -0.3 ** 1.0 1.0 0.0
1-24 months post-RA 12.8 13.5 -0.7 *** 1.9 1.9 0.0
Number of months employed
1-12 months post-RA 4.5 4.4 0.1 n/a n/a
13-24 months post-RA 4.9 4.9 0.0 n/a n/a
1-24 months post-RA 9.4 9.3 0.1 n/a n/a
Earnings in the 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,676 3,315 361 *** n/a n/a
Sample size 3,365 3,422 1,415 1,400
Fielded Sample
Number of months on benefits
1-12 months post-RA 7.4 7.7 -0.3 ** 0.9 0.9 0.0
13-24 months post-RA 5.5 5.7 -0.2 1.0 1.0 0.0
1-24 months post-RA 12.9 13.3 -0.5 1.9 1.9 0.0
Number of months employed
1-12 months post-RA 4.5 4.5 0.0 n/a n/a
13-24 months post-RA 4.9 5.1 -0.2 n/a n/a
1-24 months post-RA 9.3 9.5 -0.2 n/a n/a
Earnings in the 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,649 3,219 431 ** n/a n/a
Sample size 1,482 1,513 1,342 1,344
(continued)
NDLP WTC
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Table B.3 Continued
B.3 Comparison of baseline characteristics
It is of interest to understand the factors influencing whether an individual in the 
fielded sample responds to the survey. To some extent, this can be explored by 
comparing the characteristics of respondents with those of non-respondents. 
Tables B.4 and B.5 present means of selected baseline characteristics by customer 
group for the full sample, the fielded sample and for respondents and non-
respondents to the survey. Statistically significant differences between the 
characteristics of respondents and non-respondents are denoted by asterisks in 
the table. Overall, respondents and non-respondents are statistically significantly 
different in a number of regards. This is common in surveys and may have a variety 
of explanations. For example, members of the fielded sample who have ties to a 
community through family are easier to locate for survey participation than those 
who do not, so it is not surprising that response rates are higher among those 
who are married or who have more than one child. 















Number of months on benefits
Year 1 7.3 7.8 -0.5 *** 0.9 0.9 0.0
Year 2 5.4 5.9 -0.5 ** 0.9 1.0 0.0
Years 1-2 12.7 13.7 -1.0 *** 1.8 1.9 0.0
Number of months employed
Year 1 4.6 4.4 0.2 n/a n/a
Year 2 5.0 5.1 0.0 n/a n/a
Years 1-2 9.6 9.4 0.2 n/a n/a
Earnings in the 2005-2006 tax year (£) 3,799 3,185 615 *** n/a n/a
Sample size 1,188 1,109 1,082 1,037
NDLP WTC
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey employment, earnings, and benefits 
data and the ERA 24-month customer survey.
NOTES: Benefits refers to Income Support for New Deal for Lone Parents customers and a combination of 
Jobseeker's Allowance and Income Support for Working Tax Credit customers.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
aRA refers to random assignment. 
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Table B.4 Comparison of the baseline characteristics of the full  
 sample and the survey sample for NDLP customers 
Respondents Non-respondents
Full Fielded to 24-month to 24-month 
Characteristic sample sample survey survey
District (%)
East Midlands 16.7 16.7 18.5 10.5 ***
London 16.7 16.6 15.4 20.9 ***
North East England 16.6 16.7 17.1 15.5
North West England 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7
Scotland 16.7 16.7 15.7 19.8 **
Wales 16.6 16.7 16.7 16.6
Date of random assignment (RA) (%)
October 2003 - December 2003 9.9 3.7 3.8 3.5
January 2004 - March 2004 30.4 34.5 34.9 33.1
April 2004 - June 2004 21.3 24.5 24.6 24.1
July 2004 - September 2004 23.6 25.8 25.3 27.4
October 2004 - December 2004 12.7 11.5 11.4 12.0
January 2005 - April 2005 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Female (%) 94.9 94.5 95.2 92.1 ***
Single (%) 72.6 72.9 71.3 78.4 ***
Number of children (%)
None 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
One 53.5 54.2 53.4 57.0 *
More than one 45.5 44.7 45.5 41.9 *
Education (%)
O-level 47.0 47.2 46.7 48.6
A-level or above 21.9 22.1 23.5 17.2 ***
Other 7.5 7.2 7.5 6.4
None 23.7 23.6 22.3 27.9 ***
Number of months worked in three years prior to RA (%)
12 or fewer 72.2 71.9 71.8 72.2
13 - 24 13.2 13.0 12.8 13.9
More than 24 14.6 15.1 15.5 13.9
Worked in the past year (%) 30.4 29.3 29.8 27.6
Age (%)
Under 30 42.1 42.7 41.6 46.3 **
30 - 39 39.3 39.3 39.9 37.5
40 or older 18.6 18.0 18.5 16.3
Age of youngest child (%)
Under 8 64.4 65.2 65.0 65.8
8-12 22.9 22.1 22.2 21.8
13-16 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.3
(continued)
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Table B.4 ContinuedAppendix Table B.4 (continued)
Respondents Non-respondents
Full Fielded to 24-month to 24-month 
Characteristic sample sample survey survey
Ethnic minority (%) 12.7 12.7 12.3 13.8
Weekly earnings in the past year for 
current/most recent job (£) 28.8 27.7 27.6 27.8
Average number of months on benefits in 
the two years prior to RA (%) 17.2 17.1 17.1 17.4
Sample size 6,787 2,995 2,297 698
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, ERA 24-month 
customer survey, and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records. 
NOTES: Benefits refers to Income Support.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the respondent group and the non-
respondent group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per 
cent.
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Table B.5 Comparison of the baseline characteristics of the full  
 sample and the survey sample for WTC customers
Respondents Non-respondents
Full Fielded to 24-month to 24-month 
Characteristic sample sample survey survey
District (%)
East Midlands 56.3 58.9 57.7 63.3 **
London 8.0 7.3 7.2 7.4
North East England 9.9 9.2 9.4 8.3
North West England 6.5 6.7 6.1 8.6 **
Scotland 10.9 9.9 10.9 6.4 ***
Wales 8.4 8.1 8.6 6.0 **
Date of random assignment (RA) (%)
October 2003 - December 2003 2.7 1.1 1.3 0.5
January 2004 - March 2004 10.7 11.0 12.6 5.3 ***
April 2004 - June 2004 9.2 9.6 10.6 6.2 ***
July 2004 - September 2004 14.1 14.7 15.6 11.3 ***
October 2004 - December 2004 37.1 38.6 39.6 34.9 **
January 2005 - April 2005 26.2 24.9 20.4 41.8 ***
Female (%) 97.4 97.3 97.6 96.5
Single (%) 45.1 44.3 42.7 50.3 ***
Number of children (%)
None 1.6 1.5 1.2 2.4 **
One 50.0 49.5 48.9 51.7
More than one 48.4 49.1 49.9 46.0 *
Education (%)
O-level 45.0 44.3 43.7 46.7
A-level or above 30.7 30.7 31.8 26.6 **
Other 12.2 12.4 12.7 11.6
None 12.1 12.5 11.9 15.0 **
Number of months worked in three years prior to RA (%)
12 or fewer 12.8 12.0 12.0 12.0
13 - 24 12.9 12.7 12.6 13.1
More than 24 74.4 75.3 75.4 75.0
Worked in the past year (%) 97.4 97.7 97.5 98.4
Age (%)
Under 30 17.0 16.9 15.2 23.2 ***
30 - 39 47.1 47.0 47.3 45.9
40 or older 35.9 36.1 37.5 30.9 ***
Age of youngest child (%)
Under 8 43.8 43.7 42.2 49.3 ***
8-12 30.6 30.9 31.9 27.4 **
13-16 20.1 20.0 20.8 17.3 *
(continued)
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Table B.5 Continued
Since some of these characteristics may be correlated – for example, education and 
weekly earnings – multiple regression is used to determine which characteristics 
differ statistically significantly across respondents and non-respondents while taking 
all other characteristics into account. Table B.6 shows the results of regressing an 
indicator of response status on the characteristics shown in Tables B.4 and B.5, as 
well as an indicator of research group, in order to better understand the process 
governing response. The ‘parameter estimate’ column captures the effect of each 
characteristic on the probability of responding to the survey; asterisks denote the 
significance level of this effect.
Appendix Table B.5 (continued)
Respondents Non-respondents
Full Fielded to 24-month to 24-month 
Characteristic sample sample survey survey
Ethnic minority (%) 7.8 7.5 7.3 8.3
Weekly earnings in the past year for 
current/most recent job (£) 116.7 117.1 117.3 116.1
Average number of months on benefits in 
the two years prior to RA (%) 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Sample size 2,815 2,686 2,119 567
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, ERA 24-month 
customer survey, and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records. 
NOTES: Benefits refers to a combination of Jobseeker's Allowance and Income Support.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the respondent group and the non-
respondent group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per 
cent.











Treatment status 0.068 0.015 *** 0.033 0.015 **
District (%)
East Midlands 0.142 0.028 *** 0.017 0.032
North East England 0.085 0.028 *** 0.009 0.040
North West England 0.072 0.027 *** 0.010 0.042
Scotland 0.020 0.028 0.062 0.040
Wales 0.064 0.028 ** 0.044 0.042
Date of random assignment (RA) (%)
January 2004 - March 2004 -0.001 0.042 0.005 0.076
April 2004 - June 2004 -0.005 0.043 -0.029 0.077
July 2004 - September 2004 -0.026 0.042 -0.051 0.076
October 2004 - December 2004 -0.028 0.046 -0.082 0.074
January 2005 - April 2005 n/a n/a -0.249 0.075 ***
Female (%) 0.120 0.035 *** 0.092 0.048 *
Single (%) -0.056 0.019 *** -0.032 0.018 *
Number of children (%)
One -0.029 0.075 0.154 0.066 **
More than one -0.017 0.075 0.172 0.066 ***
Education (%)
O-level 0.042 0.020 ** 0.032 0.025
A-level or above 0.107 0.023 *** 0.069 0.027 ***
Other 0.081 0.033 ** 0.072 0.031 **
Number of months worked in three years prior 
to RA (%)
12 or fewer 0.007 0.026 -0.016 0.029
13 - 24 -0.020 0.029 -0.003 0.025
Worked in the past year (%) 0.038 0.027 -0.051 0.055
Age (%)
30 - 39 0.017 0.020 0.057 0.025 **
40 or older 0.025 0.027 0.077 0.029 ***
Age of youngest child under 8 years (%) 0.004 0.020 -0.020 0.018
Ethnic minority (%) -0.008 0.026 0.010 0.031
Weekly earnings in the past year for 
current/most recent job (£) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of months on benefits in the two years
prior to RA 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
Sample size 2,995 2,686
(continued)
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Table B. Treatment/control status as a predictor of survey  
 response
Append x Table B.6 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, ERA 12- and 24-
month customer surveys, and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records. 
NOTES: Data include only the fielded sample.
     Benefits refers to Income Support for New Deal for Lone Parents customers and a combination of Jobseeker's 
Allowance and Income Support for Working Tax Credit customers.
     Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
     Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
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The results show that many of the characteristics that differed by response status 
in Tables B.4 and B.5 were not statistically significant predictors of response status 
in the multiple regression analysis. Still, several characteristics remained statistically 
significant predictors for both groups, including treatment status, cohort, gender, 
marital status and education. Overall, although some differences in characteristics 
between the respondents and non-respondents still exist, the similarities of the 
earnings, employment, and benefits impacts from administrative records across 
samples suggests that response bias is unlikely. 
B.4 Conclusion
The survey achieved a remarkably high response rate and the available evidence 
suggests that the impact estimates based on the respondents sample hold for 
the full sample. As expected, there are some characteristics that differ between 
respondents and non-respondents, but this does not necessarily indicate bias. 
Taken as a whole, the assessments presented in this appendix support the 
interpretation of the impact estimates presented in this report as representative of 
the full sample.




Implementation features of 
ERA districts
Table C. Implementation features of the six ERA districts
East Midlands
Structure Centralised management through Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) District Manager. Three regional Advancement 
Support Adviser (ASA) Managers phased in between 2004 and 2005, 
covering 19 offices among them. Three District Adviser Managers were 
in place from April 2005 to March 2007, running three teams of ASAs 
(north, central, and south). This structure remained until April 2007, 
when it was reduced to two teams (north and south). 
Staffing Initially, ASAs were specialists for ERA customer groups but increasingly 
served all customer groups. A single ASA worked in smaller offices. 
Some peripatetic advisers experienced downtime travelling between 
multiple offices. Central management assured the ring-fencing of adviser 
resources, although in smaller offices advisers performed occasional 
mainstream adviser duties.
Intake Mainstream New Deal advisers performed random assignment and 
passed on programme group customers to ASAs. Intake of Working Tax 
Credit (WTC) customer group was the largest of all districts, concentrated 
at end-of-intake period.
Targets Little pressure on ASAs to contribute to Job Entry Targets (JET) meant 
more time could be devoted to delivering ERA. ASA benchmarks for 
post-employment contact introduced in early 2005 but were quickly 
relaxed and a flexible approach assumed. Key Work Objectives for 
ASAs introduced in 2005 and a post-employment Quality Assurance 
Framework (QAF) for post-employment interviews in early 2006.
ERA profile ERA considered to have lower profile than Incapacity Benefit (IB) 
Pathways pilot. Given centralised management, less understanding of, 
and support for, ERA from Business Managers.
Continued
Appendices – Implementation features of ERA districts
20
Table C. Continued
Events Closure of pensions centre in district in summer 2004 led to 
redeployment of staff to ERA. From end 2004, pressures on office space 
meant some ASAs lost customer-facing desks. Regional ASA managers 
phased in between 2004 and 2005 due to large size of district. New ERA 
manager assigned in autumn 2004. New District Manager appointed in 
early 2005.
Issues Large geographical district made staffing and management difficult. 
Large customer caseloads in bigger offices detracted from ERA delivery, 
with major pressure on staffing during summer 2004. Large proportion 
of ASAs had no previous advisory experience because they were 
redeployed from other parts of the organisation following restructuring. 
Pressures on office space had mixed impacts: In larger city offices ASAs 
relocated to separate premises as ‘ERA unit’; in some smaller offices ASAs 
had to ‘hot desk’.
Achievements Centralised ERA management structure effective for maintaining and 
protecting programme resources. Innovative marketing to attract 
sufficient numbers to the WTC customer group. Promoted work 
retention and advancement concepts early in implementation. System 
of regional ASA managers facilitated contact between ASAs and the 
development of mechanisms for monitoring and supporting ASAs’ post-
employment work.
Change over time Most effective period of ERA delivery from spring 2005 to end 2006. 
Adequate management structure and staffing in place by then, plus 
intake had finished. Through training and peer support, more effective 
strategies for engaging and working with post-employed customers had 
developed. From end 2006, the transfer of caseloads between advisers 
as ASAs left meant that the quality of contact was diminished; also ASAs 
anxious about their post-ERA employment opportunities.
ERA ending Due to centralised structure and specialist ASAs, difficult to manage 
reducing caseloads. ERA manager consulted individual ASAs on when 
they wanted to leave and drew up a plan for passing caseloads to 
those advisers staying the longest so that customers would not have 
a succession of advisers. ASAs experienced this as unsettled period 
when having to take on new customers with minimal time left to build 
a relationship. Six-month and three-month ERA ending letters sent out 
to customers, with three-month letters eliciting the most interest from 
customers.
London
Structure Until the formation of a Post-Employment Team (PET), management 
structure differed depending on the New Deal customer group. The 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and WTC ASAs were coordinated 
and managed centrally. The New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) ASAs were 
coordinated at the district level but line-managed at the office level. 
Staffing Initially, some resistance to staffing ERA. ASAs were specialists by ERA 
customer groups. NDLP ASAs served both control and programme 
group. Ring-fencing of the PET started in early 2005. Non-working ERA 
customers were then served by a pre-employment team. 
Intake Lone parents randomly assigned by NDLP advisers (who also delivered 
ERA). ND25+ randomly assigned by mix of ASAs and support staff.
Continued
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Table C. Continued
Targets Same JET applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. Once 
the PET was formed, ASAs were assigned benchmarks and key work 
objectives.
ERA profile Perceived to be low because post-employment delivery of ERA did not 
contribute to JET. 
Events New District Manager in spring 2004. PET formed in early 2005. 
Issues Tension with JET. Large customer caseloads and mainstream Jobcentre 
Plus work. These reduced when the PET was set up, when advisers had 
manageable caseloads and no mainstream Jobcentre Plus work.
Achievements In spring 2005, District Manager agreed to commit more resources to 
ERA. Established PET in 2005. Developed innovative customer  
re-engagement publicity materials. 
Change over time Setting up the PET was a major breakthrough. The first few months were 
taken up with processing retention payments that had fallen behind. 
In May 2005 more advisers joined the team, the backlog had been 
cleared, and ASAs thought that from this time ERA delivery improved 
continuously right until the end. This was especially evident with training 
take-up.
ERA ending In March 2007, caseloads again became an issue when ERA customers 
moved off the project. ASAs talked about the difficulty of taking on new 
customers as they were nearing the end of ERA. ERA ending letters sent 
out to customers. ‘Rush’ of customers wanted to take advantage of the 
training. 
North East England
Structure Centralised ERA District Manager but without line management 
responsibility for ASAs. ASAs line-managed locally and remained part 
of office ND25+ or NDLP teams. A number of reorganisations of NDLP 
management took place over course of ERA, shifted from local to district 
level management and back again. NDLP ASAs report having 13 different 
line managers over a three-year period.
Staffing ASAs were specialists by ERA customer group. The district experienced 
problems generating interest in the ASA posts and had to undertake a 
number of awareness sessions for advisers highlighting the role of the 
ASA. The district staffing situation up to 2006 caused problems, as if 
the full ERA allocation was used, then the district would have been left 
with no ND25+ advisers and very few NDLP advisers. A management 
decision was made on the resource allocation and after discussions 
with advisers, agreement was made to give staff ASA roles alongside 
other duties (especially in the smaller offices where full posts were not 
possible). Although no ASAs dealt with programme as well as control 
group customers, all ASAs had at times served customers who were not 
involved in ERA at all. 
Intake Random assignment performed by both New Deal and ERA advisers.
Targets ASAs expected to contribute to district JET, but their targets were half 
those of New Deal advisers.
ERA profile Perceived to be low; IB Pathways pilot given more priority. Priority in the 
district dipped after Technical Adviser (TA) left, reflected in a winding 
down of district ASA meetings.
Continued
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Table C. Continued
Events District without TA support during spring 2004. Reorganisation in spring 
2006 split the district in half.
Issues Concentration on ERA work suffered due to tension with JET, large 
customer caseloads, and mainstream Jobcentre Plus work. Contact 
between ASAs diminished after TA finished in mid-2005. Perceived to be 
ineffective support for ASAs by line managers, exacerbated by numerous 
management reorganisations for NDLP.
Achievements Most ASAs ring-fenced during 2005, some for longer. Individual ASAs 
developed innovative ways of working with employed customers but not 
always shared or co-ordinated throughout the district.
Change over time ERA delivery most effective during 2005: Majority of ASAs ring-fenced; 
regular networking meetings between ASAs and TA provided district-
wide support for ASAs. Visit of ASAs to New York in 2004 also stimulated 
development of tactics for post-employment customer engagement. 
From end 2005, network meetings dwindled and some ASAs lost ring-
fencing. TA remained as line manager in one office for another year, 
where consequently ASAs felt better supported.
ERA ending ASAs remained part of mainstream ND25+ and NDLP teams and so 
simply took on additional mainstream customers as ERA caseloads 
diminished. However, ASAs in some teams concerned about overstaffing 
and being surplus to requirements. Six-month, six-week and final ERA 
ending letters sent. Some customers responded to six-week letter with 
requests for training payments.
North West England
Structure Centralised ERA District Manager but ASAs locally line-managed at the 
office level. 
Staffing ASAs were generalists and served all customer groups. Ring-fencing of a 
PET started in 2005 when working customer caseloads were assigned to 
ASAs, while non-working customers were assigned to administrative staff 
who performed job search activities. 
Intake Random assignment performed by mix of New Deal and ERA advisers. All 
ASAs and New Deal advisers were given full intake training.
Targets Same JET applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. Once 
the PET was formed, ASAs were assigned benchmarks and key work 
objectives. 
ERA profile Perceived to be low because post-employment delivery of ERA did not 
contribute to JET. 
Events Delayed start, three months later than other districts. Was a priority 
district from the start of ERA until March 2007. District reorganisation in 
April 2005. New District Manager in mid-2005. PET started in July 2005. 
Started to take on pre-employment caseloads in January 2006. Less 
securely ring-fenced spring 2006.
Issues Decentralised line management detracted from ERA delivery. Tensions 
with JET. 
Achievements Established PET in 2005. Developed innovative customer re-engagement 
publicity materials. ‘End of an ERA’ information pack distributed to 
customers nearing the end of their 33 months of support. 
Continued
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Table C. Continued
Change over time District felt it reached a peak in its delivery in January 2006, which was 
maintained for approximately nine months. Delivery started to tail off 
when staff started to exit from ERA and ring-fencing slowly dissolved 
from about March 2007. 
ERA ending Customers had contact letters at eight months, six months and three 
months to go; and then (as appropriate) a final letter and disengagement 
folder.
Scotland
Structure Management and budget decentralised to office level. No ERA District 
Manager. 
Staffing Some mixed, some specialist ASAs. Most offices had only one ASA. ASAs 
ring-fenced in two offices in spring 2005, while those remaining served 
non-ERA as well as ERA customers. 
Intake Random assignment performed by various New Deal, ASA and support 
staff. 
Targets Same JET applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. No ERA-
specific benchmarks.
ERA profile Perceived to be low. Upper and some local managers tended to favour IB 
Pathways pilot.
Events District reorganised in 2004. New District Manager in spring 2004. 
Change in ERA District Co-ordinator autumn 2005, then dissolution of 
role in autumn 2006 when office Business Managers asked to  
co-ordinate ERA management for office clusters. November 2005 held 
customer Town Hall events to encourage re-engagement.
Issues Decentralised line management detracted from ERA delivery. Office 
geographical distribution awkward for support and meetings. Tensions 
with JET. Large customer caseloads and mainstream Jobcentre Plus work. 
Other pilot given more priority. 
Achievements ASAs in some offices ring-fenced during 2005. 
Change over time Ongoing changes to district Jobcentre Plus structure brought in new 
senior management who needed to be apprised of ERA. Dissolution 
of TA and ERA District Co-ordinator roles put strain on support and 
communications across offices. By 2005, ASAs concentrated contact with 
working customers and felt that between spring 2005 and spring 2006 
programme delivery was at its strongest. 
ERA ending Disengagement letters at six months and one month prior to customers 
ending ERA. Preferential treatment was given to those who were 
engaged with the programme. ASAs increasingly absorbed into 
mainstream activity as ERA customers flowed off the programme.
Continued




Structure Centralised management. ERA District Manager also responsible for 
delivery of NDLP across the district. 
Staffing ASAs were specialists by ERA customer groups. A single ASA worked 
in smaller offices. Some peripatetic advisers experienced down time 
travelling between multiple offices. ASA staffing levels affected by 
long-term sick leave. Continual problems with staff being pulled onto 
mainstream Jobcentre Plus activities.
Intake Mainstream New Deal advisers performed random assignment and 
passed on programme group customers to ASAs.
Targets Same JET applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
Benchmarks for post-employment contact and key work objectives 
around advancement and retention from April 2004. 
ERA profile ERA perceived to be supported at office level but devalued at upper 
management level due to tensions with JET. 
Events Intake of New Deal customer groups ended in summer 2004. From 
March 2006 tended to work with only engaged customers as did not 
have the resources to re-engage customers. From August 2006 ASAs 
worked with only post-employment customers, with pre-employment 
going back to mainstream Jobcentre Plus.
Issues Tension with JET. Limited number of ND25+ ASAs. Understaffing, large 
customer caseloads and mainstream Jobcentre Plus work. 
Achievements Promoted work retention and advancement concepts early in the 
implementation. In spring 2004 established innovative advancement 
materials for use with non-working customers and set benchmarks for 
contacting working customers. 
Change over time Staff thought there had never been enough ASAs in the district. The 
most effective period of ERA delivery was from spring 2004 to spring 
2005. From May to September 2005 there was a big push on job entries 
in the district and ASAs struggled to do ERA work. From September 2005 
ASAs were supposed to be ring-fenced but they were still being asked 
to do other work and still did not have enough staff on ERA. In January 
2006 an ERA ‘team’ was formed but in March the team lost staff, the 
ASAs had a big caseload and worked only with ‘active’ customers. 
ERA ending Staffing reduced to just one ASA in spring 2007. Six-month, six-week 
and final ERA ending letters sent. Had responses to six-week letter, with 
some customers requesting retention payments backdated. Struggled 
with transferring caseloads and losing continuity with customers.
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Appendix D 
Patterns of pre-employment 
assistance 
Employment Retention and Advancement‘s (ERA’s) primary focus was on post-
employment services and activities but New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) customers 
began the programme with New Deal pre-employment services. Since most 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) sample members were already employed at random 
assignment, they did not generally participate in New Deal activities. However, 
members of both target groups could receive assistance from ERA in finding new 
employment if they lost a job during their involvement in the programme. 
Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs) were instructed to prompt customers 
to think about retention and advancement even before they started work. 
Nevertheless, the majority of ASAs initially saw ERA as an in-work programme 
and did little to promote ERA’s goals in the pre-employment phase. They reported 
that it felt premature to ask customers to start thinking about advancement 
until they were settled into a job. Therefore, while they did remind out-of-work 
customers of ERA’s financial incentives, they tended early on in the programme 
not to encourage customers to be selective in searching for a job and tended 
not to focus on long-term goals when creating the customers’ Advancement 
Action Plans. But by 2005, because of staff training and organisational changes, 
pre-employment programme services had changed substantially, as described in 
Chapter 3. ASAs used a wider and more nuanced definition of advancement, and 
they more often proactively encouraged customers to think about their long-term 
goals, including plans for advancement, before they entered work.
The customer survey data give some indication of how well this message was 
getting through to customers. About three quarters of the customers in the NDLP 
group120 who never worked during the first two years of follow-up were aware 
120 Only a very small number of WTC customers were never in work during the 
two-year follow-up period, so measures of awareness of the bonuses during 
the pre-employment phase are not reported.
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of the work retention bonus, while half were aware of the training bonus. This 
suggests that ASAs were relatively successful in building awareness during the 
pre-employment phase of ERA’s in-work incentives. 
The customer survey data also measure the receipt of help and advice while not 
in work and participation in activities to help customers find jobs or prepare for 
work. Table D.1 (top panel) shows that the level of help received and steps taken 
to prepare for work while unemployed is much higher overall for the NDLP group 
than for the WTC group. However, it is important to remember that almost all of 
the NDLP customers were not in work at some point during the first two years of 
follow-up, but that only a quarter of the WTC members were ever not in work 
during this period. 
Table D.1 (bottom panel) also makes it clear that ERA generally did not increase the 
likelihood that the programme group would make more pre-employment efforts 
to prepare for, or seek, work relative to the control group. In fact, among NDLP 
customers, the likelihood of being out of work and making such efforts were 
comparably high (71 per cent of the ERA group versus 69 per cent of the control 
group). Similarly, these rates were comparably low among WTC customers in the 
programme and control groups (15 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively), only a 
small portion of whom were actually out of work during the follow-up period. 
At the same time, ERA did appear to increase, by a small margin, the likelihood of 
individuals receiving some types of help or advice from Jobcentre Plus on matters 
pertaining to future work. In particular, they were more likely to receive help in 
looking for training courses, working out long-term goals and advice regarding 
ways to retain and advance in future jobs. Overall, among NDLP customers, 
70 per cent of the ERA group was out of work and received these and/or other 
forms of pre-employment assistance, compared with 65 per cent of the control 
group. Among WTC customers, the corresponding rates are 15 per cent and 12 
per cent, respectively.121
121 There is no evidence that ERA increased the likelihood that programme 
group members relative to controls would not work or spend more time out 
of work during the follow-up period. Therefore, the differences between 
the programme and control groups presented in Table D.1 are driven by 
differences in their work statuses.
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Table E. Frequency of various types of in-work contact with  
 Jobcentre Plus staff among customers who worked  
 within two years after random assignment
Table E.2 Nature of most recent in-work contact with Jobcentre  
 Plus staff among customers who had contact while  
 working during the second year after random  
 assignment
Appendices – Customers‘ contacts with Jobcentre Plus, receipt of help and advice  
and receipt of Emergency Discretion Fund and bonuses
ERA Control ERA Control
Outcome group group group group
Frequency of face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff (%)
None 31.2 66.3 27.1 86.1
Once or twice 20.7 17.7 17.5 9.4
3-9 times 32.8 12.7 39.3 3.7
10 or more times 15.2 3.2 16.0 0.8
Frequency of telephone contact with Jobcentre Plus staff (%)
None 33.4 72.5 28.5 85.6
Once or twice 20.5 14.9 17.1 8.3
3-9 times 31.1 9.2 34.3 5.0
10 or more times 14.9 3.4 20.0 1.0
Sample size 904 782 1,066 1,009
WTCNDLP
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
ERA Control ERA Control 
Outcome Group Group Group Group
Most recent contacta was with (%)
Respondent's adviser                    89.0 46.6 89.7 18.5
An adviser other than respondent's 8.1 27.9 4.9 37.4
A receptionist 0.0 15.9 3.3 19.3
A clerk               0.0 0.0 0.9 10.7
An intake worker               0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Someone else                      3.6 9.5 1.3 14.1
Average length of most recent conversation (minutes) 18.1 17.5 19.0 11.5
Length of last contact was typical (%) 69.3 85.5 74.9 75.5
Average length of longest conversation (minutes) 29.6 6.9 32.0 18.2
Sample Size 82 18 461 76
NDLP WTC
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 24-month customer survey.
NOTES:  Only customers who were interviewed after 26 September 2006 were included in this analysis.
aMost recent contact refers to most recent contact in the second year of follow-up only.
22
Table E.3 Customers’ experiences with Jobcentre Plus staff  
 among customers who worked within two years after  
 random assignment
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ERA Control ERA Control 
Outcome group group group group
Customer worked and had a particular Jobcentre Plus staff person
that she/he sought out (%) 68.7 29.9 69.7 6.8
For customers who worked and had a particular Jobcentre Plus staff
person they sought out:
Degree of effort staff person has made to get to know
customer (%)
A lot 71.0 60.0 67.9 60.0
Some 17.3 23.9 22.3 19.9
Little or none 11.7 16.1 9.7 20.1
Degree of support staff person has given to customer when
customer is working (%)
A lot 62.6 49.5 61.0 39.5
Some 22.6 24.2 25.0 22.0
Little or none 14.8 26.3 14.0 38.5
Among those who had contact with Jobcentre Plus staff, overall
assessment of help and advice given by the staff (%)
Very helpful 48.4 31.8 49.1 25.8
Quite helpful 37.5 44.6 36.9 37.6
Not very helpful 7.7 12.4 8.3 12.0
Not at all helpful 4.2 8.1 4.1 16.7
No advice received 2.2 3.1 1.6 8.0
Sample size 904 782 1,066 1,009
WTCNDLP
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
NOTE: A cohort of 869 Working Tax Credit customers were randomly assigned after December 2004 and only 
interviewed at the time of the 24-month customer survey. These survey respondents are omitted from estimates 
drawn from data taken at 12 and 24 months since random assignment.
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Table E.5 Receipt of ERA Emergency Discretion Fund payments
Outcome NDLP WTC
Within two years after random assignment
Received EDF payments (%) 15.9 16.0
Average number of payments received among customers with any payments 1.5 1.4




Four or more 4.9 3.5
Average amount of each EDF payment among customers with any payments (£) 179 168
Average total amount of EDF payments among customers with any payments (£) 235 206
Through July 2007a
Ever received EDF payments (%) 20.5 20.5
Average number of payments received among customers with any payments 1.6 1.5




Four or more 5.1 5.2
Average amount of each EDF payment among customers with any payments (£) 185 177
Average total amount of EDF payments among customers with any payments (£) 250 226
Received EDF assistance for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 3.9 3.4
Sample Size 3,365 1,415
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
NOTES: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned from October 2003 and April 2005, not 
just those who responded to the customer survey. 
aERA group customers were eligible to receive payments until December 2007. At present, financial incentives 
data are only available through July 2007. 
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Table E. Receipt of ERA employment retention bonuses
Outcome NDLP WTC
Within two years after random assignment
Received bonus (%) 27.8 34.5
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses 2.9 2.8








Ever received bonus (%) 32.1 41.5
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any
bonuses 3.5 3.4







Received bonus for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 3.8 5.9
Sample Size 3,365 1,415
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
NOTES: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned from October 2003 and April 2005, not 
just those who responded to the customer survey. 
aERA group customers were eligible to receive payments until December 2007; at present financial incentives 
data are only available through July 2007.
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Table E. ERA customers’ receipt of ERA training fee assistance  
 and training completion bonuses
Outcome NDLP WTC
Training/tuition fee asssistance
Received tuition fee assistance within two years after random assignment (%) 9.4 23.3
Average amount paid towards fees (£) 352 279
Ever received tuition fee assistance through July 2007 (%)a 14.9 31.1
Average amount paid towards fees (£) 387 296
Received tuition fee assistance for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 5.3 6.4
Training completion bonus
Within two years after random assignment
Received bonus (%) 7.4 19.5
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any
bonuses 1.5 1.6




Four or more 4.4 7.2
Average amount of each bonus among customers with any bonuses (£) 340 362
Average total amount of bonuses among customers with any bonuses (£) 436 491
Through July 2007a
Ever received bonus (%) 12.7 27.6
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any
bonuses 1.8 1.9




Four or more 7.2 9.5
Average amount of each bonus among customers with any bonuses (£) 392 379
Average total amount of bonuses among customers with any bonuses (£) 527 540
Received bonus for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 5.1 6.9
Sample Size 3,365 1,415
(continued)
Appendix Table E.7 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
NOTES: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned from October 2003 and April 2005, not 
just those who responded to the customer survey. 
aERA group customers were eligible to receive payments until December 2007; at present financial incentives 
data are only available through July 2007.
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Appendix F 
Effects of ERA on childcare 
use and child well-being
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